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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: The processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication have been changed. All indicators now begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

BULGARIA

Central Electoral Commission Members Appointed *[Sofia Radio]* 1
OPT, BSP Sign Cooperation Agreement *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Socialist Leader Views Caretaker Cabinet *[NOVINI 5 19 Oct]* 1
Ministers Stanchov, Leviev Sworn In *[Sofia Radio]* 2
Noev Rules Out 'Purge' at Defense Ministry *[TRUD 19 Oct]* 2
Nuclear Reactor Suffers 'Defect' *[Sofia Radio]* 2

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus on Romania, CEFTA, Middle East *[Prague Radio]* 3
More on Free Trade Agreement With Romania *[LIDOVE NOVINY 20 Oct]* 3
Results of Prime Minister's Asia Trip Viewed *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 20 Oct]* 4
Article Views Air Force Transformation *[LIDOVE NOVINY 20 Oct]* 4

SLOVAKIA

Chinese Deputy Minister Holds Talks in Bratislava *[PRAVDA 22 Oct]* 7
Poll Shows Meciar Again Most Trusted Politician *[SME 21 Oct]* 7
Meciar's Public Relations Methods Examined *[PRAGUE POST 4 Oct]* 7
HZDS Denies Rumor of 'Split' in Movement *[SMENA 21 Oct]* 9
Weiss: SNS Not Insisting on President's Recall *[PRAVDA 21 Oct]* 9
Weiss Views Coalition Talks With HZDS *[DENNIK 24 Oct]* 9
Luptak Explains Refusal To Join Government *[NARODNA OBRODA 17 Oct]* 10
Hungarian Leader on Postelectoral Situation *[RUDE PRAVO 17 Oct]* 11
18 Parties, Movements To Run in Local Elections *[DENNIK 24 Oct]* 13
State Not Paid for Arms Shipped to Angola *[PRAVDA 20 Oct]* 13
Anti-Gabcikovo Demonstration 'Peaceful' *[DENNIK 24 Oct]* 14

HUNGARY

Trade Minister Discusses Russian Debt Repayment *[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 22 Oct]* 15
Increased Agricultural Trade With Russia Expected *[NEPSZABADSAG 22 Oct]* 16
Minister Katona Discusses 'Terrorist's' Links *[Budapest Radio]* 17
Ethnic Federation Head Outlines Tasks *[NEPSZABADSAG 22 Oct]* 17
Finance Minister Comments on Talks With IMF *[Budapest Radio]* 18
TU Federation Sets Conditions for Social Accord *[Budapest TV]* 18
Survey Shows Decreasing Confidence in Ministers *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 22 Oct]* 18
SZDSZ Chairman on Coalition, Party Relations *[MAGYAR NEMZET 21 Oct]* 19
FIDESZ's Kover Addresses Center-Right Conference *[MAGYARORSZAG 9 Sep]* 20

POLAND

Counterintelligence To Present Drawsko Findings *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 26 Oct]* 23
General Staff After Drawsko *[GAZETA POLSKA 20 Oct]* 23
Conflict Goes On *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 25 Oct]* 24

Minister: No Intent To Resign *[Warsaw Radio]* 25
Walesa Interviewed on Presidential Rule *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 20 Oct]* 25
Poll: People Increasingly Critical of Cabinet *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 25 Oct]* 28
Conflicts Among Rightist Leaders Examined *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 26 Oct]* 29
PSL Bill on Parties, Campaign Financing Viewed *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 25 Oct]* 30

ROMANIA

Foreign 'Spies' Caught at Military Exercise *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 21 Oct]* 31
Iliescu, Others Celebrate Army Day *[Bucharest Radio]* 31
Former King Addresses Message to Army *[Bucharest Radio]* 31
Institute Reports on Smuggled Strontium-90 *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 22-23 Oct]* 32
Nuclear Plant Safety Discussed *[ADEVARUL 21 Oct]* 32
New Director at Army Industrial Corporation *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 21 Oct]* 33
Foreign Ministry Views Role of CSCE *[AZI 14 Oct]* 33

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Ganic, UN's Akashi Discuss Mt Igman Situation *[Zagreb TV]* 34
UN To Deploy Motorized Patrols on Igman Road *[AFP]* 34
UNPROFOR Rejects Demands for Rose Dismissal *[AFP]* 34
UNPROFOR: Karadzic To Lift Fuel Blockade *[AFP]* 35
Mladic: U.S. Making 'Mockery' of Human Rights *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 25 Oct]* 35
Federation Demands Sovereignty Over Ploce *[TANJUG]* 38
Karadzic Denies 'Secret Talks' on Land Exchanges *[NEDELJNA BORBA 22-23 Oct]* 38
Commentary on Juppe's 'Equal Treatment' Demand *[OSLOBODJENJE 20 Oct]* 39
5th Corps Commander Claims Victory Near Bihac *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40
Corps Continues Advance *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40
Four Villages Liberated *[Sarajevo Radio]* 41
Drekovic Congratulates 5th Corps *[Sarajevo Radio]* 41
7th Corps Lines Stable on Kupres Front *[Sarajevo Radio]* 42
Serbs Claim 70 Muslims Dead *[TANJUG]* 42
Serb Attacks on Sarajevo, Eastern Fronts Noted *[Sarajevo Radio]* 42

CROATIA

UNHCR Reports Croatia Blocking Fuel for Serbs *[TANJUG]* 43
Envoy Alleges Ties Between Bosnian, Croat Serbs *[Zagreb Radio]* 43
RSK Assembly Dismisses Parliamentary President *[TANJUG]* 43
New President Elected *[TANJUG]* 43
Defense Ministry Protests Serbian 'Deception' *[Zagreb Radio]* 43
UN Reports Croatia, RSK Honoring Cease-Fire *[TANJUG]* 44

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Gligorov Appeals For Election Participation *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 24 Oct]* 45
Opposition Announces Demands in Memorandum *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 25 Oct]* 45
Opposition Leaders on Need for Election Boycott *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 25 Oct]* 46
Government Session Assesses 1st Election Round *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 25 Oct]* 46
State Election Commission Meets Without Quorum *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 25 Oct]* 47
Alliance for Macedonia Election Platform *[MIC Sep]* 47
VMRO-DPMNE Election Platform *[MIC Sep]* 49

SLOVENIA

Drnovsek Initiates Action on EU Membership *[Ljubljana Radio]* 55
Drnovsek To Serve as Acting Foreign Minister *[Ljubljana Radio]* 55
Peterle Rejects Criticism of Aquileia Accord *[DELO 24 Oct]* 55
Ministry Confirms Peterle Received Bomb Threat *[Ljubljana Radio]* 55

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

De Lapresle Views UNPROFOR, NATO *[Paris LE MONDE 25 Oct]* 56
Envoy Sees Accord as 'Key' to Recognition *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 24 Oct]* 57
Kontic Announces Policy To Protect Exchange Rate *[Belgrade TV]* 57
SRS Leader Seselj Stripped of Immunity *[TANJUG]* 58

Serbia

'Secret Negotiations' Between Srpska, Croatia *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 21 Oct]* 58
Article Views Karadzic's 'Western Variant' *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 22 Oct]* 59
Authorities Downplay Dysentery 'Epidemic' *[BORBA 19 Oct]* 61

Kosovo

School Erects Wall To Separate Minority Pupils *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT 24 Oct]* 61

Central Electoral Commission Members Appointed

AU2510195094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 25 Oct 94

["Announcement by Valentin Stoyanov, spokesman of the President of the Republic of Bulgaria," on 25 October—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Good evening. By means of Decree 215 of 24 October, Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic of Bulgaria, has determined the electoral districts and their names and numbers.

By means of Decree 216 of 25 October, the president has approved the electoral rolls for the elections to be held on 18 December 1994.

At 1730 this evening President Zhelyu Zhelev signed Decree 217, under which he appointed the following members of the Central Electoral Commission:

Chairman: Lena Dzhelepova.

Deputy chairmen: Blagovest Punev and Petur Obretenov.

Secretary: Kharalampi Anchev.

Members: Mladen Chervenyakov, Valentin Korkinov, Aleksandur Petrov, Mikhail Konstantinov, Nikolay Volchanov, Dimitur Topliyski, Bogdan Tsanev, Dimitur Dimitrov, (Ralitsa Nagenchova), Nikola Tsonkov, Baycho Panev, Kuna Damyanova, Ganeta Minkova, Ognyan Atanasov, Ilyana Rizova, Nadezhda Doychinova, Kadir Kadir, Yordan Dardov, Ana Nikolova, Galina Marinska, and Todor Tsonev.

Last, here is a further announcement: Under Council of Ministers Decision No. 461 of 24 October 1994, the Central Electoral Commission is granted office accommodation at No. 2 Dondukov Boulevard in the east wing, Rooms 402-421 on the fourth floor, and Rooms 502-521 on the fifth floor. Thank you for your attention.

OPT, BSP Sign Cooperation Agreement

AU2510134294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Rumen Popov, chairman of the Fatherland Party of Labor [OPT], announced at a news conference that the OPT and the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] have signed an agreement on long-term cooperation. The two organizations have agreed to coordinate their political activity at the central level and at the level of municipalities, and to work out joint programs on socioeconomic development in specific regions of great importance to the country.

Popov confirmed that the OPT will participate in the elections on the ticket of the Patriotic Alliance. In addition to this, the party declared it supports cooperating in a preelection alliance with the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union.

At the news conference it became clear that the OPT has also signed an agreement with the Rightist Democratic Movement, and promised to include representatives of that movement in its election lists.

Socialist Leader Views Caretaker Cabinet

AU2510150394 Sofia NOVINI 5 in Bulgarian 19 Oct 94 p 8

[Interview with Bulgarian Socialist Party leader Zhan Videnov by Rozalina Evdokimova; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Evdokimova] Mr. Videnov, could you comment on the manner in which President Zhelev presented the caretaker cabinet?

[Videnov] I think he should have announced only the name of the caretaker prime minister. The big event is setting the date for the new elections. However, we and the president view the functions of the caretaker cabinet differently: For him this is serious power, which must resolve the country's problems within several months; for us, it is a provisional and undesirable situation in the executive power, which should last as shortly as possible and during which the executive power should deal with one subject only—the new elections. If I were in the president's place, I would have devoted less attention to the caretaker cabinet and more to the terms, organization, and resources of the new elections.

[Evdokimova] If we accept the claim that this is a caretaker cabinet which should only prepare the next elections, don't Dr. Zhelev's intentions imply that he could prolong the time before the next elections and postpone them until next year?

[Videnov] I do not believe that the president will directly violate the Constitution and postpone the elections until next year. The fact that the caretaker cabinet will continue to function another two months after the elections is a result of the transitional period, during which a government must be formed. I hope this period will not exceed two months.

[Evdokimova] Don't Dr. Zhelev's intentions imply that he supports the policy of a firm hand, in the person of Reneta Indzhova?

[Videnov] I have always been skeptical about the tall tales concerning the introduction of a dictatorship. One should not spread fantastic tales but instead check the real facts. Personally, at least until now, I have not discovered any practical evidence of moving toward dictatorship. The appointment of Mrs. Indzhova is disproof rather than proof of this. A cabinet headed by her could hardly be strong or power-oriented.

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[Evdokimova] Isn't it strange for a head of state to admit that a mafia and organized crime exist in the state he heads?

[Videnov] He also said there is a genocide taking place in the country. In neither of those two cases did he act as a statesman.

[Evdokimova] My last question refers to John Stanchov. Doesn't his presence in Dr. Zhelev's caretaker cabinet imply that the state processes in our country will be influenced from the outside?

[Videnov] This influence from the outside has not stopped in our country since 10 November 1989, and this applies to even the highest level. Therefore, the presence of Mr. Stanchov would hardly affect the existing situation. I am not sure about the issue of Stanchov's dual citizenship, so I will refrain from any commentary on this subject.

Ministers Stanchov, Leviev Sworn In

AU2510134994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The last two ministers of the caretaker cabinet—Foreign Minister Ivan Stanchov and Daniel Leviv, construction and territorial development minister—were sworn in by President Zhelev on 25 October. The two ministers have taken the oath by which they are obliged to observe Bulgaria's laws and Constitution. These two ministers were abroad when their colleagues from the caretaker cabinet were sworn in.

Noev Rules Out 'Purge' at Defense Ministry

AU2510152994 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 19 Oct 94 p 9

[Interview with Boyko Noev, minister of defense in the caretaker cabinet, by Nikola Kitsevski; place and date not given: "There Will Be No Purge in the Army"]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kitsevski] Considering the financial straits of the Bulgarian Army, how do you plan to ensure the Army's combat ability during the winter season?

[Noev] I do not want to deal with this issue because it is a painful one. In February-March, when I still was deputy minister of defense, I stated that 14 billion leva will reduce a 100,000-man Army to poverty. Unfortunately, those on whom the budget depended did not react. Whether or not they had the possibility of allocating more money to the Army is another issue. However, it was a matter of ethics not to try and utilize the issue for political goals once they understood that no additional funds would be allocated.

I have the assurance of the Defense Ministry financial experts that we will cope somehow until the end of the year. Last, funds were found to increase wages. I by no means want to claim credit for this, but because of a lucky coincidence, this will take place in the first days of my tenure.

The problems of the Air force are hardly a secret. However, this is only the most visible part, because aircraft crash, while tanks do not. This does not mean that the life of the soldiers in the tank troops is easier. However, to the extent that this depends on me, I will do everything possible to resolve as soon as possible the urgent problems of the Air Force.

[Kitsevski] Your colleague, Chavdar Chervenkov, promised that there will be no purge in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What about you?

[Noev] I have never supported purges, because I was the victim of one in 1992. Purges do not solve problems; they only satisfy people with complexes. A purge at the Ministry of Defense is out of the question. There is a natural process of filling up the ranks with young people and retiring older employees in the Ministry of Defense system. I do not think I could affect those cycles in the two months I will be defense minister. Personally, I do not intend to make any major personnel changes, and I plan no structural changes.

[Kitsevski] However, certain political forces interpreted the reforms [former Defense Minister] Valentin Aleksandrov started as a purge. This was also why you lost your post as deputy minister of defense. It was then that the accusations against you began. It is known that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] declared you a foreign spy.

[Noev] I would not like to identify by name any political force, first of all because I am not convinced that a political force is behind those things. A group of radical extremists, whose ideas of controlling the Armed Forces are rather primitive, was behind all this. I am deeply convinced that the ideas and actions of those people were not the ideas and actions of an entire political force. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Reactor Suffers 'Defect'

AU2510164194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Fire Service has announced that at 1140 a defect occurred as a result of a short circuit in a circuit breaker in the main switchboard of the No. 2 Reactor Unit at the Kozloduy nuclear power station. It was not necessary to use the fire-extinguishing apparatus. There were no casualties and no damage was caused to the adjacent equipment. The operation of the reactor unit was not interrupted.

The fire fighters who were immediately called out to attend to the incident carried out their work in conformance with the established procedures. They remained on duty while electric welding work was completed at the site following the removal of the defective circuit breaker.

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Klaus on Romania, CEFTA, Middle East

LD2510205894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1723 GMT 25 Oct 94

["Regular" interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Lucie Weissova; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Weissova] Prime Minister, the Romanian Government delegation is visiting the Czech Republic. [passage omitted] Can you tell us how important Romania is for us and what our relations with Romania are?

[Klaus] Romania is an important partner, and I think it is necessary to say this out loud. Romania is not a remote country. Romania is a country that has 22 million citizens. When we are looking for markets in China, Korea, and Indonesia, it would be rather nonsensical not to look for them nearer, nearer by tens of thousands of kilometers.

It is a country undergoing a complicated process in order to overcome the legacy that was, quite likely or almost certainly, much worse than ours. It is a country that did not end communism by a velvet revolution but, as we all very well know, by a very nonvelvet revolution. So we have to view today's transformation in Romania with understanding, and, similarly, we have to view their relatively high level of stability, the well-thought-out participation in international politics and in the difficult regions because Romania is rather close to Bosnia.

I think we should welcome the attempt to implement economic reform, which is progressing at a far slower pace than in our country, of course. It is interesting to hear that the Czech path is playing some role in it and that it is being (?applied) there. That is good.

[Weissova] Why did you back Romania's joining CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association]? Why are we interested that it should be the Romanians, in particular, who should become members of this organization?

[Klaus] Saying the Romanians in particular imparts a slightly different meaning to this matter.

We principally support any arrangement that means that various regional groups will not represent small fortresses, which are becoming liberal from within, but adopt a tough attitude to the rest of the world. We fundamentally oppose this approach, and I think this policy of ours is known. From the beginning, having agreed on a free trade zone with Slovenia, we have, from the start, proposed to the other CEFTA countries that they accept Slovenia. Similarly, we have suggested that CEFTA incorporates other countries. This is solely for the benefit of us all.

Currently, Deputy Prime Minister Kocarnik is discussing these issues with the Baltic states. I have even signed, with the Estonian prime minister, a memorandum of intent to establish a free trade zone with Estonia. So, this is not a random move, it is not a matter that would lack concept and a long-term outlook.

I am able to disclose now that, on 25 November, I will have a meeting in Poznan, Poland, with the prime ministers of the CEFTA countries. It is likely that Slovenia will also participate. As soon as you leave this room, I will discuss this with Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak. There is, therefore, a reason to discuss these matters.

[Weissova] Let us now go abroad. The Israeli-Jordanian accord will be signed on 26 October. This is without doubt another important step toward peace in the Middle East. [passage omitted] How do you see the future of the Middle East?

[Klaus] I see the future of the Middle East a little more positively than we could see it some two or three years ago. That is absolutely clear. The conflict that has been going on there for entire decades cannot be wound up overnight, and, if the present-day initiatives were pursued some 20 or 30 years ago, the situation might be totally different today.

Nevertheless, I am absolutely convinced that the process that has begun is correct. After all, it is the only path that can yield results. We can see every day that it will be painful and that it will be full of hiccups. But, in this respect, a number of politicians are putting themselves on the line because they are pursuing initiatives that are costing them popularity at home, because a compromise has to be made. There is no solution at all to this issue without a compromise. I think that all are beginning to see this, and that is a good thing. [passage omitted]

More on Free Trade Agreement With Romania

AU2510172294 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY (KORUNA supplement) in Czech 20 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by "pin": "Agreement Between Czech Republic and Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Customs duties for industrial products will be essentially eliminated in trade between the Czech Republic and Romania within three years. However, the free trade agreement will not apply to automobiles, for example. Mutual trade in agricultural and food products, too, is to be partly liberalized.

The document, which the Czech Government approved at its meeting yesterday, is to be signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in Prague on 24 October. The free trade agreement could be implemented as of 1 January 1995, provided the Romanian Parliament approves it by then.

The aim of the agreement is to establish more favorable conditions for mutual trade, whose volume has been permanently declining since 1990, when turnover

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reached 3.3 billion korunas. Last year Czech-Romanian trade turnover amounted to only 1.2 billion Czech korunas [Kc]. According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, in January-August this year, the Czech Republic's exports to Romania totaled Kc625 million, while imports from Romania amounted to only Kc211 million. The elimination or lowering of duties will initially apply to only some commodities, as is the case of the CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association] agreement.

According to the ministry, no political problems exist between the two countries that would stand in the way of trade. The only bone of contention was Romania's failure to compensate the Czech Republic for its surplus stemming from the former clearing account. In the meantime, Romania has repaid about 50 percent of its debt (roughly $10 million) through the delivery of two tankers.

Results of Prime Minister's Asia Trip Viewed

AU2510154794 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 20 Oct 94 pp 1, 12

[Article by Jaroslav Brabec: "Czech Entry Into Asia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some $600 million worth of signed or prepared contracts with the PRC, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea—that is the specific result of Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus's Asian trip last week. China alone accounts for $470 million of this sum. In relation to the size of the population, this is more than German Chancellor Kohl brought from the PRC this year (6 million German marks). Following the Czech economy's initial reorientation toward West Europe, the Asian azimuth and China, in particular, are thus becoming, besides the United States, the next direction of the Czech Republic's economic expansion. This information was provided to us by Radomir Sabela, Czech deputy minister of industry and trade, who, together with 47 Czech entrepreneurs and managers, accompanied Prime Minister Klaus on his trip to Asia on 17 October. According to Sabela, in the dynamically developing countries of Asia, the Czech delegation studied the economic instruments and methods of their development with a view to reviving the Czech economy. At the same time, it informed the Asian partners about the Czech Republic's investment and trade opportunities. The Czech prime minister was received in China by President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Li Peng.

The signed and prepared contracts concern three spheres:

1. Investment deliveries for the Shentou electric power plant—two 500-megawatt units. The contract was facilitated by the delivery of four 200-megawatt units to Shentou in 1979 and two 500-megawatt units in 1985. The new contract received strong support from Li Peng, and experts are now working on the details. The Czech side also raised the issue of deliveries for the construction of nuclear power plants. These talks are to continue in the fall in Beijing, on the occasion of a Czech industrial exhibition in the Chinese capital. The Czechs see great chances for cooperation in the field of energy generation.

2. Investment deliveries for the Ji Min-chi [name as published] open-pit coal mine. This represents a great opportunity for deliveries of excavators from Vitkovice. The appropriate "letter of understanding" has been signed.

3. Assembly plant for Tatra and LIAZ trucks. There were talks about direct deliveries and about spare parts. China raised import duties for ready-made automobiles, and the Czech side expressed understanding for this step. It therefore raised the issue of building an assembly plant in China.

During the talks, the possibilities also emerged of one Czech bank opening its branch in Beijing and of deliveries of spinning machines and high-grade steel from Poldi Kladno. Deputy Minister Sabela noted a very positive echo in China during the entire visit of the Czech Government delegation. Projects, discussion of which only started, will be the subject of talks at the Chinese Embassy in Prague next week. The Czech Republic is opening a consulate in Shanghai, which, according to Sabela, "fascinated the Czech delegation by its dynamic economy and investment boom," and the government recommends to the Chamber of Commerce and the Union of Industry that they quickly become integrated in the financial and economic life of Shanghai, which is the main economic zone along the Yangtze River, with 400 million inhabitants.

The Czechs are extremely satisfied with the results of their Chinese economic mission, and next month they will welcome in Prague the Chinese minister of foreign trade for further talks. Sabela expressed satisfaction with the fact that the decline of Czech-Chinese trade has been halted. Its volume represents a mere $95.5 million today (with a Czech $17-million surplus), but the curve is beginning to move up again.

Article Views Air Force Transformation

AU2510163394 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 20 Oct 94 p 9

[Article by Jan Gazdik: "Czech Army Is Being Drawn Into a Maelstrom of Changes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only four years after November 1989, the Czech Army is shedding an unfunctional economic model, in which billions [currency not specified] used to dwindle away without anyone knowing for sure where the money had gone. The Army is gradually being drawn into the maelstrom of big business, technical reconstruction, and personnel changes. Arms procurement and investments (on which 30 percent of the Army budget is to be spent every year) should become

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controllable and, most important of all, efficient. Money should no longer be spent to finance an insatiable colossus but, rather, specific targets that the Army intends to fulfill.

Following totalitarian and postrevolutionary twists and turns, federal "gung-ho" attempts at professionalization, and corruption scandals in which money was flowing in streams, this may be the last chance for the Czech Army to become a relatively small yet, nonetheless, effective 65,000-man corps, one whose upkeep will no longer be beyond society's strength. But does this idea have a chance to prevail?

Better Shock Than Collapse

With its 200,000 men and a gigantic amount of equipment, the Czechoslovak Army in 1989 was one of the best-equipped satellites of the USSR. As of 31 October 1989, this, in relation to the size of the population extraordinary, colossus availed itself of 2,708 tanks, 4,660 armored transporters and combat infantry vehicles, 3,276 artillery systems, and 687 aircraft and helicopters.

A faithful though perhaps striking illustration of the transformation changes and of the movement of people and flows of money in the Army is provided by the military Air Force. While many pilots and technicians may still curse former Minister Antonin Baudys, even after his dismissal, they send Miroslav Kalousek, deputy minister of defense in charge of economic affairs, to hell. Hardly anyone knows, however, that the shock therapy to the Air Force had been prescribed by Colonels Hudec, Padelek, and Vasek.

"When the three told me one year ago what they were up to, I closed the door on them," General Pavel Strubl, the Air Force chief, recalls. "I realized that they had prepared a social, technological, and economic bang such as we had never experienced before. But, with a cool head, I subsequently figured out that, without radically limiting the bloated Air Force, where almost all costs are expenditures on the operation of the aging fleet, the Air Force would gradually become extinct."

The changes in the Czech Air Force, which are to be wound up by 1 January 1995, also painfully affect 250 pilots who must stop flying. The question remains how the need for this radical incision was explained to them.

End to Suicidal Flying

The transformation of the Air Force also involves the putting out of service of 77 combat vehicles, 11 combat helicopters, 20 training aircraft, 10 transport and special aircraft, and 20 transport helicopters—that is, almost one-third of the 400 machines that are at the disposal of the Czech Army today. "The money saved will be invested in the modernization and improved quality of pilots' training," says Col. Frantisek Padelek, Strubl's deputy. "Within a few months, we want to move up from the suicidal 50 flying hours annually to 90 hours."

It is hard to estimate how many more top pilots (the training of each of them costs 8 million [currency not specified]) and technicians will leave the Army because they reject yet another relocation, of which they have experienced more than enough over the past four years, under public pressure. Cases of pilots and technicians who were transferred from Mosnov to Brno and then back to Mosnov a year later, then from Mosnov to Prerov, and who are now about to move to Caslav represent no exceptions. Many of them, or, more precisely, their wives, refuse to move again and see a solution in their departure from the Army.

Of the 54 airfields originally in service, only 29 will remain, of which five will be permanent, seven with a permanent airport administration, nine with maintained reinforced surface, and eight with grassy surface.

Baudys Supposedly Committed High Treason

An even greater storm than the laying off of 250 pilots and the departure of hundreds of other Air Force personnel has been provoked by the mothballing of 10 MiG-29 interceptors. Former Defense Minister Baudys had been criticized for this step mainly by left-wing deputies and, following his dismissal, by some soldiers. Defense Ministry staffer Jiri Horak, who allegedly speaks on behalf of another 17 officers, is even convinced that the elimination of a defensive potential of such significance for the Czech Army as represented by the fleet of MiG-29's, carried out without an adequate immediate replacement, can only be understood as high treason.

"If we had a greater number of MIG-29's, I would naturally never get rid of them," claims Gen. Strubl. "However, the aggregate operating costs of a few Russian supermachines over a period of 10 years (the service life of the Czech MiG-29's ends in 2005) exceed almost threefold the operating costs of 45 older MiG-21's." If the Army kept the Russian 29 models, this would cost it much more than the contemplated modernization of 24 MiG-21's, which has been frequently criticized by deputies. Following modernization, however, the fire power of the rejuvenated oldies would be on a par with that of the more modern MiG-23's and, in some specifications, even with that of the MiG-29's.

Mathematical models show that 24 modernized MiG-21's destroy 9.8 targets at low altitudes and 11 targets at medium and high altitudes, while 10 MiG-29's destroy 4.14 targets at low altitudes and 5.5 targets at medium and high altitudes. However, if the 29's came within sight of the 21's, they would easily rout them in a maneuver-type air battle [v manevrovem vzdusnem boji], even if the 21's were vastly superior in number.

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There Will Be No War in Next Few Years

"When planning the transformation, we told ourselves that, in the next few years, there exists no danger of an armed conflict in Central Europe and no immediate threat to the Czech Republic," Gen. Strubl reckons. The Army's budget will not permit any radical reconstruction of the Air Force in this period. For a couple of years, the Air Force will therefore linger on, with all of the consequences arising from this. The Czech Army will apparently have to wait until 2003-4 for top-of-the-line interceptors (such as F-16's or Mirage 2000's) to become the backbone of the military Air Force.

Even though the modernization projects assume international cooperation, in which the final supplier should be a domestic firm, battles for Army orders between domestic and foreign firms are already in the offing. While the procurement plan for military equipment for 1995-2005 is ready, judging from the [controversy over the] selection of supplier of board electronics for the L-159 aircraft from Aero Vodochody, we can expect a great many disputes and, perhaps, even political scandals. A great bundle of money is at stake—90 billion korunas over a period of the next 10 years.

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Chinese Deputy Minister Holds Talks in Bratislava

AU2510132994 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by "(lm)": "Interest in Long-Term Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo expressed complete satisfaction with the results of his talks yesterday with officials of the Foreign Ministry.

"We achieved much more than I expected," said Dai Bingguo, in reply to a question from a PRAVDA editor. He added that the Chinese side is interested in long-term cooperation and that it wants to expand mutual relations as much as possible. According to him, it is an advantage that there are no obstacles on the road to improving relations. "As far as the sphere of political relations is concerned, we want to become a reliable friend of Slovakia; in the economic sphere, we want to become a dependable partner in cooperation," declared the Chinese deputy foreign minister.

Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan also received Dai Bingguo yesterday, and he then held talks with Foreign Ministry State Secretary Dusan Rozbora. Following their meeting, they signed a protocol on cooperation between the two ministries. The protocol envisages regular consultations between the ministries, and it is anticipated that a representative from the Slovak ministry will visit Beijing next year.

The PRC deputy foreign minister stated that, of the international issues, they devoted most attention to the opportunity for cooperation in the United Nations. At the same time, he appreciated the fact that Slovakia understands the Chinese point of view on the issue of Taiwan. As far as developing cooperation in the economic sphere is concerned, the Chinese guest expressed his hope that Slovak entrepreneurs and businessmen will involve themselves more in the large PRC market and seek the most advantageous direct contacts there.

Poll Shows Meciar Again Most Trusted Politician

AU2510140694 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by "(dos)": "The Citizens' Trust in Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Statistical Office (SU SR) conducted a representative public opinion poll between 6 and 13 October involving a sample of 1,234 respondents. They were asked the following question: "Which Slovak politicians enjoy your trust at the moment?" The respondents could cite three names at most. The method of ascertaining trust thus differed from the survey conducted by the Methodological-Research Department of Slovak Radio (MVK), whose results were published last week, in which respondents were given a list of politicians and were asked to say, in reference to each one, whether or not they trusted him. This explains the overall lower level of trust expressed in politicians in the SU SR poll compared with the MVK survey. Compared with the SU SR poll conducted in September, trust in Jan Luptak has increased most substantially (by 8 percent). Trust in Vladimir Meciar has increased by 7 percent and in Jan Slota and Ivan Gasparovic by 3 percent. A more substantial decline in trust was expressed in Michal Kovac and Peter Weiss (by 5 percent) and in Jozef Moravcik (by 3 percent).

	Percent		
	Aug	Sep	Oct
Vladimir Meciar	25	21	28
Jozef Moravcik	19	18	15
Ivan Gasparovic	14	7	10
Michal Kovac	15	14	9
Jan Luptak	4	1	9
Peter Weiss	15	13	8
Jan Slota	3	2	5
Vojtech Bugar	4	4	5
Jan Carnogursky	6	5	4
Mikulas Dzurinda	3	3	4
Sergej Kozlik	2	2	4
No one	28	37	31

Meciar's Public Relations Methods Examined

95CH0003C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 4 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by Michele Kayal: "Beer and Singsongs Blot Out Meciar Misdeeds"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava—Vladimir Meciar has been accused of robbing the state to give to his friends, of using secret-police files to coerce his opponents, he's snubbed foreign investors and stood by as the economy crumbled—yet a large part of the public wants him back as prime minister.

"When someone promises paradise on earth, people are going to vote for him," said 25-year-old journalism student Denisa Nova. "He's always been the one big name standing above anything else."

At rallies awash in cold beer and hot stew, the twice-ousted ex-premier tosses red foil packets of "Meciar Coffee" to the crowd. He promises implausible reductions in the country's crippling 15 percent unemployment and inflation rates.

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He tells factory workers: "I'm on your side." His chief economist recently promised to re-nationalize important companies that the current government might sell to foreigners.

Meciar's top-10 music video—a rousing rendition of "Long Live Slovakia" performed a la "We are the World"—plucks the nation's pride and heart-strings with its footage of simple country Slovaks, mountain sunrises, horses, storks, sheep and slightly embarrassed politicians with headsets to their ears.

"I consider the election process a competition," the 52-year-old former boxer recently told reporters. "Having people around me with a sense of humor and imagination is a good thing."

Local newspapers recently reported that Meciar was planning a sham attempt on his own life to gain voters' sympathy. A party spokesman denied the rumors. (See Short Takes, page 2).

Meciar's promise of coffee in every pot may lead to a political resurrection that parallels that of drug-using former Washington D.C. Mayor Marion Barry. Past turmoil in his previous two stints as premier may prevent Meciar from getting the parliamentary support he needs to regain the post after the September 30-October 1 elections, but he has a plurality of voters solidly behind him.

His Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) commands nearly 30 percent support in opinion polls, and with 20 percent of the country's 3 million voters still undecided, political analysts say he could score much higher. The party most closely trailing him hovers in the mid- to high-teens.

"I voted for the HZDS the last time, and I'll vote for them again," said Stepan Hlavaty, a 70-year-old retired railroad employee. "The lowering of prices, the lowering of taxes—maybe these are just promises, but at least they show some sympathy."

Hlavaty and other Meciar supporters shrug off the country's growing budget deficit and spiraling inflation as natural in a post-communist economy. They dismiss charges of corruption and political sniping, and argue that Meciar didn't have enough time to complete his reforms.

"Things didn't get worse under Meciar," said Hlavaty. "It was simply the outcome of 1989."

His fellow politicians have not been as forgiving. They removed Meciar the first time in April 1991 amid accusations that he had used communist secret-police files to blackmail his colleagues. The charges were later dismissed for lack of evidence.

He was voted back into office in June 1992, pledging to shake up relations with the Czechs, a stand that quickly led to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. He was ousted six months ago in a no-confidence vote following a rebellion within his own party.

"It was not a question of expressing support or not expressing support for the government," said President Michal Kovac, who made a televised appeal for Meciar's removal. "It was a question of whether an authoritarian power system would gradually be installed."

Meciar's ouster prompted the coming elections, which are being held two years ahead of schedule.

The caretaker government of Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik has also tried to reverse the rampant corruption in the privatization process under Meciar—who acted as his own minister of privatization from the summer of 1993 until his ouster. Under his reign, the process was brought to a complete stop, except for 40 deals he crammed through in the final weeks before his fall from power.

The new government overturned 14 of those deals, many of which involved associates of Meciar, saying that the sale prices were improbably low.

Whether Meciar will overcome the political dueling and persuade other parties to help him form a coalition government remains unclear. If no party has the strength to form a government, new elections could be called in six months.

"There are many 'ifs,'" said Radio Free Europe political analyst Dano Butora. "All possibilities are equal."

Part of Meciar's gravity-resistant hold over the public comes from a lack of formidable opponents.

"There's no alternative to Meciar's vitality in Slovakia, unfortunately," said Igor Uhrik, who returned to his homeland last June after 23 years in New York.

Moravcik's government has tried to jump-start the economy, attract foreign investors and restore credibility to the privatization process. But his party's shaky 9 percent in opinion polls makes them lightweights in the fight against the two-time title winner.

"(Meciar) can start talking and it's not coherent, but it's exciting," said Zora Butorova, a researcher at the polling agency Focus. "When Moravcik, the former university professor, sits down, it takes him a long time to say something."

Meciar has used his time in opposition to cast himself as the underdog, the fighting champion of a nation that sees itself as short-changed by the West. In the past he has blamed his failures on the communists, the Czechs, and Slovakia's Hungarian minority.

This time, he has told the public, he will be "in a difficult position" when he returns, because the current government has slowed economic growth and has botched the privatization process. But he has promised he will get his programs through.

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"The six months we have spent in opposition have been a great help to us," he said in early September. "We have cut out all the dead wood. We are stronger than we were in 1992."

Despite the seeming indestructibility of the once and possibly future prime minister, young Slovaks—who make up a large segment of the estimated 70 percent of voters who will not choose Meciar—say they are optimistic that a better life in their country is not far off.

"It's going to take a new generation before people can judge who to vote for," said journalism student Nova. "I love this country and I want to help it. I'm here, and I believe it's going to happen."

HZDS Denies Rumor of 'Split' in Movement

AU2610100694 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 21 Oct 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "(is, dv)": "The HZDS Is Denying That There Is a Split in Its Ranks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] hastily organized a news conference early yesterday evening at which Deputy Chairman A.M. Huska issued a statement on the mounting speculation about internal disputes within the movement. "The informative and consultative debates conducted by the HZDS in the wake of the parliamentary election are leading to speculation among many correspondents and politicians. They proceed from the false premise that there is a split within the movement and a lack of unity in enforcing its policy aims," he said. He also described the speculation about the separation of "realistically thinking leaders" from the HZDS leadership, who allegedly intend to place themselves in opposition to Chairman V. Meciar, as absolutely unsubstantiated. He also declared that I. Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR], S. Kozlik, HZDS deputy chairman, and he have never cast any doubts on the position of Meciar.

Huska believes that respect for the will of the voters will be the factor that contributes to forming the cabinet, and, thus, the HZDS will win the support of at least 76 deputies in the NR SR. He envisages that there will be more of them following the completion of the coalition talks, close to a three-fifths' majority (90). Therefore, he described the nonformation of a cabinet as a problem that neither the activity of a so-called caretaker government nor further parliamentary elections could resolve. O. Keltosova added that a vacuum has not arisen in the state's administration since the election because Jozef Moravcik's Cabinet will remain in office until the new government is formed. She envisages that the current government will submit its resignation during the constituent NR SR meeting.

Weiss: SNS Not Insisting on President's Recall

AU2510154494 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 21 Oct 94 p 2

[TA SR and "(sm)"-signed report: "Common Choice/SNS: They Are Not Making Fundamental Demands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak National Party [SNS] does not insist on the recall of the president and the imperative mandate for National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] deputies. This statement was made by Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Chairman Peter Weiss following the talks between representatives of the SNS and Common Choice. According to him, they did not reach agreement on the form of constituting the NR SR bodies, where the SDL insists on the proportional principle. SNS Chairman Jan Slota explained that they are not making any fundimental demands before the start of the session. The priority for the SNS is the stabilization of the Slovak political scene, and, for this reason, they are also prepared to make compromises. In his opinion, the public is justifiably disgusted with the prolonged agony on the Slovak political scene. The SNS is willing to retreat from some of its demands so that a stable coalition government can be formed as quickly as possible. According to him, the meeting was of a consultative nature: they were looking for points of contact in the views of the two political entities. The representatives of the two entities put forward their views on further concrete steps in the economic and social spheres, steps that, according to him, should form the basis for all of the negotiations. Jaroslav Volf, chairman of the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia, said that, in the interest of Slovakia, trust among the political parties, not only within the framework of the coalition or opposition, is essential. Preliminary conditions that could cast doubt on democratic development in Slovakia or have a negative impact on its international standing should not be set.

Weiss Views Coalition Talks With HZDS

AU2510133194 Bratislava DENNIK in Slovak 24 Oct 94 p 4

[TA SR report: "They Are Not Serious About Preelection Promises"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY and the TA SR on 22 October, Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], confirmed that, at Friday talks with representatives of the Common Choice coalition, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] proposed the establishment of a commission of inquiry against Slovak President Michal Kovac, although no mention of this was made at a news conference held after the consultations. Weiss, who did not attend the meeting with journalists because he was in Vienna for preparatory talks on a seminar on left-wing politics, said that the HZDS can initiate in parliament whatever it wishes as

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long as this is in accord with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and with laws. The question is, however, who will support the HZDS. "The HZDS can strive for such an inquiry, but it cannot expect the SDL to chastely observe the work of this commission and participate in the government at the same time," the SDL chairman said, adding that this is also what he told HZDS representatives during the talks. During the Friday consultative talks, Weiss was also surprised by the HZDS's not taking its preelection promises seriously. He cited statements on a 100-percent rise in the salaries of university teachers and scientists, on measures in the social sphere, and on decreasing the value-added tax, all of which the HZDS described on Friday as campaign rhetoric. Weiss labeled SDL Deputy Chairman Pavol Kanis's Friday statement that the SDL's joining the anti-Meciar coalition in March was its historical mistake as Pavol Kanis's private opinion. He observed that judgments on historical events ought to be made by historians 20 years after the fact. He conceded that such views were to be heard also at the last meeting of the SDL Republican Council, but they did not receive general support. Weiss said that, as party chairman, he is bound by the decision of the Republican Council, which charged the party's negotiators with holding talks with all of the political parties. On the basis of the results of these talks, the SDL Republican Council will have the final word and will decide whether the SDL will go into opposition or under which conditions it will join the government.

[Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 24 October on page 6 carries a 600-word report by its Bratislava correspondent Vladimir Misauer on the HZDS-SDL coalition talks, entitled "Kanis Was Deliberately Deceiving the Public," which includes the following passage: "LIDOVE NOVINY managed to ascertain that, on Friday, Kanis did not interpret the results of the talks quite accurately because, in their course, the HZDS demanded the establishment of a parliamentary commission of inquiry to examine President Michal Kovac's steps. SDL Chairman Peter Weiss, who attended the talks but was not present at the subsequent news conference, confirmed this fact in an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY during the weekend. 'The talks showed that there is no consensus on the issue of the president. What Mr. Kanis said at the news conference was his private opinion,' Peter Weiss said. Asked how someone can dare present his personal opinions after talks on the formation of a new government and, thereby, deliberately mislead the public, Weiss replied that the course of the talks will be assessed by the SDL Executive Committee, which will then propose a further course of action. Weiss, who was shocked by Kanis's assessment of the SDL's participation in Moravcik's government, rejected this assessment with the words that historical mistakes ought to be discussed by historians 20 years after the fact."]

Luptak Explains Refusal To Join Government

AU2510135994 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 17 Oct 94 p 1-2

[Interview with Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia, ZRS, by Maria Tolnayova, in Banska Bystrica on 15 October: "We Approached Other Political Entities With a Request for Remedy, Claims ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banska Bystrica—The Central Council of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] met behind closed doors and virtually unnoticed by the media in Banska Bystrica on 15 October. NARODNA OBRODA discussed with ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak the conclusions reached by the supreme body of this novice on the Slovak political scene and its plans for the near future.

[Luptak] The deliberations concerned both important political issues, but also our internal problems. We assessed the election results and exchanged information on our meetings with the other political parties that have entered parliament. Regarding our internal problems, we have decided to build our party's structure because, until now, we have had neither the time nor the money to do that. Our idea is to have district secretariats with unpaid functionaries.

[Tolnayova] Have you arrived at any decision regarding the possible conclusion of a coalition and, if you did, with whom?

[Luptak] Our ZRS Central Council unanimously approved what I have repeatedly expressed in person—namely, that no party or movement will be able to drag this pure and unburdened party under the yoke. There are stronger and more experienced parties out there. Let them join forces for the benefit of this nation, and we will give them support. Workers have had no part in the pauperization of this country. On behalf of our voters, we are therefore approaching other political entities with the request that they mend the present state of affairs.

[Tolnayova] What are your specific demands?

[Luptak] We want to place our demands under public control so that everyone can check whether we comply with what we promised before the election. The demands consist of 13 points, to which a 14th point could be added. We want to enforce an amendment to the Labor Code and to laws that were passed that were against the interests of workers. We demand that everyone be obliged retroactively to prove the origin of financial resources used in auctions and privatization since 1990 and that this obligation be enshrined in law. We demand that the possibility be enshrined in law and realized for workers and other working people to acquire a share in the property they helped for 40 years to create. The fourth demand concerns better social provisions for pensioners and the physically handicapped and another demand the immediate return of workers' houses to

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those for whom they were intended. Sixth, we support the abolition of all limited liability companies set up on the basis of state enterprises. We want to put on a just and realistic footing the prices of primary agricultural products, amend the National Council of the Slovak Republic rules of procedure, immediately pass the law on conflict of interests, and set up a Ministry of Construction. We demand that each political entity publicly declare its attitude toward the ZRS and that those who in the past publicly humiliated and offended workers give up their mandates as deputies. Our last demand, for the time being, is the immediate implementation of international treaties on antidrug policy.

[Tolnayova] Why do you not join an open coalition with another political entity and do not try to realize those demands yourselves?

[Luptak] I have already said that the situation is difficult and that it is not the fault of workers. I know what will happen to this state in a half-year's time, and then they will say: Your party was there, and what did you do? No one speaks about how much money there is in state offers.... We realize that our party will have to work hard to help pull this nation out of hardships.

[Tolnayova] What kind of government will manage to win the necessary support of parliament, in your opinion?

[Luptak] The left, the right, and the center must put their heads together, assuming, of course, that they want to help this Slovakia. The best thing would be if they all came to an agreement and we then supported them. But representatives of the right should realize that, in the past, there were great social advantages here and that the people will not accept their policies, as presented by them to date. Even a Christian wants to have a full stomach and be adequately rewarded for his work.

[Tolnayova] You demand that the other political parties publicly declare their attitude toward your movement. Try to explain your attitude toward them....

[Luptak] We analyzed, and still do, developments in individual parties, and we therefore have a clear picture of each political entity and its leaders. Although it is impossible to assess the entire member base in this way, a great deal always depends on what the representatives of a party say and how they say it. We know exactly with whom we are dealing. According to the aforesaid analyses, the closest to us are parties of the left-wing spectrum—the Party of the Democratic Left, the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, the Farmers Movement, and the Green Party. However, the gentlemen in the leaderships of those parties must realize that they will have to treat the ZRS as an equal partner.

[Tolnayova] Did the ZRS Central Council meeting deal with the case of Kolnik?

[Luptak] Yes. However, we were unable to discuss matters in person because Mr. Kolnik did not attend the meeting. We do not have the right to condemn him before we hear the authentic recording of what he said. If he really said what was published, however, we condemn his statements and will draw conclusions from them. It is necessary to realize that our party is not just Kolnik or Luptak.

[Tolnayova] After the election, you have become the most trusted politicians. To what do you ascribe this?

[Luptak] To our close contacts with ordinary people.

[Tolnayova] What is in store for you and the ZRS in the days to come?

[Luptak] Meetings with other political parties, Brussels, where I will participate in a congress of Europeans workers and labor parties, but, right on Monday, also a visit to the Mostaren Brezno plant, where workers want to go on strike.

[Tolnayova] One last question. Have you already received from the Constitutional Court the request that you express your opinion on the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia complaint against the Democratic Union?

[Luptak] Yes, on Friday. But I do not know why we should express our view. It is a matter between the two parties.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 17 October on page 2 carries a 500-word interview with ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak by Eva Laukova entitled "We Do Not Forget Where We Came From." In the interview, which was also conducted after the ZRS Central Council meeting in Banska Bystrica, Luptak discusses the same issues as in the NARODNA OBRODA interview. The PRAVDA interview includes the following passage:

"[Laukova] Does the decision of your leadership not to go into an open government coalition with anyone remain valid?

"[Luptak] Yes. But let no one think that we do not want to join the government because we do not have qualified people! We even have intellectuals. But what could one or two of our ministers accomplish? Things would be different had we obtained more votes in the election. We would be able to have a wider selection of deputies. In that case, we would have to assume responsibility. But all laws that will be acceptable to the people will have our tacit support."]

Hungarian Leader on Postelectoral Situation

AU2510163594 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 17 Oct 94 pp 1, 4

[Interview with MKDH Chairman Vojtech Bugar by Pavol Minarik; place and date not given: "We See Our Place in the Slovak Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Minarik] Having received 10.18 percent of the votes, the Hungarian tripartite coalition

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became the third-strongest entity in the new Slovak parliament. Can you see in the new government a place for the coalition of Hungarian parties?

[Bugar] That place is for us still a question. To be clear about it, however, the new government Cabinet needs the support of at least 76 of the 150 parliament deputies—that is, an absolute majority. Under the conditions here, a minority government must always fall, unless some other agreement exists. The victorious HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] has, together with the SNS [Slovak National Party], 70 seats. The remaining five parliamentary parties have 80. Hence, it is possible to form a government with the HZDS or without it. There is a problem, however, in a government without the HZDS, for instance, having two unstable factors.

[Minarik] What factors do you mean?

[Bugar] One is the Party of the Democratic Left. So far, it is not known how it will assess its election failure. Moreover, we have no idea whether there will be a new leadership, and if so, what it will be like, whether it will want to cooperate with the HZDS or with Moravcik's former government coalition. The other, and more important, risk factor is Luptak's Association of Workers of Slovakia, which has not completely shaped up politically, so it is not clear how it will conduct itself in the critical issues.

[Minarik] So, are you getting ready for the government?

[Bugar] As far as the Hungarian coalition goes, we do see our place in the government. We have, among other things, very good contacts abroad. The MKDH [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement] is a member of the European Democratic Union and also of the European Christian Democratic Union. Moreover, our coalition partners from Egyutteles and the Hungarian Civic Party also have good foreign contacts, which could be used in some way to benefit the Slovak Republic. If we were in the government, we would be interested not only in the agricultural sphere but also in social affairs.

[Minarik] Who voted for you?

[Bugar] Our support came mostly from Hungarians—that is, citizens of Hungarian ethnic background. We are pleased that approximately 9 percent of our voters are Slovaks. After we gave our support to the recall of Vladimir Meciar from the post of prime minister last March and to Moravcik's government, numerous Slovaks contacted us by mail and telephone openly to promise us their support in the election. They reasoned for it by understanding us best.

[Minarik] Would you say that, in the final analysis, the statement by SNS Chairman Jan Slota on the danger threatening Slovaks from the south helped you because the Hungarian voters united?

[Bugar] Our voters do not react to such talk as one could expect offhand. We must take into consideration that most of them live on the territory where at least three cultures blend. If you consider that they watch television broadcasts from Bratislava, Budapest, and Vienna, and now, thanks to cable television, also from Prague, they are, as voters, more mature. Trying to frighten them by tales of Slota or the HZDS coming and holding a knife to their throats would not work here. At the preelection meetings, and not only there, we have most often encountered the question of whether there will be political stability in Slovakia because it is the precondition for economic stability and also what is our program.

[Minarik] Why are the HZDS and the SNS so frightened by the Hungarian tripartite coalition?

[Bugar] There is more than just one reason. The ethnic Hungarian deputies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic have always stood, in the decisive issues, on the side of democracy. We have contributed twice to the HZDS government's having to go into opposition. This actually explains the HZDS approach to Hungarians. In the case of the SNS, it is simple hatred. Unfortunately, comments have been heard at SNS assemblies and from the Slovak Heritage Foundation about the festering sore, predators, and even worse similes. During the last three or four days before the election, the SNS appealed to the voters to vote for them because otherwise Slovakia would come to a bad end. If it were not for this, they might not even have made the 5-percent minimum and would not make it to the parliament. Actually, they only made it with the Hungarian card because they already exhausted their program. After all, Slovakia has been independent for almost two years.

[Minarik] The HZDS and the SNS are not favorably inclined toward your endeavors to attain autonomy, and the same is true of all of the other Slovak political parties....

[Bugar] Those with whom we talked after the election know what kind of autonomy we want. We tried to explain it to them. So far, our endeavors have been interpreted as though we wanted territorial autonomy with our own government, which has been automatically linked to breaking the territorial integrity of Slovakia. Our objective is, however, that, in the constitutional arrangement of the Slovak Republic, the essential powers be transferred to the communities, and that corresponds to the recommendations by the Council of Europe and the expert group that was present at various debates in the Slovak parliament. We want every community to have the most comprehensive powers—taht is, not only the Hungarian communities. Moreover, we want not only the Hungarian but also the Slovak communities to be able to associate, to form various higher territorial entities. That is not a territorial autonomy, however, that would have its own parliament and its own decisive powers. That is only the second level of state

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administration, and, of course, it is possible to establish the first level. It is nothing more than that.

[Minarik] How is it with financing Hungarian parties in Slovakia?

[Bugar] I will speak only for the MKDH. We have lived and will continue to live on the money we receive from the state. That means depending on the election results.

[Minarik] Do the Hungarian businessmen who operate on the territory of the Slovak Republic help?

[Bugar] So far, we have not asked for help because we made do with the funds from the state. Of course, this does not mean that we could not use such money. The former landowners, for instance, can ask for its restitution until the end of 1995. Some of them have not yet done so because it is a rather long-term process, lawyers are needed, and so forth. We had this idea that the party or movement would retain in every district a lawyer who will assist these people. That would require substantial financial means. It seems that we attempt it as the tripartite coalition. After all, if this is not done by the end of next year, their land will be automatically transferred to the Slovak Land Fund, and this institution will be able to sell it to anyone. Thus, it is possible that it would be acquired by people who would not want to use it in such a way that it would benefit all. We are simply trying to show people that we are useful to them, that we are able to help them, and that to all of them.

[Minarik] There was a change of government in Hungary. After the conservative government of Prime Ministers Antall and Boros, with whom you had good relations, came the left-wing Horn government. Did your relations change?

[Bugar] So far, we have not noticed that there would be any great differences between these two governments and their relations with us. Regarding the treaty currently in the works between Slovakia and Hungary and other issues directly relating to us, we have been invited to consultations. I could not say that I have observed any negative features of the new Hungarian Cabinet in relation to us.

18 Parties, Movements To Run in Local Elections

AU2510140894 Bratislava DENNIK in Slovak 24 Oct 94 p 4

[TA SR report: "18 Political Entities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The electoral campaign of political entities participating in local elections in Slovakia starts today. In the course of the campaign, 18 political parties, movements, alliances, unions, and initiatives will be guaranteed equal access to state public information media (Slovak Television and Slovak Radio). The condition for this right (the submission of slates of candidates in at least one-third of districts in Slovakia) was met by the Democratic Party, the Democratic Union of Slovakia, Coexistence, the Farmers Movement of the Slovak Republic, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, the Communist Party of Slovakia, Christian Social Union, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, National Democratic Party-New Alternative, the Farmers Party of Slovakia, Romany Civic Initiative in the Slovak Republic, the Slovak National Party, the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, the Party of the Democratic Left, the Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen of the Slovak Republic, the Green Party in Slovakia, and the Association of Workers of Slovakia. The election campaign ends 48 hours before the start of the elections—that is, on 16 November at 1400.

State Not Paid for Arms Shipped to Angola

AU2510134894 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 20 Oct 94 pp 1, 4

[Article by Robert Matejovic: "Rocket Launchers Left, No Money Arrived; Slovak Defense Ministry Is Suing Arms Trader"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kosice—On 17 February of this year, in the article "Rocket Launchers for Angola," we reported on the sale of 40 122-mm RM-70 rocket launchers, with spare parts, and 9 OT-64 Z ambulance vehicles to Angola. The deal was worth just under $2 million. At that time, we had no idea that the deal would become the subject of a legal complaint by the Slovak Ministry of Defense against the 3 Part Ltd. company.

The deal was essentially a legal one or, more accurately, the first phase of such a deal. It took place in accordance with disarmament protocols, on the basis of the Slovak Government Licensing Commission's consent and after the lifting of the embargo on arms exports to Angola. Protagonists in the deal were 3 Part Ltd., a Kosice firm, and the Marketing and Technical Services S.A. from Luanda. The Angolan Army was to be the end user of the shipment. We write "was to be" because it is not clear to this day whether it received the shipment.

As we managed to ascertain, 3 Part Ltd. is a firm engaged in trade with arms and military equipment that is oriented mostly toward African countries. Last year it obtained exclusive rights to sell weapons to Angola. Besides Angola, it trades with Yemen, Uganda, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Egypt. According to additional information that we managed to ascertain, on 19 January 1994, the Slovak Economy Ministry's Special Production Department awarded to this firm License No. L35894 for the export of RM-70 rocket launchers, OT-64 Z ambulance vehicles, EC 15 kilowatt electricity distribution systems, T-813 chassis, and spare parts in a total value of 71,553,211 Slovak korunas [Sk]. On the same day, the ministry set a license fee of Sk143,106, which the Kosice firm transferred to the state budget account in Vseobecna Uverova Banka [General Credit Bank] in Bratislava. It was to transfer to the same account almost

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Sk70 million for the sale of the above weapons and ambulance vehicles to Angola. Because it has not settled this financial obligation to this day, on 2 September 1994, the Slovak Defense Ministry, which initially supported the deal, lodged a complaint with the appropriate Bratislava court against 3 Part Ltd. because of failure to meet financial obligations. [passage omitted]

From well-informed circles that do not wish to be named, we learned, furthermore, that the sold rocket launchers were originally to be scrapped in the Military Repair Plant No. 016 at Moldava nad Bodvou. Later, on the basis of a phone call from Colonel Engineer Jozef Elias, director of the Weaponry and Equipment Department at the Slovak Defense Ministry's Logistics Section, and an agreement with 3 Part Ltd., they were overhauled and subjected to technical control, but without a warranty. [passage omitted]

We turned to Engineer Peter Vaskanin, director of 3 Part Ltd., to learn the reasons for the nonpayment of its obligations, which were to be settled as long ago as February. As he told us, he transferred about 50 percent of the required and contractually agreed sum to the state budget account in late February 1994. He was unable to transfer the remaining sum because the account of its partner, the Luanda-based Marketing and Technical Services S.A., had been frozen because of an illegal deal with a certain Austrian firm. [passage omitted] The trustworthiness of these claims is questionable because Mr. Vaskanin has changed their contents several times. Most recently, he promised that he would settle all of his obligations by 14 October 1994 and that an Angolan Government delegation would come to Slovakia and confirm to the Slovak Defense Ministry the unfreezing of the Luanda firm's account. The case clearly bears out that both the Slovak Defense Ministry and the Slovak Government Licensing Commission did not sufficiently verify the credibility of the entire deal and, in particular, its protagonists.

Anti-Gabcikovo Demonstration 'Peaceful'

AU2510163294 Bratislava DENNIK in Slovak 24 Oct 94 p 4

[TA SR report: "Bela Liptak on Julius Binder; Protest: 200 Demonstrators in Gabcikovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gabcikovo—More than 200 people participated in a protest rally at the dam of the Gabcikovo hydroelectric power project on 22 October. The demonstration, held on the occasion of the second anniversary of the hydroelectric power project's being put into operation, was organized by the American-Hungarian Environmental Protection Fund and Bela Liptak, a U.S. citizen of Hungarian origin.

In his emotion-laden speech, Liptak focused mainly on Julius Binder, director of the Vodohospodarska Vystavba [Hydraulic Engineering Works] state enterprise, whom he described as "a person who, through his actions, has made Slovakia look ridiculous. With the construction of the Gabcikovo hydroelectric power project, he set two nations against one another to be able to steal millions for himself because he never in his life loved the Slovak nation."

Concurrently with Bela Liptak's demonstration, several dozen members of the Slovak Green Alternative and the Hungarian Club of Real Greens staged a counterdemonstration. Its participants expressed disagreement with Liptak's actions by means of banners reading "Liptak go home," and "Slovak and Hungarian Greens support the completion of Gabcikovo and Nagymaros."

Except for some heated verbal clashes, the demonstration took a peaceful course, also thanks to organizational provisions by the Slovak Republic Police Corps.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 24 October on page 2 carries a 150-word TA SR report on a statement made by Vojtech Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, in reaction to the 22 October demonstration. In Bugar's opinion, the issue of the Gabcikovo dam's environmental impact must be assessed "realistically" because "it is very difficult to expect that a project that cost several billion korunas to build would be easy to tear down." Bugar believes that attention should now center on the fulfillment of promises made by politicians to the population living in the immediate vicinity of the project and that "the financial means and, above all, human energy invested in organizing this demonstration could have been used much more usefully and effectively for the benefit of Hungary and Slovakia."]

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Trade Minister Discusses Russian Debt Repayment

AU2510145994 Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 22 Oct 94 pp 125, 126, 129

[Interview with Industry and Trade Minister Laszlo Pal by Gyorgy Heimer; place and date not given: "Back to the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Year after year, a high deficit is being accumulated in Hungarian-Russian trade that is beginning to threaten a new indebtedness. Industry and Trade Minister Laszlo Pal sees a chance of regaining lost eastern markets and, despite the many problems, can see a point in using some of the former Russian debts to acquire assets.*

[Heimer] Last week you were in Kiev and before that in Moscow. Why did you hold these talks precisely now when you did not manage to make a breakthrough this time, either, and you were not even received on the highest level, at least not in Moscow?

[Pal] The government is 10 weeks old, and this period was needed for the preparatory talks that made it possible for me to start talks in Russia. It is true that I did not manage to meet the highest leaders—the simple reason being that President Yeltsin happened to be in Washington that week with a large entourage—but I still managed to hold discussions with 22 Russian partners. I had not expected a breakthrough but we managed to achieve a qualitative change of direction.

[Heimer] What do you mean by qualitative change of direction?

[Pal] In Moscow, the two main issues on the agenda were the following: Repayment of the Russian debt and the way the annually increasing Hungarian deficit resulting from bilateral trade can be worked off. This indebtedness is more important than the repayment of the debts. It can be said to be a strategic issue, because even the $3.1 billion trade balance deficit was mostly a result of the Hungarian-Russian foreign trade deficit. The fact that we pay cash for Russian crude oil and natural gas is the main source of the problems. This is elegant and modern but we cannot counterbalance it on the export side. No real alternative exists as opposed to the energy purchases from Russia, and therefore I find it very important that Gazprom is setting up a trading house in Budapest and, in principle, is also willing to accept Hungarian goods; for example, it has even shown interest in buying the rubber tube production section of the Taurus factory. In addition to this, we managed to come to an agreement in principle with Moscow's chief governor on delivering foodstuffs, medicines, buses, and medical equipment in exchange for the city's energy base. Other similar agreements are also under discussion—with Tumen and Moscow county—and, according to my calculations, the Hungarian deficit to Russia can be reduced to $400 million-$500 million in 1995. This indeed is not a breakthrough but a promising chance.

[Heimer] The Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] election program laid great emphasis on the importance of regaining the eastern markets. Do you now, from you ministerial chair, believe this goal is achievable?

[Pal] The claim that the undemanding Russian market preserves the Hungarian industrial level and makes it feel comfortable has not been true for a long time. For a long time, there has been competition for the sales on this market, but we need not be ashamed if our products are not as modern as those of our competitors. We have to sell what we have.

[Heimer] However, the European Union floods the CIS markets with subsidized food and we hardly present competition for the West in industrial goods.

[Pal] We certainly will not get far with prayers. In 1995, Hungarian agricultural exports will receive 75 billion forints of direct and indirect subsidies, and the lower wage costs and the new barter agreements can improve our competitiveness. We need not mystify the suppliers of the western industrial products, either. I am convinced that Ganz-Hunslet engines and railroad cars, Raba rear axels, or Ikarus buses can be sold well if the exporters seek out solvent buyers.

[Heimer] In Moscow, you also talked about settling the $900 million Russian debt left from the time of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. What did you manage to achieve here?

[Pal] Five repayment methods were discussed on the basis of the 1993 Hungarian-Russian prime ministerial agreement, but we only signed working documents and did not reach a final agreement. As for military materiel, the Russians would be willing to deliver more than we are asking for; we would only accept the excess if we could reexport it but the Russian side is unwilling to let us have access to its markets. In the area of assembly and construction, the continuation of the Budapest underground is promising. I estimate this at a value of $400 million. A decision can only be made after the local government elections at the earliest, although several enterprises are already having talks with prospective Russian partners. Another pending area is Russian companies delivering ships and barges for Mahart [Hungarian shipping company] to the value of many tens of millions of U.S. dollars, while others would build crude oil stores as our laws prescribe a 90-day stock. An agreement in principle was also made on Moscow providing some kind of service to Ukraine from where we would import energy in exchange for some of the debt; this would be important for us because we will have to deliver electricity to Austria in connection with the failed dam project at Nagymaros. Finally, it was also discussed that Hungarian enterprises could acquire assets or shares in Russian enterprises in exchange for the debt.

[Heimer] This last method, the "shares for debt," created probably the biggest interest in domestic business circles. How far did you manage to get in this respect?

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[Pal] Russia still lacks high-level laws on foreign purchase of property. The way the assets offered for sale can be set against the debt has to be clarified, and the conditions of property assessment and bidding will also have to be formulated. In the meantime, the interested Hungarian enterprises can take on some of the debt providing adequate guarantees are given and cash is paid, but this mechanism also has to be drawn up. This way, the two processes can be matched, namely, the appearance of the Russian offer of assets and the authorization of the interested Hungarian enterprises to buy part ownership. We will certainly hand over a package that, among other things, will include the car assembly plant in Likino and the railway manufacturing plant in Kaluga.

[Heimer] According to many people, this "shares for debt" method is a non-starter because it is so chaotic that not much can be implemented from it by 1996, which is the deadline for repaying the debts.

[Pal] It is complicated rather than chaotic and I believe that we have to enter even into complicated talks in the hope of success. Let me say that some foreign capital has already been offered in support of all the Hungarian enterprises that have so far shown interest, and the Russian partner is just as interested as the foreign investors in investments that promise modernization.

[Heimer] However, in Hungary, the interministerial committee dealing with working out the mechanism of reclaiming the debt should by now have appointed the government commissioners who can hold talks on military technology deliveries and capital investments. What is the reason for the delay?

[Pal] We have already made the proposals but there is nothing to discuss until the Russian legal conditions are drawn up. As chairman of the interministerial committee, I see myself as the government commissioner at the moment. As soon as the situation has developed I will share the responsibility.

[Heimer] Are you not bothered by the fact that many people believed they had discovered the return of the dependency system when Otto Hujber, an entrepreneur known for his Russian interests, and chairman of the MSZP's entrepreneurial section, was nominated as government commissioner a few days ago?

[Pal] First of all, Hujber, who has already played a key role in regaining the eastern markets, has formed excellent Russian links with influential company leaders, ministers, and so on. On the other hand, rather than getting certain market shares, he will be getting tasks as a reward. Rather than acquiring property for himself, he is to involve all the interested enterprises. I cannot see any contradiction in his possible appointment, especially because we have few cadres who can hold talks with the Russians, and I can count on one hand the entrepreneurs who have any hope of success in Russian privatization.

[Heimer] Which method of debt settlement do you prefer?

[Pal] Primarily, I give preference to the Hungarian state getting back as much as possible of its demands and as soon as possible. Obviously, paying with military materiel for the whole debt would be the easiest and the whole issue would then be concluded. From an industrial policy point of view, I find the capitalization of the debt the most promising way although it is undeniably the most complicated. However, it might be worth the effort because it will allow the Hungarian companies to become part of the Russian economy and this is important for imports. I know that another method also exists, namely to sell the debt in the West. I do not think this is a good idea because I know the offers and we would lose much through the exchange rate. All in all, I expect that some combination of debt repayment methods will be used.

Increased Agricultural Trade With Russia Expected

AU2510151294 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Oct 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "A New Phase in Russian-Hungarian Agricultural Trade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The intergovernmental agreement signed by Russian Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Zaveryukha and Hungarian Agricultural Minister Laszlo Lakos in Budapest could result in an increase in exports worth several hundred million U.S. dollars.

A month ago, Russian Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Zaveryukha came up with the proposal to revive the Russian-Hungarian food industry relations. The agreement between the Hungarian Republic and the Russian Federation signed on 21 October is the result of this.

The agreement focuses on broadening the agricultural trade, and it also includes the setting up of a commercial house in charge of barter trade as well as a relevant commercial banking service. The agreement mostly details the mutual use of modern technology, materials facilitating the growth of animals and plants, and plant protection methods that do not pollute the environment. Particular emphasis is on the creation of mixed enterprises in the field of the mechanization and automatization of processing and food industry, and the use of renewable energy sources in agriculture. The agreement also deals with scientific and educational cooperation.

Until the end of August 1994, Hungary exported agricultural and food industry products worth $215 million to Russia. However, Hungary only imported an insignificant amount of food from Russia worth $1.9 million. According to Agricultural Ministry estimates, the Hungarian exports to Russia could reach $350 million-$360 million in the remaining months of 1994 and in the months of 1995 up to the wheat harvesting.

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Minister Katona Discusses 'Terrorist's' Links

LD2510174794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] This afternoon deputies asked questions from ministers in parliament. Andras Domany reports from the scene.

[Domany] The international terrorist known as Carlos stayed in Hungary with forged documents and without permission on several occasions between 1979 and 1985. This is what Bela Katona, minister without portfolio in charge of the secret services, replied to an earlier question by Zoltan Trombitas, parliamentary deputy of the Federation of Young Democrats.

The Hungarian authorities of the time did not invite the terrorists, they did not cooperate with them, and did not use them either. The secret services only held talks with them in order to make them leave the country. They tried to achieve this only by way of persuasion, because they were afraid of the possibility that in case of tougher actions, Hungary or Hungarians staying abroad could have become targets of terrorist attacks.

The foreign political aims and methods of the Hungarian leadership of that time should not be linked with international terrorist methods, the minister's answer stressed. However, the fact that the hesitant official behavior—by applying delaying tactics—contributed to Carlos's shorter and longer stay in Hungary could be criticized.

The present government, just as the former one, condemns terrorism and has taken measures to build international cooperation in order to avert dangers that still exist, Bela Katona's answer ended. He also warned that nobody should make use of this story from the past for petty-minded political aims because it would harm the country's's political interests.

The deputy who addressed the question has not accepted the reply, because, in his view, it did not contain the entire truth. However, the majority of deputies have accepted the minister's answer.

Ethnic Federation Head Outlines Tasks

AU2610100794 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Oct 94 p 8

[Interview with Istvan Bakos, general secretary of the World Federation of Hungarians, by Banfai Tamara in Budapest on 22 October: "The Domestic Region Is the Weakest in the World Federation of Hungarians"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Banfai] The World Federation of Hungarians [MVSZ] is in charge of gathering the 15 million Hungarians and representing them. However, two-thirds of the 15 million Hungarians live in Hungary and many people wonder why the member organizations originate from the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the circle of MDF supporters. Can we talk about the representation of all Hungarians?

[Bakos] I think we must regard as a MVSZ member every school that teaches in the Hungarian language and all the theaters, libraries, and public institutions that foster Hungarian literature, culture, and spirit, including the churches and religious communities that preach in the Hungarian language. Whether they joined the MVSZ or not, they are natural members of our organization.

[Banfai] What are the MVSZ's relations like with the domestic organizations?

[Bakos] I regard the domestic region as the weakest in the activity of the MVSZ. I hope we can win over a large number of institutions, foundations, and persons that are working for the same goals as we are. However, for this, we must make the MVSZ more open.

[Banfai] What are your relations with the Hungarian organizations beyond our borders?

[Bakos] Our member organizations have different opinions about our activity. We would like to create a confederation of these organizations rather than a union or uniformization. The regions that the MVSZ regards as equal organize their activity independently. We do not interfere in the activity of the new organizations; we only coordinate and help their activity. [passage omitted]

[Banfai] What did the MVSZ succeed in carrying out in the past two years?

[Bakos] The MVSZ played a big role in creating Duna Television, something that contributes to the implementation of our cultural mission. The other cultural organizations set up in the past two years also have the same goal. We have published books and journals aimed at winning the third generation of people who almost forgot their Hungarian for the Hungarian cause.

[Banfai] What budget support has the MVSZ received so far, and what do you expect from the current government?

[Bakos] The MVSZ received 200 million forints budget support in 1993 and 1994. I do not think that this organization that serves national goals and the survival of our nation depended on the government. I think the MVSZ is eligible for this support in the future as well.

[Banfai] What are your relations with the government?

[Bakos] The MVSZ endeavors to develop an honest division of labor with the current government and with the prevailing government at any time. It is important for us to refrain from taking over government functions that are not our mission. At the same time, we should get government support for every task that has a national character and which the government is unable to carry out. I see a readiness for cooperation on the part of the

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government. We will discuss the possibilities of cooperation after the upcoming meeting of delegates. [passage omitted]

Finance Minister Comments on Talks With IMF

LD2610102894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0500 GMT 26 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The IMF delegation left Budapest without any further loan agreement for the time being. However, the discussions are to be continued. Here is Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi's assessment; the reporter is Attila Kert:

[Begin recording] [Kert] What is our position as we await continuation [of the talks]?

[Bekesi] Today the difference is no longer as big as it was some weeks ago, or during the first discussions. Basically, the Hungarian Government's assessment of the situation is identical to that of the international financial organizations. There is also agreement that the country should not further increase its net debt and that it should try to speed up healthy economic growth. That requires reforms. This is reflected both in next year's economic policy program and in the budget directives. Well, these will now have to be given mathematical form.

[Kert] When do you think the agreement can be signed?

[Bekesi] There was never any question of it being signed before the first quarter of 1995, since that is the IMF's schedule of approvals. But this is also the Hungarian Government's intention, since first of all we need to adopt the 1995 budget and the negotiation and submission of the three-year economic program which we mentioned before. [end recording]

TU Federation Sets Conditions for Social Accord

LD2510221494 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ], the largest trade union group, is asking the government to maintain the level of real wages next year in return for signing the social agreement. The trade unions summarized their demands in 10 points. Among the demands are the boosting of the economy and the preparation of a long-term plan for creating jobs.

For the MSZOSZ chairman, who is also a Hungarian Socialist Party deputy, at the moment is not clear whether the trade unions are able to sign an agreement with the government about the social pact. For the time being, the largest interest protection organization only knows what itself wants. The federal council of the MSZOSZ analyzed the government's draft for next year's budget for hours. [passage omitted]

The body's most important demand is that real wages should not be reduced next year. According to the government's proposal, the purchasing power of wages would be reduced by four percent next year. The MSZOSZ does not support the idea either of having a national agreement about the extent of wage reduction. The MSZOSZ considers it to be a local issue of individual companies and their employees.

According to Sandor Nagy, the ideas of the trade unions were received with understanding by the IMF chairman who recently visited Hungary. [passage omitted]

The politician and trade union leader is offering quite a prize, that is social peace in return to the government if it accepts the conditions.

[Begin Nagy recording] What the trade unions can offer in exchange is that there will be no endless strikes and demonstrations which, no doubt, would be very costly for the economy. [end recording]

Sandor Nagy also let it be understood that in a given situation, he might be forced to represent interests contrary to his own governing party and he did not considered it impossible that if a social pact had not come about, the trade unions would use strikes. [passage omitted]

Survey Shows Decreasing Confidence in Ministers

AU2510194094 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 22 Oct 94 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Szonda-Ipsos Public Opinion Poll on the Government—Confidence Is Decreasing But Has Not Yet Been Lost"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We regularly publish the latest results of the public opinion polls carried out every month by the Szonda Ipsos [public opinion research company], commissioned by MAGYAR HIRLAP, on the population's views on the activities of the Horn government's ministers and the government offices they lead. The inquiry is carried out in Budapest's 22 districts and the country's 105 various settlements, on different sets of 1,000 people on each occasion who, according to their age, gender, and dwelling place, represent the entire adult population who have a permanent address in Hungary. The publication of the results is particularly timely because the new government has been in office for precisely 100 days, in other words, the "grace period" that exists in the Western democracies has now expired. This grace period does not merely stem from politeness because, after handing over the government, roughly this period is needed for the outlines to emerge on the basis of which the public can form an opinion on the new cabinet's activities, intentions, and its past and expected activities.

Fading Hopes

[Passage omitted] Looking at our data, we can say with some irony that people's patience is waning. Compared to the distinctly good starting position at the end of

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summer, confidence in the Horn government's members is slowly eroding. The ministers' total suitability index decreased from 67 points in August and 64 points in September to 61 points in October. None of the government members are an exception to this general tendency, only the degrees are different. However, we cannot at all say that the government has already lost the population's confidence because the assessments are still in the positive half of the scale from 0 to 100 in the case of every minister and the government as a whole.

The general reductions of points has not changed the order of the ministers. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti continues to be considered the most suitable member of the Horn cabinet who is closely followed by the foreign, interior, and cultural ministers and the prime minister.

Naturally, it is still true that the voters who support one of the current government parties value the suitability of the Horn cabinet's members much higher than the supporters of the opposition parties do. The views of the two groups of people differ to such an extent that the opposition voters gave less than 50 points to half of the ministers and even the prime minister in October, which means that they see them as unsuitable rather than suitable for their positions. The biggest difference of views can actually be seen precisely in the case of the prime minister: The supporters of the government parties have a very positive view of him (80 points), while the supporters of the opposition parties rather express their dissatisfaction (47 points).

It seems that the past 100 days were just enough for some ministers to make the public familiar with them—if this is at all possible. While the proportion of those people who expressed their views very quickly increased from the low August level by September in the case of almost all ministers, this level did not continue to increase in October. Naturally, the public's familiarity with the leaders of various ministries is very different, which is partly due to the differences in the political past of these people and partly to the character of the area they lead.

Average for the Ministries

We have spoken about the views of the government members. In the second half of the questionnaire we asked people's views on the activities of the governmental apparatus, namely the various ministries. From this point of view, the government's assessment is much worse because the ministries have all been given worse valuations than their ministers; the average score is at around 50 points. In October, even the general improvement that had been seen in September was halted; in fact, we can actually see some decline. The foreign and defense ministries continue to be the most well-known areas while the labor and agricultural ministries received the worst marks.

In the case of the institutions, the valuations of the government supporter and opposition voters are closer to each other than in the case of the ministers. The only exception is the Finance Ministry's activity on which the opposition supporters have a very negative view (34 points).

To summarize the assessment of the first 100 days in the light of the public opinion survey, we can say that, compared to the favorable beginning, we have seen some fading of confidence. However, it would be difficult to indicate the long-term tendencies from these survey results.

SZDSZ Chairman on Coalition, Party Relations

AU2510145694 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 21 Oct 94 p 7

[Interview with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto by Istvan Boros; place and date not given: "1995—the Year of the If....—Peto on the Past in Brackets, the Devil, and When They Want To Rethink the Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Boros] Before you signed the coalition agreement with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], did the top leaders of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] agree among themselves on at which point they would leave the coalition if the MSZP was to violate this criterion?

[Peto] Our criterion is that the accepted government program must be in force. We will question whether the coalition can be maintained if, in 1995, we see that there is no chance to take the steps we consdier necessary for the economic policy changeover. This will become clear in 1995. Therefore, if the overall reforms are not started—the reform of state administration and the measures in connection with the economic policy changeover—if a privatization that is much more clear is not started, if major differences arise between the two parties in legislation for the Constitution, and if the media law is not passed, then we might have to rethink the situation.

[Boros] How much of a threat is all this for [Prime Minister] Gyula Horn? For an outsider, it seems that [MSZP Deputy Chairman] Imre Szekeres and you can easily agree in a given situation, but then you still have to take an autocratic politician like Horn into consideration who can upset your plans. For example, the property tax....

[Peto] I have to coordinate certain types of issues with Szekeres and, due to the nature of the issues, we might be able to harmonize these more easily than with Horn. The two parliamentary groups together are often forced to indicate to the government that the cabinet decisions are not yet prepared in the parliamentary groups. The two parliamentary groups—often in contrast with the government—are, if you like, partners of each other. It is obvious that the SZDSZ's party structure is different from that of the MSZP. We divide the roles more. The MSZP is actually a pyramid type structure where Horn's personal decisions are decisive in many aspects. Until he forms a view on a certain issue or says the final word, we might have partial agreements, but the issue cannot be

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seen as closed. In our party, after prior coordination, the politicians dealing with various issues represent the SZDSZ's views with a great deal of independence and it does not often happen that the completion of an issue depends on expressing my personal view.

[Peto] Does, therefore, Horn present a number of uncertainty factors? He is mainly an expert on foreign policy and it is not certain that he has a good overall view of other issues. At the same time, he has proven that he will unrelentingly try to achieve his main strategic goals.

[Peto] He is the prime minister, the head of the government. In certain cases, his word is automatically decisive due to his office. It is not a secret, and hopefully not an unfriendly statement on my part, if I say that Horn is seen in the MSZP as someone who does not always coordinate matters before making a statement, and this can result in problems. The SZDSZ would not like to accept this as a custom. For this reason, we have disagreements, and it can be expected from a government head to coordinate with the relevant ministers, especially on professional issues, when he makes statements.

[Boros] However, with his individual initiatives, he keeps creating situations where all you can do is retreat.

[Peto] It is unacceptable to retreat or to turn against. We have enough power within the coalition to prevent decisions being passed that are unacceptable for us. However, this is too little. We also want to be able to see positive events that mean the implementation of an accepted program. [passage omitted]

[Boros] On the basis of their articles and statements on the SZDSZ and the MSZP, it seems that opposition politicians and journalists can much rather accept the MSZP than the SZDSZ. As if the SZDSZ was the devil and the Socialists, well, they are dear and honest Hungarian people, but here we have these suspicious SZDSZ members.... Some kind of irrational hatred is in the background.

[Peto] The fact that the MSZP in a certain sense rules politics and has a decisive influence is almost natural for some of the politicians and publicists and they cannot see anything strange in this. However, they somehow saw the SZDSZ as alien to Hungarian politics, and simply attributed its success at the elections and it finishing as the second largest party, way ahead of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], to some supernatural or subnatural—the devil's—machinations. This is what irritates these people so much. Let us remember that, two years ago, [MDF member] Jozsef Debreczeni threatened the SZDSZ with the 4-percent margin, namely that it would not even reach this level. Some people see intrigue, some kind of secrecy, irrationality, the cooperation and influence of international capital, and some kind of free masons' affair in the SZDSZ's success. However, another explanation also exists. The MSZP's efforts—I do not mean as a whole, but in many elements—are more attractive for certain opposition politicians and publicists. They stand closer to the MSZP's views than to ours because, in a traditional sense of the word, a significant conservatism is present in the MSZP. For them, our intention to renew things and our radicalism—namely that we want to change things that are not functioning well—are less popular. In very many cases, it might be part of the issue that people who have strong emotions and aversion against us fitted very well into the previous regime. [passage omitted]

FIDESZ's Kover Addresses Center-Right Conference

94CH0424C Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 9 Sep 94 pp 6-7

["Abridged text" of speech by Laszlo Kover, member of the Federation of Young Democrats executive committee, at the Windsor Club's conference on 18 July 1994 in Hungary, city not given: "The Chances of a Field Mouse on Burning Stubble"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Cooperation or Annihilation

The way I see it, every party has come to realize that the opposition must cooperate in some form or other, in order to preserve its remaining position, or—to put it more bluntly—to survive. That cooperation will answer the question of whether to be or not to be. This is in contrast with the past four years, when none of the opposition parties was under such compulsion, although some of them—citing all kinds of threats from the far right—would have liked to make others believe that they were.

I must dispute the contention that our election defeat is not catastrophic. In my opinion, the defeat is indeed catastrophic, because it carries within itself the possibility of annihilation. Today the question is no longer whether the tripolar system, on which FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] had based its strategy, is dead. The question is whether we will have a "unipolar" system, or will a truly bipolar system of political rotation evolve.

Let me add a polemic comment to this. I believe that two liberal parties do not exist in Hungary today. There are two parliamentary parties that profess to being liberal and have links of varying closeness with the Liberal International. But if we examine the voters' motivation and consider the ones who were motivated either by self-interest or by a system of values, then I doubt whether any of the voters who supported the two parties could automatically be called liberals. I am convinced that there is no stable liberal system of values in Hungary, and certain surveys bear this out. I think what also Peter Tolgyessy has dwelt on briefly—that even the "liberal voters" who had been motivated by self-interest voted mostly for the MSZP, expecting it to produce a program for the market economy's further development, which would be to their advantage.

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But let us revert to the main thread of our discussion: The parties mentioned are slow to realize that they cannot continue their politics of the past four years. There are many MP's [members of parliament] in the opposition benches who believe they ought to continue where they left off in the second round of the elections. I am convinced that this failure to recognize the situation not only makes cooperation among these parties impossible; it will also lead to their extinction.

Two Scenarios

In my judgment, two extreme scenarios are conceivable for the period until the next general elections. According to one scenario, this coalition will cast itself in concrete. It has at its disposal all the legal and extralegal means to do so.

This could mean two subvariants. It could mean stable government with the participation of these two parties, over the life spans of several Parliaments. There would be some sort of formation serving as the opposition, but without the slightest hope of ever coming to power. I must say that the conception of this strategy by the governing coalition would become increasingly obvious as the chairman of the Smallholders Party began hogging an ever larger proportion of the total time that the electronic media set aside for the opposition. And the more the alternative offered by the opposition turned into something like this, the more readily would competent social groups regard the alternative as frivolous and unacceptable.

According to the other subvariant, the future of the bipolar system of political rotation would evolve around the two coalition parties. This is a stated strategic direction, and therefore there is no particular need to read between the lines. It is being stated, or has already been stated, by intellectual thinkers and politicians close to the present government. Earlier, Miklos Szabo wrote an essay in which he clearly argued that everything modern could be formulated within the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] and already existed there. Consequently, everything else was superfluous. Lately, they have been adding the MSZP's name to that of the SZDSZ. But at the same time, they have been questioning openly the opposition parties', especially FIDESZ's, reason for existing....

According to the other extreme scenario, the pendulum will swing back from the left to the right, because the government will be unable to fulfill the enormous expectations it raised. If that happens, those will survive who were able to climb onto the pendulum at the midpoint of its swing. And those who were not able to do so will vanish. In other words, the question here is: Will there be a center right in the future? Or, as the possible second pole, will there be only a right undergoing radicalization? After all, this scenario contains the political structure's polarization.

If either of these extreme scenarios were realized, there would be no justification to think about a center right. Consequently, what we are talking about, what is worth talking about, lies somewhere between these two extreme alternatives. Which means that the core of the next governing coalition should be a center-right group. It is really worth thinking and saying something about how this could be accomplished, and it is mostly here that my own perplexity will manifest itself.

Additional questions arise here. The first such question is: How far should this center-right group extend, considering what is on offer at present? To this question there are various answers, unspoken for the time being. Some say this bloc should comprise the Smallholders Party, the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] and the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], and perhaps also FIDESZ, if FIDESZ is willing to join forces with Torgyan. Anyhow, 8 percent of the Smallholders Party would be needed in such a group and must not be ignored. The rest [of the Smallholders Party] would not be worth the bother....

There is, of course, also another answer, uttered less and less frequently, and ever so quietly: Some see the formation of a center-right group feasible by breaking up FIDESZ and integrating it into the MDF. I personally do not regard either of the two alternatives as appealing or feasible.

And a Third Variant

Therefore let us agree that a third variant would also be feasible, in which the circle could include the KDNP, the MDF, FIDESZ, and certain factions within the SZDSZ. . . .

The next question is: Which political grouping or party is to be at the center of this future conglomerate, and who is to determine its aspect? Perhaps it will be expedient to go back to the previous question raised, according to which there exist different ideas and ambitions, and it is only natural that everyone would like to stake out his place at the center of this future center-right group. And the extent of everyone's willingness to admit others depends on his ability to maintain his own central position.

I wish to note—in agreement with Peter Tolgyessy—that, in my opinion, also the future prospects of this center-right group will depend on which groups will be able to exert the most influence on shaping this group's aspect. A further question is: What kind of relationship should there be in the future among the group's constituent elements?

Three possible solutions are conceivable. First, there can be a loose confederation, within which there is actual cooperation among the opposition in Parliament. Second, a party alliance can be formed, within which there are distinct, relatively autonomous, independent groups, but outward the alliance acts in unity. Third, an amalgamation is feasible—either as a consolidation in which a new party absorbs the earlier ones; or as a

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merger in which the parties partially cease as such, and their remaining party elites or party members join the one party that seems the most viable.

Finally we have to ask: Through what steps can we reach the desired objective, assuming we know what that objective is?

We have to anticipate the difficulties that will loom before us, regardless of which solution we choose. I have in mind the inertia of organizations, their sense of self-preservation, the understandable tendency of party chairmen, general secretaries, secretaries and other functionaries to dislike being forced to move from the front row to the second row.

There has already been mention of the serious grievances that exist between the parties' local members and elites. Naturally, fears have also been expressed regarding the imagined or real ulterior motives of others. Everyone asks himself what kind of party he would like to belong to (here I refer to what has been said about political amateurism). And these people also ask themselves whether it is worth investing time and effort in a party to which they actually would rather not belong, and would an honest civil occupation not be more profitable for them in every respect. Therefore, will these politicians and party elite be capable of reaching with one another the compromises without which no amalgamation can result, in any form?

We have also discussed how fickle the social base of these parties is, and that a significant proportion of the Smallholder Party's and the KDNP's supporters—and I say this without any cynicism—will have died out in four years from now. We have to mention also FIDESZ, which is again coping with problems. Its base of support is too young, and for that very reason also uncertain, fickle, and difficult to mobilize. The question is: Will these supporters not outgrow FIDESZ within four years? Because, in my judgment, FIDESZ is an excessively generation-oriented party, more so than before. [passage omitted]

The willingness and ability to cooperate demonstrated in the coming weeks and months, during the preparations for local elections, will significantly influence the opposition parties' future prospects. But I am convinced that it will be even more important to start elaborating the future civil liberal-conservative center right's intellectual background. But this is work to be done primarily by intellectuals rather than politicians, before forums such as this one.

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Counterintelligence To Present Drawsko Findings

WS2610115394 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 26 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "Military Counterintelligence Will Share Findings on Drawsko Dinner; Confused by Voting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even Piotr Kolodziejczyk is no longer certain whether a formal vote on his recall was actually held in Drawsko. During yesterday's session of the Sejm subcommittee investigating the crisis in the Ministry of National Defense [MON], the minister said that he saw General Tadeusz Wilecki raise his hand and Vice Admiral Romuald Waga abstain from the vote. A week ago the minister remembered many more hands being raised.

Apart from Kolodziejczyk, only President Lech Walesa has so far mentioned a vote in Drawsko. All of the generals that took part in the dinner unanimously denied this. Vice Adm. Romuald Waga, who testified before the committee yesterday, did not see any vote, either. Neither did Waga confirm Kolodziejczyk's report that right after the dinner in Drawsko, Waga told him that the entire meeting had been prepared by two General Staff generals.

"Watch is being kept though the storm that is raging round us," Waga told journalists before testifying in front of the committee.

The deputies, who were completely confused by the dinner participants' conflicting reports, decided to invite to its session Gen. Bishop Slawoj Leszek Glodz, who, according to Tomasz Nalecz of the Union of Labor, "should have more sensitivity" because he is a clergyman.

Committee Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski noted that the General Staff and the minister perceive the reasons for the conflict within MON differently. The generals raised, first of all, economic, financial, and legislative issues, and, according to Kolodziejczyk, there is a conflict over to whom the Army should be subordinated—the president or the minister.

Three deputies of the subcommittee will soon be presented with counterintelligence materials. The counterintelligence services tried to find out whether the events in Drawsko were recorded in any way and who leaked the information about the dinner.

The deputies are going to continue the work of the subcommittee until 4 November.

General Staff After Drawsko

WS2510150094 Warsaw GAZETA POLSKA in Polish 20 Oct 94 pp 1, 7

[Article by Piotr Jakucki: "Revolt in the General Staff"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The "Drawsko Rebellion" was engineered by Mieczyslaw Wachowski and generals grouped within the so-called Officers Association, a secret organization carrying out informal orders of the head of General Staff [SG], General Tadeusz Wilecki. A vote of confidence was taken to establish the fate of not only Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, but also that of a civilian defense minister.*

The Woroszylow Group Misses the Polish People's Republic [PRL]

The meeting with President Lech Walesa was concluded by a vote initiated by the head of state after a briefing by commanding officers. Voters included:

Army Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki—head of the SG

Division General Lech Komornicki—deputy head of the SG, head of the Training Inspectorate

Division General Edmund Bolociuch—first deputy of the SG

Division General Zbigniew Zalewski—deputy head of the SG in charge of the Logistics Inspectorate

Division General Tadeusz Bazidlo—commander of the Pomeranian Military District

Division General Julian Lewinski—adviser to the Warsaw Military District

Division General Janusz Ornatowski—head of the Silesian Military District

Division General Zenon Bryk—head of the Krakow Military District

Vice Admiral Romuald Waga—deputy head of the Polish Navy

Division General Jerzy Gotowala—head of the Air Force and Air Defense

Division General Bis[illegible] Slawoj Leszek Glodz—field ordinary of the Polish Army [WP].

Apart from the last and Adm. Waga, every participant is a graduate of the Woroszylow Military Academy in the former USSR (Waga studied at the USSR Naval Academy). According to GAZETA POLSKA sources, the vote was not to decide whether Kolodziejczyk stayed or went but to establish the need for civilian supervision over the Army. Except for Gen. Zalewski and Adm. Waga, everyone voted against a civilian defense minister and subordinated the SG directly to the president.

Bermuda Triangle: Wilecki, Wachowski, the Officers Association

The operation had been prepared for several months. It was spearheaded by Mieczyslaw Wachowski. The elimination of Kolodziejczyk, who had lost the support of the presidential center on charges of listening to the dictate of Pawlak and ignoring the orders of Walesa and replacing him with a person who would obey Walesa and Wachowski, would allow the president and the SG to take full control over the Armed Forces. The candidate of the Belweder and the commanding officers would be Tadeusz

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Wilecki, who maintains close contacts with Mieczyslaw Wachowski. The 47-year-old head of the SG was appointed to this post to replace General Zdzislaw Stelmaszak, who supported former Defense Minister Jan Parys in his fight against the Belweder's unconstitutional attempts to take over control of the Ministry of National Defense [MON].

According to information from highly reliable sources, Gen. Wilecki is most probably controlling the activities of the so-called Officers Association, members of which include high-ranking WP commanding officers, and which is headed by Franciszek Puchala and Leszek Chyla. The latter is in charge of mobilization in the SG. General Piotr Szweda, deputy to General Jan Kuriata, responsible for weapons and military infrastructure, is a gray eminence in this organization. The association was established in 1992 and advocates handing over control of the Polish Republic's Armed Forces to the head of the SG, and completely eliminating civilian control. SG members declare loyalty to the Belweder, demanding the subordination of the Army to the president.

Before the rebellion in Drawsko, Gen. Wilecki and his group had strong support from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], which claimed that the minister was going too far in his seemingly pro-NATO policy.

"After the events of 30 September, the SLD changed tactics. It began supporting Kolodziejczyk because it wanted to oppose Walesa, at the same time building its public image as a defender of democracy," a high-ranking MON official tells us.

The Same Clique

"It was a sort of conspiracy," the MON head comments on the events at Drawsko.

"Kolodziejczyk fell into his own trap. His moves led to limiting the influence of the SG generals. It had to end in mutiny. The SG has received the support of the Belweder. It is not true that we are dealing with a power struggle between 'supporters of reform' and 'postcommunists.' This is a struggle between a clique that wishes the PRL were back and another that wants exactly the same thing," a military insider tells GAZETA. Having taken office in 1992, Gen. Wilecki began strengthening the position of the generals. The number of full-time staff was increased, most of which doubled the civilian staff. The SG also wanted to take over the Military Information Services [WSI], which had thus far been supervised by the ministry. The SG Press Bureau is allocated the largest funding from the MON administration budget (approximately 4 percent).

Questionable Vistula Military Units [NJW]

The Drawsko crisis may lead to a distinct polarization of relations within the Army. Whereas Wilecki is supported by the SG staff and the Belweder, Kolodziejczyk is backed by some of the WP units—for instance, the NJW (subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Rear Admiral Marek Toczek of the Navy is the NJW commander. In times when Kolodziejczyk enjoyed the support of the Belweder, the NJW served as an argument for the president. After Drawsko, where Rear Adm. Waga opposed the abolition of civilian control over the Army and the dismissal of Kolodziejczyk, the Navy-controlled NJW may come out from under Lech Walesa's influence. As we have learned, after 30 September, the NJW staff voiced the opinion that it would not support the president if a full-scale conflict were to develop.

Kolodziejczyk has yet another ace up his sleeve—the military special services. They were once headed by Admiral Czeslaw Wawrzyniak, connected with the GRU [Chief Administration for Intelligence; Division of the General Staff of the Soviet Army], until he was dismissed by Jan Parys. At present, Wawrzyniak is an adviser to the minister, and the WSI is headed by Colonel Jozef Malajczyk. The latter is a man trusted by General Boleslaw Izydorczyk (former head of the WSI, closely connected with Wawrzyniak and Kolodziejczyk, dismissed in 1994 when U.S. intelligence presented Polish authorities with documents showing Izydorczyk's ties to the Soviet secret services).

Stop Quarreling!

Younger officers look upon quarrels among commanding officers in MON with distaste. Instead of fighting, they believe a thorough training program should be launched for soldiers whose skills are deteriorating with each passing year. Situations resembling that in Drawsko may postpone or even exclude our membership in NATO.

Conflict Goes On

WS2510120194 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by "(pw)": "Will Kolodziejczyk Resign? Will the Prime Minister Accept His Resignation? The Conflict Continues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Sejm subcommittee investigating the crisis in the National Defense Ministry will issue its findings. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk will decide whether to tender his resignation following his meeting with the prime minister, we learned unofficially.

During its last meeting, the subcommittee heard the testimony of Rear Admiral Romuald Waga, another participant at the Drawsko dinner. When several generals, gathered at the Karwice palace, expressed a vote of no confidence in the minister, he abstained.

All generals from the General Staff who have given testimony so far have unanimously denied that a formal vote was held at the Drawsko dinner on whether to recall Kolodziejczyk. "We did determine, however, that there were activities that the president and the prime minister might have interpreted as a vote," Subcommittee Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski said on 21 October.

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According to him, the date of the minister's resignation was also determined in Drawsko.

Minister Kolodziejczyk himself will once again offer testimony before the subcommittee. He said that he would not withdraw the charges of insubordination that he had leveled against the staff and General Tadeusz Wilecki, its head.

Kolodziejczyk declared that he would submit his resignation regardless of the result of the committee's work. According to his close aides, however, he now determines his future actions on the stand taken by Waldemar Pawlak. He will meet with the prime minister probably this afternoon during the session of the Council of Ministers.

Last week, the General Staff head declared that he might continue to cooperate with Kolodziejczyk. Asked whether it is possible to resolve the dispute and whether it is possible for Kolodziejczyk to cooperate with Wilecki, our source replied: "That is out of the question."

Most probably, the final discussion on the fate of the defense minister and the staff head will be held on Wednesday at the session of the National Defense Committee. Participants in its sessions include, among others, the president, the prime minister, the defense minister, and the head of the General Staff.

Minister: No Intent To Resign

LD2510141194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1400 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk has denied a report by Leszek Bugaj, a member of the Sejm subcommission examining the conflict in the National Defense Ministry [MON], that he allegedly intends to resign.

Minister Kolodziejczyk and Vice Admiral Romuald Waga, commander of the Navy, appeared before the commission today.

Walesa Interviewed on Presidential Rule

WS2510121594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 Oct 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with President Lech Walesa by Dariusz Fikus and Kazimierz Groblewski; place and date not given: "I Will Not Agree to Stagnation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview Lech Walesa gave RZECZPOSPOLITA yesterday, the president of the Republic of Poland said, among other things:

—that our country needs "a leader to implement state policies and Polish reforms with determination";

—that the political system in Poland generated conflicts and that he, as president, would try to change that;

—that he had not and would not change his attitude on the issue of the National Broadcasting Council;

—that he was unable to fulfill his promises because the prevailing political and legal system made it impossible, and that he therefore suggested the introduction of presidential rule, which would benefit Poland "regardless of who is president";

—that he was not yet 100 percent sure whether he would run in the presidential election, and that it depended on the introduction of presidential rule;

—that he would prevent the parliament from "violating the law" in a "civilized way, with regard for state security";

—that he disagreed with many concepts of Waldemar Pawlak's government, with "stagnation," and that he would have had dissolved the current government if he had a constitutional right to do so, eventually leaving 80 or 90 percent of its present members;

—that he would support the emergence of a rightist bloc, and, if it was unable to appear of its own accord, he would have to "build something here," although for the time being he was unwilling to form a new political group;

—that he would not dismiss Mieczyslaw Wachowski because no one had a right to impose staff policy on him, adding that he might introduce some changes if the system was modified.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Mister President, you are under attack from all sides, from the Freedom Union, the right, the government coalition, the parliament. What is your next move going to be? Do you want to extinguish the current conflicts, or, on the contrary, to aggravate them?

[Walesa] The situation should not be viewed in such categories, but in categories of responsibility for what we will create. How often I have read in the papers: Who rules this country? Where is the head of this household? I must admit I also do not see him. Neither does the nation. Therefore, I suggest that the Constitution should define who is in charge. I believe that a leader is needed for the interim period, someone who will decisively and firmly carry out state policies and Polish reforms. A presidential system guarantees that, so it has to be provided for in the Constitution.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] But you have been president for four years. And you say there is no head of state?

[Walesa] You must remember where we started. Of course, some may say everything could have been steered. We could have agreed with Geremek, Mazowiecki, and others to divide the Polish scene. We could have divided it because it had to be divided. We could have agreed to do it together, in agreement, and that would have been nice. It was a possibility. But that would have been manipulative. I support strong divisions within this term in office, but a process of a proper joining of forces would have to be initiated at the same

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time—proper as far as orientations, attitudes, and political programs are concerned. Observing what the developments are, I try to put everything together.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You did not tell us what your next move is going to be, what you are going to do now, what your plans are.

[Walesa] I will say what everyone knows—that the current political system generates conflicts. I recently arrived at that conclusion. It is what I focus on right now. I have come forth with the idea of introducing presidential rule because, in my view, it is efficient. But you could choose another solution: You could do away with the president altogether, and his responsibility could be taken over by the prime minister or the speaker of the Sejm. That is a way out.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What are you going to do next? We are asking this question for the third time. Who will you dismiss, who will you appoint, what are your next moves going to be?

[Walesa] In the campaign battle that has just begun, politicians are applying simple associations. They think that I am acting upon impulse or that I want more control. I do not want to take over. But, when I observe others work, I see that they are ineffective, so I want more influence and improvement. I am deeply convinced that the National Broadcasting Council has really done a bad job. And I had to make the moves I made to turn them back. At the same time, I had to observe the law. I tried to meet the requirements of the law with sense and effectiveness.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What will you say in your address to the nation?

[Walesa] I will say exactly what we have been talking about—that Poland has no leader, that Poland will have no leader if the system is not changed. I have not implemented the program I declared. I have said earlier, during the election campaign, that there would be no possibility of implementing it unless the system changes. My predictions proved right. Therefore, I suggest we establish a system that is more efficient, that will be more operative.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Simply because you state that presidential rule is best for Poland does not necessarily make it true. The parliament and the political parties have different opinions.

[Walesa] So let me ask you: Who runs this country?

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You have been president for the past four years.

[Walesa] You say things are fine, and I say they are not. I have a suggestion. I think it is the best there is, but some may believe otherwise. I am looking for a leader for this country. I think a reform of the system will be good for us, regardless of who is president.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Therefore, you would like to become the leader. Why are you not one at present?

[Walesa] Given the current political conditions, I cannot be. I have no political platform. I am blocked. I may only negate, veto. Each of my proposals, even the best of the legislative initiatives, share the fate of my idea to allow the nation to come forth with Constitution drafts. They have rejected my idea only to approve another, basically the same, only they raised the limit from 100,000 to half a million. The system is designed so that I may only negate and not act constructively. My constructive concepts are rejected.

I will try to fix that. I have already said this does not have to be my idea. I ask for other suggestions, so that both the nation and I know who is in charge. Fine, let us transfer the responsibility of the president to the speaker or the government. Because today, when we have a government, a parliament, and a president, everyone is pulling in opposite directions. This cannot be good, and it is impossible to have one leader.

Let me put it a different way. I suspect everyone who is trying to keep up this chaos, that they have no program for Poland, that they want chaos, they do not want effective rule. At the same time, they shun responsibility. Demanding presidential rule and running in the elections, I am not afraid of responsibility. I want to pay my bill but not the way I do currently—that I pay all the bills yet have no executive power to implement what the nation bills me for and demands of me.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Mister President, your latest decisions give rise to fears that you will stop at nothing to win the election, that you might even impose martial law, lead the Army out into the streets. Is that part of your philosophy?

[Walesa] No, I would never do that. I will observe the law, but I will try to change it. I just want to make it clear that I am president, and, if the country became destabilized or its interests were threatened or an enemy stood on its borders, I would do anything to save Poland and my fellow countrymen. This has nothing to do with the conflict about the system that has broken out in our country. There is no such need within this conflict, and there never will be. There is no danger that, driven by ambition, I would resort to force anyone toward combat. I am waiting for arguments. I am ready to accept them and change my opinion. Please give me arguments.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Does that also mean that you will not, for instance, dissolve the parliament?

[Walesa] Not under the current conditions, of course, which do not allow me to do so anyway. Unless the parliament violates the law, and it already has to some extent because it has sentenced the prime minister without a trial. The parliament has no right to do so. If the parliament violates the law, it should keep in mind that it might pay the consequences. Just as I myself may

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not violate the law, I will not allow the parliament to do so, either. I want that to be clear. I will act in a more civilized manner, with respect for national security, within the framework of democracy, provided the arguments are strong enough.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Are you sure you will not change your mind and definitely run in the election?

[Walesa] I am not yet 100 percent sure whether I will run. If the next term in office is to be like this one then no, thank you, I will not run because I have done something for this country and want to do more.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What do you mean by: "If the next term in office is to be like this one"?

[Walesa] If the current system is retained and we remain without a leader, I do not want to be president. I want to do something for Poland. I see stagnation; I see mismanagement of the country; I see inefficiency. Therefore, I am presenting other solutions and, within such concepts, I am prepared to take on responsibility, to oppose everyone who does not want responsibility, who wants some obscure system. I am the only one prepared to take on responsibility without fear.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Does this practically mean that you will not run in the elections unless presidential rule is provided for in the Constitution? Is this what you are saying?

[Walesa] You could say so. But I have a feeling for the nation, and I know what it wants. I am certain that, in a constitutional referendum, the nation will decide that it does want a leader.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What are your true intentions regarding the Army?

[Walesa] Even if a noncommissioned officer has problems with an officer, he informs his seniors. I thus had a right to carry out a discussion with the Army because I am the commander in chief of the Armed Forces in general. So what are we talking about? I had the right. Moreover, I wanted to find an honorable solution together with the generals, among whom I include the admiral. I did not want to bring in anyone else. Being aware that this was a huge conflict that had been going on for almost a year, I wanted to solve it like a gentleman, between the generals.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] No one refuses you the right to enter discussions with the Army, but you did something else: You provoked a situation in which the generals could decide whether the minister stayed or had to go.

[Walesa] No, that was not what the discussion was about. We talked about everything, about unsolved problems, about unnecessary conflicts. Everyone had his turn to speak. In the end, they stated that cooperation was impossible within that group. That was all. No one waged a war against the admiral or anyone else. Because I knew that the admiral was also a general, that they ate the same army bread, I thought it worthwhile to settle the issue in a normal way, like a gentleman. The minister had told me earlier that this was a problem with only one general, not all of them. I talked to the minister in front of everyone to show the minister this was not true, that everyone held a grudge against him, not just one general. The grudges were not political, but human, petty, grounded on ambition.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] So this was a social gathering...

[Walesa] Exactly.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] ...and your naivete was taken advantage of, and the whole issue was blown up.

[Walesa] Not my naivete but the fact that I am a gentleman.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] How do you intend to straighten out your relations with the government? Will you cooperate, assist it, or will you stand in opposition?

[Walesa] I have helped and continue to help, but whether I will continue to do so remains an open question. I do not agree with many concepts of the current government. I do not agree with stagnation, with the way in which many issues are handled at present—for example, the issues of the head of police, privatization, and many others.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Do you think this government should resign?

[Walesa] If I only had the right that was denied me by the Small Constitution, I would have dissolved the government a long time ago. Of course, not everyone in the current government is doing a bad job, but they are inefficient. Therefore, I would leave 80-90 percent of its members, but some of them would have to be replaced.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Would you dismiss the prime minister or let him stay?

[Walesa] The government cannot be dissolved leaving the prime minister intact.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Everything you have been doing lately leads to isolation, making you a lone fighter.

[Walesa] Because cliques have appeared, there are already fixed groups. Couches are being moved and joined. Elites that have taken over power from the communists following the "Roundtable" are now trying to maintain that power. Therefore, if you try to force them to start building in a different way, to apply different implementation methods, everyone begins to shout because they are being deprived of the possibility of feigning action.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] There was a time when you were surrounded by many people: Kurski, Pusz, Rybicki, the Kaczynskis, the liberals. Some went away on their own, others you threw out. There is no eminent politician at present who would support Walesa. You are alone. Why?

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[Walesa] This is not so. My office was to be apolitical. I had to dismiss everyone if I wanted to remain true to what I preached.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You stated earlier in this interview that you have no supportive platform. You have announced repeatedly that you would create such a platform. You have never done so. Where do you intend to seek allies? Who will you rely on?

[Walesa] I do not wish to destabilize the pluralism that is currently emerging; therefore, I threaten and encourage rather than act. I do not want to establish any party or to head one unless I am forced to do so.

After the great victory I led, I am now tempted to win a second victory by building a true, effective system in Poland. I coax, scare, and threaten. Sometimes I am successful, sometimes I am not. That depends. Some say I am successful, that the left is gaining strength. Very good. This strengthening of the left will lead to a strengthening of the right. That is obvious to me.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Will you support the right?

[Walesa] I will try to help it grow. If not, I will have to construct something else to balance the inequality of democracy today.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] You have spoken of staff changes within your office. Many rightist politicians, since we have begun to speak of the right, claim they would be willing to support you if you dismissed Minister Mieczyslaw Wachowski. Will you do that?

[Walesa] I will not. I will not allow anyone to choose my dancing partners for me. I have consistently refused to do so before. Before the "Roundtable" I did not surrender to the communists' demands that Kuron and Michnik be excluded from the talks. I am doing the same thing now. Of course, if the concepts change and new people are called, I have already proved that I am not guided by habits, that I am ruthless in implementing ideas. Therefore, it is possible that, if the concepts are different, there will be different people. That is obvious.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Who would you really like to dance with?

[Walesa] With people who think as I do, who also believe that this country has no leader and that the system is to blame—people who want to improve the system. Everyone who fits the description: Please follow me!

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Who do you think will vote for you in the election?

[Walesa] A sufficient number of voters to guarantee my victory, if I do decide to run. I know I am conceited, but that is how I have always been, and that is why I won.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] What are the grounds for your optimism? Opinion polls do not claim you will win.

[Walesa] Twenty-five years of work have proved that I headed the movement on my own—moreover, that my suggestions were really the best. Despite everyone, despite these polls, I am sure I will win. I just do not know yet whether I will run.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Why are you going to the United States?

[Walesa] It is unimaginable that the president fighting for the Third Republic, whom the American Poles have stood by, would not attend their anniversary, while the successor of communism did. I know Pawlak is not a communist; he is a young man, but he is in the postcommunist system. Is that a nice present for the American Poles?

Poll: People Increasingly Critical of Cabinet

WS2510124494 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 25 Oct 94 p 2

[Report by NIKA: "OBOP: Leftist Cabinet Lost Over a Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A year after the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] took over power in Poland, the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP] asked Poles to evaluate this period. The results of the research show that the Pawlak government, which initially created great social expectations, is increasingly criticized.

Fifty-four percent of respondents say that since the SLD and the PSL won the election, the overall situation in the country has changed for the worse (as recently as June, 34 percent expressed this opinion). The optimists who can see an improvement are almost half as numerous (28 percent); in June they were more numerous (42 percent).

The acceptance of the present composition of the government is also steadily decreasing: Nearly half of the respondents to the October poll say that this composition is not good. Right now, every third respondent gives positive grades. It is worth recalling that, as recently as March of this year, the percentage of those who were satisfied with the composition of the government was equal to the percentage of those who criticized it (39 percent).

Forty-eight percent of respondents agree with the statement that Pawlak's people are introducing some changes to the policy carried out by the previous governments. Thirty-nine percent say that it is not contributing anything new to it (the percentage of people who express this opinion has increased since last November by 25 percentage points).

In November of last year, every second Pole was convinced that the government would keep its election promises, and only every fourth Pole believed that it would not implement what it had promised. Now 68 percent of respondents say that the coalition is not meeting its campaign commitments.

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Asked why this is happening, they most often pointed to the lack of unity in the government and in the coalition that supports it. According to 39 percent of respondents, these promises were made only for the purpose of winning power in Poland, and, in reality, the government never intended to implement them. Every third respondent believes that the disputes with the president hinder the implementation of the campaign promises, and every sixth respondent that this hindrance is the poor condition of the state and of the economy.

Who exerts the greatest influence on the government today? The respondents, who could choose three answers, most often pointed to the Sejm (44 percent), the church (41 percent), the president (36 percent), and foreign capital (24 percent).

The research study was conducted by OBOP between 1 and 4 October of this year on a random sample of 1,130 Poles over age 16.

Conflicts Among Rightist Leaders Examined

WS2610134794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Private or Political Disputes? Right-Wing Leaders Do Not Like One Another"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chrzanowski cannot stand the sight of Parys, Parys bears a grudge against Kaczynski, Kaczynski does not like Czarnecki, Czarnecki hates Macierewicz, Macierewicz can reach agreement only with Olszewski, and both of them cannot stand the sight of Szeremietiew. This is what the public still thinks about the right side of the political scene, which has failed to unite and which keeps quarreling. Leaders of the right wing, however, say that there are no private antipathies among them.

The list of rightist politicians who are said to dislike one another might be much longer, and probably in all cases the dispute was caused by ambition or personal matters. There is no reason that Wieslaw Chrzanowski should like Jan Parys because the latter once called him a "communist informer." Parys...

Bears a Grudge

...against Jaroslaw Kaczynski for leaving the Secretariat of Center Rightist Groupings (comprising, among others, the Movement of the Third Republic) after the parliamentary election and forming a bloc with Chrzanowski's Christian-National Union [ZChN]. Kaczynski allegedly dislikes Ryszard Czarnecki because of the young age of the acting ZChN president. Czarnecki, in turn, cannot stand the sight of Antoni Macierewicz for his inefficient file-checking and for placing Chrzanowski on the "list of agents." Incidentally, the former head of the Internal Affairs Ministry [Macierewicz] does not enjoy the sympathy of almost anyone—not because of file-reviewing but because of the style of his political activities, because of setting up small, closed, and conspiratorial groups. Macierewicz reaches agreement only with Olszewski. Neither of them likes Romuald Szeremietiew because he defeated the former prime minister in the election of the new chairman of the Movement for the Republic [RdR]. "Indeed, Jan Olszewski and Staszek [diminutive of Stanislaw] Weglowski (chairman of the other RdR) do not like me. However, Jarek [diminutive of Jaroslaw] Kaczynski has stopped liking me, as well," Szeremietiew says. "He is behaving as though I had...

Kicked Up a Ruckus

...in the living room. He says that he will never sit at the same table with me. Well, despite that, I like Jaroslaw Kaczynski. He is a man with a good sense of humor; he is intelligent and brilliant. He is still a partner of mine," the RdR leader adds.

However, it is the conflict between the leader of the Center Accord [PC] and the Union for Real Politics [UPR] that is considered to be the factor most impeding the integration of the right wing at the moment. These parties are fighting against each other in both purely political activities and press polemics. The chairmen of both groupings rule out the possibility of holding negotiations, which keeps delaying an agreement between two coalitions: the Covenant for Poland (PC, ZChN, RdR, Peasant Accord, and the Conservative Coalition—KK) and the Accord of 11 November (UPR, Conservative Party—PK, Peasant-Christian Party, Party of Christian Democrats, and National-Democratic Party). "I cannot say that I personally have a negative attitude toward Mr. Kaczynski, who really dislikes us. I dislike not him but what he is doing because his goal is to secure power. If Mr. Kaczynski became a member of our coalition, we would not only have to fight with enemies from outside, but also combat an internal conspiracy," says UPR's Stanislaw Michalkiewicz. He adds that he thinks highly of the PC president's ability to devise political plots and that he would be a "great statesman if only he knew what his intrigue is for."

"Personal relations are important only when they turn into a political fact; now, I cannot see such a situation in the right wing. UPR is attacking us for political reasons," says Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and adds: "I am certainly not vindictive. If I were, I would have to quarrel with everyone because our party has been attacked by many. There was a time when Mr. Janusz Korwin-Mikke [UPR chairman] compared me to Hitler, and, when I ridiculed the extreme character of his views, he spat on the floor." The PC president admits that private sympathy might facilitate negotiations on the formation of an alliance. However, he himself does not maintain any social contacts with politicians of the right wing (with the exception of the KK leaders).

Aleksander Hall does not really like Kazimierz Michal Ujazdowski, who, together with a group of his colleagues, split Hall's PK and formed the KK. Ujazdowski says that the politicians...

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Do Not Maintain Social Contact

"Work in a post office does not differ that much from the work of politicians in this respect," says the KK leader, who stresses that conflicts concern the choice of different political roads rather than personal matters. Ujazdowski concedes, however, that he finds it difficult to recall Freedom Union politicians who like him; they accuse him of splitting the Democratic Union and of encouraging Hall's group to leave the party. "Indeed, politics in the right wing is considerably influenced by old issues, which have been going on since the 1990 election and the conflict between Mazowiecki and Walesa. Another such issue is the fact that the PC did not become part of the Suchocka cabinet," says Robert Stepien, general secretary of Hall's PK. According to Stepien, however, "the time for the conservative-liberal option to unite is drawing near."

PSL Bill on Parties, Campaign Financing Viewed

WS2510125194 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 25 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Piotr Zaremba: "No for the Small"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Janusz Dobrosz, spokesman of the deputies' club of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], reported on Sunday in Wroclaw that a bill on political parties had been submitted in the Sejm.

This initiative is a repeat of the bill submitted by the PSL in the spring of 1993. Janusz Piechocinski argued then that subsidies from the budget would consolidate the party system and that the barrier of 10,000 party members would put an end to fictitious parties. It would also force politicians to refer to more "than only parliament members and several newspapers." "In Poland, there is room for five or six strong groups," he stated. This argument was repeated by Dobrosz.

The 1990 Law on Parties does not envision any state subsidies for parties. It is, however, quite liberal as far as the establishment of new groupings is concerned: A motion signed by 15 persons is enough for a party to be registered in a court of law. As a consequence, there are over 200 parties in Poland, even though only six are represented in the Sejm and 10 to 12 are major groupings.

The Electoral Law of 1993 introduced limited subsidies for groupings. It allowed for partial return of costs of the election campaign of those groupings that won seats in the Sejm or in the Senate.

Most European states do not subsidize parties. The Federal Republic of Germany, however, finances parties quite considerably, which the Hungarians, for instance, used as a model to follow.

"In 1990, subsidies were not supported because everyone remembered the parties of the old system, which existed at the cost of the nondemocratic state," comments Freedom Union [UW] General Secretary Bronislaw Komorowski. "Later, it turned out that this provision was supported by the SLD and, to an even greater degree, by the PSL, which managed to at least rescue part of its property. However, it worked against new parties. The idea is interesting, and it should also go for extraparliamentary parties that won quite a considerable number of votes in the election."

"However, I do not understand the threshold of 10,000 members," Komorowski says. "A test of a party's strength is its social support, not the number of members, which may be pure fiction."

"The system of party financing is not regulated at all today. Therefore, one can consider the idea of subsidizing them, even those parties that have not obtained the required 5 percent," Tomasz Nalecz, of the Union of Labor [UP], says. "However, at a time when the party system is still taking shape, my evaluation of the idea to register parties with over 10,000 members is different. This is the same as saying: I am in favor of new births, but the infant must weigh 50 kg."

"Parties are public institutions. Thus, the principle of subsidizing them by the budget is correct," says Kazimierz Ujazdowski, of the Conservative Coalition [KK]. "It would limit the phenomenon of clientism [klientelizm], the phenomenon of hiring politicians by interest groups and others."

Ujazdowski is, however, against the threshold of 10,000 members because "it favors Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] and the PSL, the membership of which is the result of material privileges."

"Both proposals are absurd," says Stanislaw Michalkiewicz, leader of the Union for Real Politics. "My taxes should support the SLD and UP, which I consider harmful? This is a pretext for increasing the citizens' tax burden even more. If there is a demand for a party, it will always find the money."

"It would be very easy to collect 10,000 signatures by admitting fictitious members to the party. This does not, however, mean that such a party would have real support," Michalkiewicz believes. "This does not even mean that it is a party. A party should also have a program, and many so-called parties do not have one."

According to Komorowski, UW has more than 10,000 members. The KK has several hundred of them. "We have approximately 3,000 members," Michalkiewicz says. "We do not have 10,000 members, but we got support from over 7 percent of the voters," Nalecz recalls. Many politicians think that, in fact, the only parties that have more than 10,000 members are the SdRP and the PSL.

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Foreign 'Spies' Caught at Military Exercise

AU2510121194 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 21 Oct 94 p 4

[By Radu Tudor]

[FBIS Translated Text] The largest military exercise of 1994, "Jubilee '94," was held in Transylvania on 1 October. During the drills, the counterintelligence services identified four foreign citizens who, from ideal positions, filmed and took pictures of the entire exercise.

The four foreign citizens, whose identity is currently being checked carefully (nationality, citizenship), drove to one of the exercise grounds near Cluj in an orange Mercedes 100-MB minibus. Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca; Colonel General Paul Cheler, commander of the 4th "Transylvania" Army; and other generals and officers were not more than 1 km from the four on the day they were caught. It is worth mentioning that many international military observers were present on the rostrum, including an officer of the country from which the four spies come.

Of the four people caught taking pictures and filming, at least one belongs, for sure, to a European intelligence service. The four "tourists" explained their presence in Romania by claiming to belong to the welfare society of a church from their country of origin. The i.d. documents they presented are no clear indication of the citizenship of the four individuals, since it is very likely that the documents are false.

In the presence of counterintelligence and police authorities, the camera and i.d. documents of the four individuals were seized. Although it would have been normal for the four to be arrested and the case to be pursued by the magistrates, this did not happen. The spies were set free, but under constant supervision. According to their own statements, the four "tourists" were going to a place in Transylvania for the dedication of a church. Subsequent checks revealed that the church had been dedicated last August. According to the accounts of the Romanian authorities, the four entered Romania in the same "formation" in February and April 1994.

After the incident was properly recorded in writing, the four were told that they were free to go to the "dedication of the church."

Despite the fact that there were international military observers present at "Jubilee '94" and that there are many spy satellites orbiting over Romanian territory, espionage on the ground is still a basic concern of countries interested in gathering information about Romania.

Iliescu, Others Celebrate Army Day

AU2510133394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A large ceremony was organized today in front of the Romanian Soldiers Monument in Carei, Satu Mare County, by the Ministry of National Defense and the Satu Mare Prefect's Office on the occasion of Army Day and the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the last Romanian area from the Horthyist-fascist occupation. Romanian President Ion Iliescu, Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca, members of the government, parliamentary representatives, war veterans from all over the country, local authorities, generals and officers, and many Carei inhabitants were present. The ceremony was also attended by representatives of the armies from the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, the United States, Turkey, Greece, Great Britain, France, Ukraine, Hungary, and Latvia as guests.

After the religious service officiated by Eftimie Anchira, bishop of Maramures and Satmar, the ceremony was addressed by Satu Mare Prefect Vasile Suciu; Reserve General Marin Dragnea, president of the War Veterans Association; military cadet Marin Barsan; Deputy Bebe Ivanovici; Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca; and President Ion Iliescu. The speakers pointed out the heroism, courage, and sacrifice of the thousands of Romanian soldiers who gave their lives on various battlefields for the liberation of their country. They also emphasized the need for younger generations to confirm the glorious fighting traditions of the Romanian Armed Forces.

In his speech President Ion Iliescu made a broad review of Romania's war effort aimed at liberating and recovering some ancient Romanian lands and its participation, alongside the UN coalition, in the liberation of other countries from fascist occupation. President Iliescu highlighted our country's important role in this respect, despite the fact that Romania was subsequently denied recognition of its status as a cobelligerent country.

Referring to the current situation in Europe, President Ion Iliescu welcomed the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of Central European states and said that a new era should begin, an era of establishing a European climate of reconciliation and stability, since the only chance for prosperity is a Europe of unity, of states with equal rights and responsibilities, and of a partnership for the sake of development. On the other hand, the Romanian head of state expressed concern over certain revisionist trends and said that Romania speaks out for developing relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation with all states and for establishing harmonious forms of coexistence with neighboring peoples.

Our correspondents Teodor Mateescu, Adrian Marchis, and Sorina Man report that the event continued with wreath-laying ceremonies at the Romanian Soldiers Monument in Carei and a parade of participating troops.

Former King Addresses Message to Army

AU2510133494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] We have received, from the press office of former King Mihai, a message by the former sovereign on the occasion of Army Day.

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After recalling the fact that 50 years ago, on 25 October 1944, units of the Romanian Armed Forces managed to liberate the entire northern part of Transylvania from the foreign domination imposed there—as well as in Bessarabia and northern Bucovina—during that time, with its dramatic consequences for our country, the message stresses that today's Army maintains the spirit that has made possible the many victories obtained in the course of the nation's history.

The Army is also a force placed exclusively at the service of the nation, to defend its territorial integrity and carry out humanitarian missions. The Army is the nation's force, secure against any interference that might harm the cohesion of soul so required by a national army.

The message extends best wishes for health and strength in honorably fulfilling their noble mission to generals, officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers.

Institute Reports on Smuggled Strontium-90

AU2510151194 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 22-23 Oct 94 p 14

[Report by Oana Maiuga: "The Nuclear Physics and Engineering Institute Establishes: Strontium 90"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The radioactive substance seized on the night of 29 September from SPP [Guard and Protocol Service] and MApN [National Defense Ministry] officers [who were smuggling the material] is believed to be strontium-90. The substance was examined at the Nuclear Physics and Engineering Institute [IFIN] in Bucharest.

The substance, enclosed in aluminum and plastic (airtight source) [sursa etansa], was then put into an aluminum container with walls 8 mm thick. That container was then inserted into a lead container with walls 10 mm thick.

Strontium-90 gives off beta rays, which are blocked by the first container, the aluminum one. As a consequence of the stoppage of the beta radiation inside the aluminum walls, X-rays are produced. The latter are blocked by the lead container.

Measured at the outer layer of the source, radiation is 100 times higher than the limit value admitted for the population; when measured just outside the containers, it is negligible.

Strontium-90 is a substance produced by nuclear fission. It cannot be used for military purposes, but if it is left unprotected it can irradiate people.

IFIN Director Valeriu Zoran made the following statement: "The most important thing is that the substance was very well insulated. Neither the containers nor the source present radioactive contamination, and therefore it is not dangerous at all to be close to the containers."

Nuclear Plant Safety Discussed

AU2510160394 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 21 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Dr. Constantin Milu, president of the Romanian Society for Radiation Protection: "What a Pity—The Uranium Traffickers Have Nowhere To Sell Their Goods"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The attitude toward nuclear power plants is either one of total rejection—such as that of Greenpeace-type organizations—or acceptance without reservations, such as the official position of end-users. The Romanian Electric Power Network RENEL maintains that there is no risk in using the Cernavoda nuclear power plant, while the environmental organization based in Galati—which subscribes to the standards of the international organizations that sponsor it—warns in beautifully colored letters about the future genocide in Cernavoda. For the experts, the important thing is the benefit-to-risk ratio calculated whenever a new technology is being developed. In this respect, the Romanian Society for Radiation Protection has adopted a middle-of-the-road position that supports development of the sphere of nuclear energy but under very strict control.

The risks mainly involve the possibility of an accident. The Chernobyl disaster introduced new and higher coefficients into the equations of those who calculate these risks because, until Chernobyl, nobody had anticipated such a chain of human errors and technological defects.

The risk is actually higher. From the viewpoint of its construction, the Cernavoda plant has nothing in common with Chernobyl. This is one of the arguments in favor. Next, there is the pollution resulting from exploitation, the result of fission (tritium) and corrosive products that have found their way into the cooling pipes. There is a strict control system that maintains their level at a small fraction of the maximum permissible dose. This control is ensured by the plant's own self-monitoring system, the supervising system of the Ministry of Environment, and the control system of the Ministry of Health. In principle, radioactivity must not exceed the natural level—not even around the plant, let alone in Bucharest or Constanta. In case of an accident, the danger zone extends to 80-100 km for the open nuclear plants of the Chernobyl or Kozloduy type and only 10-20 km for Cernavoda.

As far as the benefits are concerned, two are more important: First, nuclear energy could solve the crisis in this domain at a time when water and oil resources are limited. Second, the coal-based power stations are also high polluters, with a level of natural radionuclides discharged higher than that of the nuclear stations. Since we referred to Kozloduy, it is worth mentioning that although the danger of a significant accident looms over that station, there has been no change in natural radioactivity registered in the neighboring counties on the Romanian side [of the Danube] since 1983.

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While it is quite normal for the population to be concerned about the radiation level caused by Kozloduy, the actions of the so-called uranium traffickers appear very strange indeed. More than 90 percent of the thieves get hold of unenriched uranium—an unprocessed mineral that cannot be used in nuclear power plants or for the manufacture of fissionable materials. They are just dealing with a more concentrated mineral. Not even those who steal mineral pellets enriched with U-235 can do anything with them, since the pellets are used only in a cluster of tubes specific to each individual power plant. I do not understand where they want to sell and who is going to buy such goods, since, I repeat, there is no immediate practical use for them in either the industrial or the energy sector.

New Director at Army Industrial Corporation

AU2510154394 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 21 Oct 94 p 3

[FBIS Translated Text] Elena Olariu, spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense, said at a news conference on 20 October that, on orders from Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca, Colonel Dr. Engineer Grigore Laptes has been appointed director general of the Autonomous Army Industrial Group Corporation. Dr. Laptes' predecessor has been released from his post. The reasons for releasing the former director general will be made known to the press at a later date.

Foreign Ministry Views Role of CSCE

AU2510134594 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 14 Oct 94 p 3

[Report on statement by Mircea Geoana, director general in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Alexandra Dragoi]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Romania unreservedly supports the efforts to more clearly define the CSCE's identity, place, and specific role within the new structure of European security. In the context of these efforts to permit the CSCE to adapt to the new conditions in Europe, it is essential to maintain the characteristic features of the pan-European forum, which has ensured the viability of its actions. However, with the political-military security problems that have appeared recently, it is important to work out a code of conduct for dealing with various security aspects.

Likewise, the talks currently being held in the forum for security and cooperation should lead to the conclusion of various accords on arms control, disarmament, and security and confidence-building measures. At the same time, it is necessary that the deployment of peace protection forces—belonging to a third party—in the CSCE area be carried out only under the authority of the general European forum and on the basis of a clear mandate. The establishment of ad hoc groups to examine the activity of these missions would be welcome as it would ensure increased cohesion and a more substantial contribution to applying these recommendations.

Regarding the situation in the Republic of Moldova—the only European state on the territory of which there are still foreign troops—Romania believes that the CSCE must observe and demand the observation of engagements it has adopted on this issue. In fact, effective measures for the concrete implementation of the engagements assumed by the member states must be identified in a broader framework. In this context, Romania supports the organization of a seminar that the International Bureau for Human Rights has proposed for next spring, which Romania is willing to host."

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Ganic, UN's Akashi Discuss Mt Igman Situation

LD2510195394 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Yakushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy, and Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Ejup Ganic have met at Zagreb airport to talk about the problem of the demilitarized zone on Mt. Igman. Soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army yesterday started withdrawing from their position within the demilitarized zone. During their withdrawal they twice opened fire on the French blue helmets who were supervising this operation. This is what Akashi and Ganic told our news program after their talks.

[Begin recording] [Akashi, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] We discussed the situation on Mt. Igman and freedom of movement.

[Ganic] We demanded this road be safeguarded by the UN force. Nevertheless, we are going to withdraw our troops from one part of Igman, since the UN are seriously opposed to our presence there.

[Akashi] I do not think anybody wanted to create such an incident. I am glad to hear the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government forces are withdrawing from Igman, as promised by Dr. Ganic to me.

[Ganic] As you know, this was a serious problem. We are attempting to resolve it. We must, however, be enabled to get out of and get into Sarajevo safely. We will attempt to secure this in a diplomatic way, so we do not have to resort to additional means. You know what additional means are.

[Akashi] We discussed long-term questions, including how to bring about stability in Bosnia during the winter. [end recording]

UN To Deploy Motorized Patrols on Igman Road

AU2610094994 Paris AFP in English 0935 GMT 26 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 26 (AFP)—The UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) will carry out motorized patrols along the Igman road once Bosnian Government forces have fully withdrawn from the area's demilitarized zone (DMZ), an UNPROFOR spokesman said Wednesday [26 October].

The patrols will take in part of the mountain road where traffic currently has to run a gauntlet of Serb fire, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Labarsouque, spokesman for the Sarajevo sector, said.

Protection of the Igman road, the only government-held link between Sarajevo and the outside world, has been the Bosnian Government's main demand as its price for evacuating positions in the Igman DMZ, as demanded by the UN Security Council.

The council has called for an unconditional withdrawal from the DMZ, which was established in August 1993 by the United Nations to stop a Bosnian Serb offensive that was about to overrun the strategic heights southwest of Sarajevo.

But Bosnian Government officials have insisted that the withdrawal, which began on Monday, would only be completed once guarantees were received concerning protection of the road. Some 120 Bosnian soldiers fell back from advanced positions inside the DMZ on Monday, but it was not certain they had actually left the restricted zone, Labarsouque said.

Meanwhile, negotiations took place on Tuesday between UN officers and a local Bosnian commander, Fikret Prevljak, who has refused to be budged and whose soldiers Monday fired at French blue helmets who were approaching their positions. Prevljak forces Tuesday fired at Serb civilians from their positions inside the DMZ, but ceased when UN soldiers fired back about 10 warning shots, Labarsouque said. Further talks between UN officers and Prevljak were scheduled for Wednesday with blue helmets visiting positions due to be evacuated by the Bosnians and which they proposed to take over.

Elsewhere in the DMZ Tuesday, Bosnian forces continued to dismantle installations and vehicles were seen transporting material, but UNPROFOR was unable to say whether any soldiers had actually left the zone. More than 500 Bosnian soldiers were understood to be deployed in the DMZ.

In Moscow, Russian officials Tuesday said they were concerned about the slow pace of the Bosnian withdrawal, a situation they feared could lead to an escalation in tensions.

UNPROFOR Rejects Demands for Rose Dismissal

AU2510182094 Paris AFP in English 1744 GMT 25 Oct 94

[Report by Francis Curta]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Oct 25 (AFP)—Bosnia's political parties Tuesday [25 October] demanded the removal of British UN force commander General Sir Michael Rose, alleging bias in his ordering of government troops out of a demilitarised zone on Mount Igman, outside Sarajevo.

All eight political factions represented in parliament, including representatives from President Alija Izetbegovic's ruling Democratic Action Party [Party of Democratic Action], called for Rose's recall in a statement carried by the OSLOBODJENJE newspaper Tuesday.

"The behaviour of General Rose is unacceptable. General Rose has been doing everything to weaken the world's readiness to punish (Serb) crimes and draw attention to peripheral matters, such as the presence of

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Bosnian soldiers on Igman," the statement said. "His demand that Bosnian troops withdraw from Mount Igman when at the same time he tolerates firing on the only road link between Sarajevo and the outside world is just another example of such behaviour," they added. [passage omitted]

The representatives also asked that the matter be put to parliament.

UN Protection Forces spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Spicer said Rose was aware of the statement, but was not concerned by its criticism. "The job of peace-keeper, as opposed to peace-enforcer, is a difficult path to walk and there is no question that General Rose has done anything other than walk a central line," he said. Rose had no intention of abandoning his mandate before the end of its term in January, Spicer added.

Meanwhile the withdrawal of government troops from the Mount Igman demilitarised zone continued at a trickle, following an initial fall-back by some 120 soldiers on Monday, UN officials said. But, while the planned pull-out appeared to be going smoothly if slowly in the west of the Igman demilitarised zone (DMZ), up to 500 Bosnian soldiers remained put in the eastern sector, where a firefight Monday opposed UN peacekeepers and Bosnian troops, officials said.

Rose and Sarajevo sector commander General Herve Gobilliard held talks with Izetbegovic Tuesday morning, following an initial meeting late Monday when they formally protested the attack on UN troops. Izetbegovic, Spicer said, was understood to have issued orders to his troops to stop firing at the peacekeepers and speed up their withdrawal from Igman. [passage omitted]

The French government urged the Bosnian Serbs Tuesday to respect their commitments regarding freedom of movement for UNPROFOR troops escorting fuel and supplies. Spokesman Richard Duque in Paris said UN convoys "must be able to move around without hindrance so that UNPROFOR can carry out its mission."

A UN spokesman in Zagreb said there was a continuing fuel crisis in Bosnian eastern enclaves despite Serb authorisation allowing 53 tonnes of fuel to be delivered on Tuesday. The UN operation in the three besieged areas requires 700 tonnes of fuel to be effective, and the UN contingent there was operating at the limit of its capacity, Paul Risley said.

UNPROFOR: Karadzic To Lift Fuel Blockade

AU2410172494 Paris AFP in English 1700 GMT 24 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 24 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic agreed Monday [24 October] to allow a UN convoy to take 20 tons of fuel into the Bosnian Government enclaves of Gorzade and Zepa to supply UN forces there, a UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] spokesman said.

Bosnian Serb forces had earlier Monday reneged on their weekend pledge to lift their blockade of fuel convoys aimed at replenishing diminishing UN supplies.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Spicer told AFP that the authorization was given during a telephone conversation between Karadzic and UN special envoy to the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi. Akashi had called the Serb leader to protest the Serb refusal to authorize passage for the tankers in spite of a promise made Saturday that they would be allowed into the towns. The authorization was for immediate effect and UNPROFOR was determined to proceed with the fuel convoy Monday, although the tankers would probably not reach the two enclaves, east of Sarajevo, until Tuesday morning, Spicer said.

Serb forces, which occupy 70 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have only been allowing a handful of fuel tankers, essential to supply UN forces in the enclaves, to pass through for some weeks. The UNPROFOR in the past has had to ask for permission for each of its convoys to pass through Serb checkpoints. There is an almost routine refusal where fuel is concerned.

The UN fuel reserves have been strained to their limits in the enclaves, and some UN contingents have been reduced to making patrols by foot rather than in vehicles. In Gorzade, the British contingent has already used up its "operational reserve," fuel stocks reserved for extreme emergencies.

The Serbs stepped up the pressure on the UN three weeks ago after Bosnian commandos infiltrated a UN-monitored demilitarized zone on Mount Igman to attack a Serb command post, killing 20 including four female military nurses.

Mladic: U.S. Making 'Mockery' of Human Rights

AU2510180494 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 25 Oct 94 p 8

[Interview with General Ratko Mladic, Srpska republic military commander, by Vlstimir Shone of the Gamma Agency; place and date not given. "The Only Rule of This War Is That It Has No Rules"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Shone] Mr. Mladic! The Muslims allegedly wounded you in Bihac, and you have even been captured....

[Mladic] These are rumors spread by Muslim propaganda. Several rumors have been spread about me being killed or wounded. In reality, we are talking about psychological warfare here.

[Shone] Have you been wounded at all?

[Mladic] Fortunately, only according to the Croatian and Muslim radio stations. These radio commentators simultaneously pronounced me both wounded and dead on

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the same day, and they wanted to send my uniform to Sotheby's for auctioning. With the agreement of the so-called democratic world, a campaign of every possible and imaginable slander has been launched against me.

[Shone] Which propaganda tricks are believed by the West?

[Mladic] Not only the Croats and the Muslims excel in making up such stories that have nothing to do with reality. However, compared with the stories made up by the international community, the stories of the Croats and Muslims show a lack of imagination. The world violated all the international laws when it erased a sovereign state from the world map. With a unilateral decision, they simply eliminated a country and forced their own ideas on the whole of former Yugoslavia, and particularly on the Serbs. It was decided that the Serbs should be left without a country and they should be spread throughout other countries.... The former Yugoslavia was declared communist, with a red dictatorship in power. In the world's opinion, with the exception of the borders, everything was bad in this country. Disregard of international law was the direct cause of all our current suffering. This war was forced upon the nations of former Yugoslavia, and the German and Muslim countries played a decisive role in this. The Croats and the Muslims are collaborating with these states, which, relying on NATO weaponry, are trying to force upon us borders and a regime that meet their own interests.

[Shone] For the world at large, this is a local conflict; however, you regard this conflict as a world war. Why?

[Mladic] This is really a local conflict for the United States; for us, however, this is the bloodiest war that we have ever fought. Every means is being employed against us, with the exception of naval and nuclear weapons. Even chemical weapons have been tried against us. In our view, this cannot be regarded as a local war, because all interests converge here. Christianity and Islam meet in the Balkans. The Turks, Albanians, and Bosnians want to create an Islamic state here. On the other hand, the Germans want to take revenge for the failures endured in the course of past world conflagrations. They do not dare to confront Russia or Great Britain and, therefore, they take revenge on Serbia and the disbanded Yugoslavia. Through Slovenia and Croatia, the Germans have access to the warm waters of the Adriatic, and it will be difficult to stop them now. I do not understand the U.S. interests in Bosnia. What do the Americans have against the Serbs? We have always been allies. Our grandfathers and fathers fought together against the ancestors of the Croats and Muslims. What would they say now if they were alive? It is totally absurd that they take the side of their traditional enemies against their eternal friends.

[Shone] Indeed, why do they?

[Mladic] I think that the U.S. political elite have dirtied their hands with petrodollars and have become the puppets of Islamic leaders. Therefore, this elite is now making a mockery of human rights and international law and, with the help of CNN, they keep saying that the United States is the only democratic country in the world. And they deal with us as they did with Vietnam. The Americans even want to force their way of life on us. They want us to have the same haircuts as their marines do and to change our national food into hamburgers. The Serbs do not interfere in the affairs of Texas; therefore, I beg them to leave us in peace....

[Shone] The Serbs and the French have always been allies. Why are you now on such bad terms with the French peacekeeping forces?

[Mladic] We are not on bad terms with them or with the other blue helmets. Not a single UN soldier has been killed on the territory of the Srpska republic, and none of them has even been in danger. Among the Muslims in Sarajevo, however, the peacekeeping forces do not dare leave their quarters, while, on the Serbian side, they take off their flak jackets and go to restaurants to have a glass of beer. At the same time, a lot of provocations and incidents have recently taken place on behalf of elements that have drifted away from UN control, all this in order to put pressure on the Serbs and their leaders. I have been greatly disappointed in the French peacekeeping troops and General de Lapresle. The French commander created a mess in Cazin, near Bihac. He arbitrarily sent his soldiers into this area, and they provided weapons for the Muslims. The French are supplying arms to the Muslims for the second year in a row. The humanitarian organizations and their high-ranking leaders earn a lot of money from this trade. The supply of medicine is only a front. The embargo is only being observed against the Serbs.

[Shone] Do you think that the Serbs are responsible for the current situation?

[Mladic] The Serbs did not start the war. The Slovenes, the Croats, and the Muslims were the ones who started this war. For what they did in 1991, Slovenia and Croatia were immediately recognized as independent states. They received diplomatic, media, and military support from Western and Islamic countries. You now see what is happening and are blaming the Serbs, instead of returning to the beginnings, when the rules of the game were set down. Those who started this war are responsible. Processes are under way now which the Serbs cannot influence. There is war now, and the only rule of this war is that there are no rules.

[Shone] However, most victims in this war have been Muslims.

[Mladic] I do not see it that way. The Muslims killed more than half a million Serbs during World War II, but they did not have to repent for this genocide. The Serbs only become heroes for the West when they are the ones being killed....

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[Shone] The Serbs currently control 70 percent of Bosnia's territory. Karadzic would probably accept a 50-50 percent division. What is your opinion?

[Mladic] We are on our own land. Our fathers and grandfathers lived here. At present, we control a larger territory than what we would get according to the [Contact Group's] maps. The Western powers do not want to know to whom these lands belong. They protect their own property with all means available, but they want us to hand over our land to those who have committed the third aggression against us since the beginning of this century. The Serbs will not relinquish their land.

[Shone] In the Contact Group—France, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and Russia—Russia defends your interests. To what extent has Russia supported you militarily?

[Mladic] The Russians have not sent us so much as a pair of boots. At the same time, the Muslims receive all the military equipment that they need in aid packages.

[Shone] Have the Russians ever helped you?

[Mladic] Never. The rumors that the Russians are sending us weapons only aim to divert attention from the illegal supply of arms to the Muslims. NATO supplies arms to the Muslims, while the Russians offer us copies of "Anna Karenina."

[Shone] You claim that the United Nations is supporting the Muslims at Bihac.... Is every UN soldier against the Serbs?

[Mladic] No. The soldiers differ from their superiors. The commanders of the UN peacekeeping forces used to be NATO officers, and their doctrine has remained the same. NATO regards the Serbs as potential allies of the Warsaw Pact, and that is why the Serbs should be eliminated. It does not bother them that the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, and that the Serbs have never belonged to anyone and never will. French officers carry out the orders of a certain man called Juppe. This Juppe hysterically demanded the bombing of the Serbs, without knowing the reason for Serbian casualties. Has it ever happened that the Serbs have threatened any French people? The Serbs are honest people who want neither to threaten nor to fight against their allies.... Serbian blood is given to wounded Muslim soldiers, while dead Serbs are thrown into the Drina. Ask the Muslims why they never complain of any lack of blood. The Serbs' enemies are curing themselves with the blood of the Serbian people.... The Muslims also use the living organs of their Serbian victims.

[Shone] Can you provide concrete proof of this?

[Mladic] Look around in Italy and Germany, and you will see that the price of kidneys has dropped compared with 1990. There is no need for more eloquent proof.

[Shone] What is your opinion about the plans of the Contact Group?

[Mladic] The Serbs answered this question in a referendum. We are on our own land. One who does not know the situation in the former Yugoslavia cannot draw a just map. We will defend our land, and we will not relinquish it to anyone....

This plan aims at dividing the Serbian Government and making the Serbs confront each other. We do not oppose a Muslim state on their own territory, on the territories that they currently control, and we do not mind with whom they form an alliance. But not with us. Why do you want us to live together with Muslims? They did not want to live together with us in the former Yugoslavia; however, this is what the world demands from us now, namely to live in a Bosnian Muslim state. The world keeps talking about a multinational state. Was not Yugoslavia a multinational state? Why did they dismantle Yugoslavia then?

[Shone] Are you strong enough to fight to the very end?

[Mladic] We must fight, and we have all the moral and material means for this. The Serbs are the strongest nation in the Balkans. We are the strongest because we have fought all the wars on our own territory.

[Shone] What will you do if the arms embargo against the Muslims is lifted?

[Mladic] What embargo? The Muslims are continuously receiving arms. They also manufacture weapons in the factories that have remained in their possession. With the technology and scientific background at their disposal, the Croats and Muslims are even capable of producing nuclear weapons.

[Shone] Do you seriously think this?

[Mladic] Yes, sir, I do!

[Shone] Is it possible that they will manufacture nuclear weapons in the near future?

[Mladic] Yes, because they are supported by those who have the necessary technology and can supply what they lack.

[Shone] Are you joking when you say that the Croats and Muslims have nuclear weapons?

[Mladic] Mr. Shone! I am a serious general!

[Shone] Who will supply the technology? Can you give some more details?

[Mladic] Not at the moment.

[Shone] What is your message to the world?

[Mladic] The Serbs hope that the French, the Americans, and the Russians are their friends and allies. A traditional ally does not turn into an enemy overnight. I would like to tell the Western leaders and our enemies that I am in favor of peace. A just peace and a political solution is the only possible road leading out of this crisis. If they choose war, this will have catastrophic

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consequences, and not only in the Balkans. I am ready to negotiate with any colleague for a peaceful solution. Let us discuss the debatable things! As for the creation of an Islamic state, I suggest they do that in Iran, and not on Serbian territory.

Federation Demands Sovereignty Over Ploce

LD2510143194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1419 GMT 25 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 25 (TANJUG)—The Muslim-Croat federation government in Bosnia has demanded that Croatia give up sovereignty over the seaport of Ploce and cede it to the government in Sarajevo.

Croat Herceg-Bosna radio Tuesday said that the Muslim-Croat government had cited the Washington agreement as the basis for its request. The agreement, signed in March at the insistence of the United States, envisaged the forming of a Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its subsequent confederation with Croatia. The federation, with no other organs but a president and government, was slow in constituting said Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic blaming the Croats for this in an interview to Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVOSTI on Oct. 16.

The Muslim-Croat government also demanded that the Ploce-Celjevo road and rail corridor at the Croatia-Bosnia border be put outside the jurisdiction of the Croatian authorities. Herceg-Bosna radio quoted Croatian parliament deputy speaker Vladimir Seks as saying during a recent visit to the region that the demands were unacceptable and that the "pro-Muslim government in Sarajevo" had misinterpreted the Washington agreement. Seks said the Ploce seaport, in the central Adriatic, could only be turned into free customs zone, such as those in other countries which were formed under international laws.

As one of the six republics of the former Yugoslav Federation, Bosnia-Herzegovina had 24 km of the Adriatic coast in the region of the town of Neum, near the confluence of the Neretva river. Neum has never been a port. Since the war broke out in Bosnia in 1992, Neum has been held by Bosnian Croats who have denied access to the Muslims.

The Muslim government last year asked to be given access to the sea in the region of Ploce and Metkovic in order to build a port. It also asked for a land corridor along the Neretva river to link that port with central Bosnia. Bosnian Muslims and Croats started a war for communications in May 1992, demolishing dozens of settlements and leaving 230,000 homeless people. The fighting ceased prior to the signing of the Washington agreement.

Karadzic Denies 'Secret Talks' on Land Exchanges

AU2510154194 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22-23 Oct 94 p 4

[Report by M. Maric: "We Did Not Discuss the Swapping of Territories"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka—Concerning a TANJUG report on a VECERNJE NOVOSTI article about alleged secret negotiations between representatives of the Srpska republic and Croatia that was carried by Serbian television in its Dnevnik newscast at peak viewing time on 20 October, Radovan Karadzic told the "Open Screen" program of the Banja Luka television studio that "these talks were not about swapping territories."

"After all, we could only talk about that with their President Tudjman," Karadzic said. We reached an agreement about the Dubrovnik hinterland and Prevlaka, that is, about our access to the sea a long time ago.

We have, he went on to say, the right to an outlet to the sea according to the Corfu Declaration signed by Dusan Vasiljevic on behalf of the Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to which the sea belongs to everybody.

Karadzic added that the Croats and President Tudjman found it difficult to give anything away according to that declaration, as nothing is really being done according to international legal documents.

"We have accepted this exchange of territories (around Prevlaka), but not any kind of concessions. This way out is much more honorable for Croats, as they will be given nine times more territory in the Dubrovnik hinterland than the 30-35 km of sea and rocky coastline that the Serbs will be getting. However, this would solve the Prevlaka issue and it will no longer present a problem," Karadzic pointed out.

As regards media guesswork concerning links between the Prevlaka question and the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], Karadzic said that that was out of question and that nobody may or can talk about problems of Serbian Krajina with anybody without its president, who represents the RSK according to its constitution.

"Our talks abut Prevlaka concern only our part of the Trebinje Commune [in Herzegovina] near Dubrovnik, so that Dubrovnik would have some territory in its hinterland in order to be able to have tourism," Radovan Karadzic said.

Karadzic said that he does not know whether the RSK would accept a confederation with Croatia, but we cannot negotiate on this. "I know only one thing: We will accept any decision made by the RSK."

"I know that some negotiations (RSK-Croatia) are under way aimed to improve economic relations. We are going

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to accept every decision the RSK makes, whatever it assesses as not dangerous for its security."

The issues of electricity and water probably present no danger to its security, so if they decide in favor of such cooperation, we will support this, Karadzic pointed out, adding that such cooperation would be of multiple benefit to both Croatia and the RSK. However, he went on to say, as far as other issues are concerned, we will not be negotiating on behalf of the RSK and we do not advise anybody to negotiate on its behalf without President Martic.

"I think that this would be possible only if one knew about the complete Croat-Serb dispute. However, representatives of the Srpska republic, the RSK, and Serbia, that is, their presidents, would certainly take part in that. I do not think that Krajina will accept being a federal unit within Croatia, nor would it accept confederal status either. Although a confederation is a union of neighboring states, I do not think that this will take place," Radovan Karadzic concluded.

Commentary on Juppe's 'Equal Treatment' Demand

AU2610094694 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 20 Oct 94 p 5

[Commentary by Alija Latic: "A Plan To Liquidate One State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [French Foreign Minister Alain] Juppe's demand that the so-called Serbian entity be given equal treatment in the Bosniak-Croatian Federation, that is, in the future institutional construction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, actually comes down to a demand that the so-called Serbian entity in the possible future Bosnia-Herzegovina be given the right to form a confederal association (union) with the so-called Yugoslavia at the same level as the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia. Deliberately or accidentally, Juppe forgets that there is a considerable difference between actual legal and state relations between the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia on one hand, and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the so-called Yugoslavia on the other hand. That is, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been recognized by Croatia in legal terms, while the so-called Yugoslavia is still carrying out aggression against our country. Second, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina pertains only to the transformed internal structure of one part of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Bosniaks and Croats make up a majority.

Such a federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been accepted by the majority of its citizens, who see it as a good, realistic, and well-chosen road toward reintegration of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the same, federal basis. Furthermore, this reflects the determination of the citizens, confirmed in the referendum for the preservation of integral Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders, saying "yes" to the establishment of a modern, democratic state with a highly decentralized state authority. This decentralization involves also federal units and townships, in which all citizens can successfully, and in agreement with the highest international standards, fulfill their human rights and freedoms as individuals on one hand, while on the other hand accomplishing collective ethnic rights and freedoms as members of one specific nation.

Transformed in such a way, Bosnia-Herzegovina should be the subject of an international contract regarding confederation with the Republic of Croatia, that is, to take over that role from the already established Federation. Confederation, or rather international alliance, can only be an association of two or more sovereign and independent states regulated by a contract, in which each member state of the confederation retains its own international legal status and full freedom of action on the domestic as well as on the foreign plane.

Therefore we have understood and accepted the confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the republic of Croatia as a relationship between the two sovereign, independent states, rather than as an introduction in the constitution of a new state. Therefore any effort made to establish a confederation between the so-called Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and so-called Yugoslavia, which does not take into account the aforementioned legal ground rules regarding confederation, is not likely to be successful as well. Because any disregard of the rules set by international law on confederation would automatically mean recognition of the state sovereignty and independence of the Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thereby establishing a state within the state. Furthermore, the attitude that the Federation is the final solution definitely brings the process of carving up a sovereign state with all its attributes to just one part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and seeing the Federation as the sole and final basis for the confederation with Croatia, which is already being suggested, would inevitably bring about the confederalization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the cessation of its legal and state continuity, which means its partitioning.

All this must be kept in mind, because the Contact Group has so far uncovered very few cards regarding the internal organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that regard Juppe has also been quite imprecise and mysterious. Instead of speaking about the state organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he uses the following construction: "in the future institutional construction of Bosnia-Herzegovina the framework of the future Bosnia-Herzegovina is to be more frequently used [as published]," and so forth. Such formulations conceal many unknowns about the legal and national makeup of the future framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Which is to say, whether it would be a federation, a confederation, or a loose union with quite reduced unique, joint functions for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Because of all this, the modalities of union of the so-called Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina with so-called Yugoslavia, as well as the internal state organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, should be discussed only when a peace plan is accepted for Bosnia-Herzegovina, presupposing and guaranteeing the international sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders, with a minimum of joint state functions, that is, only when so-called Yugoslavia recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina as such.

There is no need for Juppe to remind us that Serbs in Bosnia are not immigrants, that Bosnia is their country as much as it is the country of Croats or Bosniaks. Nobody has ever denied this fact. What has been denied them is to persist in their efforts, going so far as to commit genocide to achieve their freedoms, by denying those freedoms and rights to other nations.

Objectively, Juppe's initiatives, perhaps even unintentionally, encourage Karadzic's Serbs to persist in their demands for the right to self-determination and secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, for the a Greater Serbia.

However, the implementation of the right to self-determination is much more complicated. On that matter Dr. Smilja Adamov and Dr. Milenko Kreca, professors of International Law at the Belgrade Faculty of Law, say in the textbook of International Public Law, 1989 edition: "The principle of self-determination is a principle of the modern, universal legal system, but it cannot be absolutized, or viewed and interpreted independently from the context of the legal system. It must be viewed as its part. This actually means that elements and criteria for the implementation of this principle ought to be looked for in the UN Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 4. The Charter guarantees territorial integrity to all its member states, therefore the principle of self-determination, as is rightfully emphasized in the UN Security Council Resolution 1514, cannot serve as justification for partial or total disintegration of national unity, or of the territorial integrity of a sovereign state. Also, it cannot be used as a basis for settlement of the minority problem in any country, because the Charter resolves that problem within the basic human rights and freedoms. The member states are bound to uphold that in their territories those rights are observed, without discrimination in terms of religion, race, sex or ethnic membership."

Do the honorable professors still hold these views?

5th Corps Commander Claims Victory Near Bihac

LD2510223594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Oct 94

[Statement by General Atif Dudakovic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps on 25 October; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] I would like to wish a very good evening to all listeners of Sarajevo Radio and Television, i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and Television, all Bosnians [words indistinct]. I can tell all our Bosnians that this morning we launched a counterattack on the Grabez and the Srbljani plateaus. It was this evening that we brought our combat operations to an end in the Srbljani and Grabez plateaus. We have taken control of an area of over 70 square km. Bihac has been liberated for good from the chetnik mayhem and their shelling from the Grabez plateau. The chetnik stronghold of Grabez is in the hands of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

I can say that we have completely smashed three chetnik paramilitary brigades. We have captured a large number of guns, mortars, antiaircraft machineguns, and antiaircraft artillery pieces. Many chetniks have left their bones forever in our forests. There are also many prisoners. The units of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have taken the village of Grmusa. We have reached the zone of Drenov Lijes. At the moment a battle is going on for the villages of Pritoka and Ripanj.

From our point of view, we have thus taken their dominant strategic positions in western Bosnia. Favorable conditions are also taking shape for our advance toward Bosanska Krupa and Bosanski Petrovac. For a year the 5th Corps has in fact been waging this kind of war under very complex circumstances, having been completely encircled. We have been successful against the quislings thanks to our determination. This victory is one of the foundations for constituting the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation.

Since we have reached the second stage of the liberation war, in line with the supreme command's instructions to take part in the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we embarked on this action and as early as on the second day, after intense and bloody fighting, the 5th Corps managed to push back and smash the units of the 2d Krajina Corps in this area. This is why the 5th Corps sings a song, we are a heavenly snake [as heard], and this victory proves this.

Well, so far so good. The citizens and all people of our region are proud of their army. In fact, the people here are also part of the 5th Corps. They no longer have to fear shelling from the hills and those criminals who have constantly, for two and half years, been shelling and destroying from here. The situation has now completely changed. These guns are now in our hands. We are going to train them on the right kind of targets.

Corps Continues Advance

AU2610102594

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 26 October provides the following account of the overnight situation in the country:

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Bihac correspondent Muhamed Mujic again recounts yesterday's 5th Corps takeover of the Serbian strongholds in Grabez and Srbljani plateaus, stating that the "fighters of our army led by Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic liberated the settlements Grmusa and [words indistinct], and since this morning [word indistinct] and Ripanj have been free, too." As he adds, "numerous important heights and lines of communication were also placed under our control." Mujic reports that the Bosnian soldiers seized "tons of ammunition and grenades, (?30) mortars and 10 guns of various calibers, as well as a large quantity of other military hardware. However, this is not all, as the booty is swelling by the hour."

A report by the 3d Corps press service claims that "the chetniks are taking revenge on civilian settlements now that things have turned bad on the battlefield. They attempted artillery attacks on the Zavidovici front on several occasions yesterday." As these attacks failed, the press service continues, "they used a 57-mm antitank gun to shell the center of Zavidovici from Blizna. At the same time, the defense lines were subjected to attacks from mortars and hill guns. In the afternoon, the chetniks on several occasions used a 128-mm rocket launcher to attack our positions. Our fighters on the Maglaj front were successful in destroying a chetnik earth cabin, killing two and injuring several chetniks, and seizing a certain quantity of arms and equipment."

An announcer-read report on the situation in Sarajevo states that "the aggressor yesterday afternoon fired seven mortar shells from Donje Mladice at Hrasnica," injuring two civilians. The report also mentions infantry and antiaircraft arms' fire in various parts of the town and reports that the Serbs "in the evening opened several bursts of fire from an antiaircraft machine gun in Orlovac at the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] deployed in [word indistinct), to which UNPROFOR responded."

Four Villages Liberated

AU2610105194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 26 Oct 94

[Report by the information service of the 107th Chivalrous Motorized Brigade of Gradacac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The free Gradacac municipality has been expanded by 20 square km. In the fighting that has raged for 10 days, our fighters took advantage of an opportunity and in a direct counterattack managed to push the aggressor back northeast and eastward. Because of the unprecedented heroism, resoluteness, and unity of our fighters, as well as the outstanding preparations, the enemy forces were compelled to halt their offensive and withdraw. After two long years of war, the following villages have been liberated in this area: [Word indistinct], Huskici, Bosnjaci, and Liporasce. Our fighters are holding the strategically important heights firmly in their hands.

Bearing in mind the manpower that the chetniks have deployed in this area, which are directly linked to the corridor, this success is even more significant. The (?6th) Sana Brigade, which has been present on this battlefield for a long time, has been practically annihilated. The same fate befell the units of the chetnik East Bosnia Corps. Information on the aggressor's casualties and the war ante in this action is still being gathered.

All in all, Gradacac is no longer so much [word indistinct] from the east. The (?heroic town) has once again proven that (?it does not bear this title) without a reason.

This brilliant action was carried out by the fighters of the 107th Chivalrous Motorized Brigade of Gradacac in cooperation with the 201st Srebrenica Brigade and the members of the joint units of the 2d Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. The aggressor's attacks on the positions recently taken by our fighters have continued since early morning.

Drekovic Congratulates 5th Corps

AU2510200194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 94

[Statement by Ramiz Drekovic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 4th Corps; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] I would like to greet the officers and men of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps.

Some time ago we named the 5th Corps in the Bihac Commune the Heavenly Force, and I can honestly say that I am not in the least surprised about the liberation of the Grabez heights, and the largest and most infamous of chetnik strongholds—the Grabez barracks—from which death had been sown for months, indeed years, in the Bihac Commune.

I never had any doubts when it came to the fighters and officers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps dealing with the greatest traitor to the Bosniak Muslim people, Fikret Abdic, as I myself also fought [as 5th Corps commander] at the front together with these officers and men against the rebels and the traitor Abdic for a month and 20 days. Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic, my esteemed colleague and respected commander, finished off the job, together with the other officers and men of the 5th Corps. They crushed the greatest traitor to the Bosniak Muslim people, Fikret Abdic, and his falangists. Thus, the conditions were created for the further liberation of territories temporarily occupied by the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor.

I repeat, I am not in the least surprised. I would like to extend my wholehearted congratulations to the officers and men of the 5th Corps. I am convinced that once they continue—as I know they will—to work and plan, as we used to in the 5th Corps, that happy news for all Bosniak Muslims will come, particularly those in the municipalities of Bosanska Krupa, and others within the Bihac

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Commune and beyond, so that these territories, too, will be liberated, and the light of freedom will shine over these regions again.

I once again congratulate the officers and men of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps, led by Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic, and I wish them more success.

The significance of the Grabez heights, the significance of liberating them and the largest of the chetnik strongholds there lies in the fact that the door has now been opened for the further liberation of (Radic), Bosanska Krupa, and the successful advance of the 5th Corps toward Bosanski Petrovac and all the other places within our internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7th Corps Lines Stable on Kupres Front

AU2510200094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 94

[Report by Sead Suskic from Travnik]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our lines on the Bugojno-Kupres part of the front have been exposed to fire from all kinds of artillery weapons, and the positions of our fighters on the Donji Vakuf-Komarska front and the Vlasic plateau have not been spared enemy artillery fire either. The chetniks have also been firing from well inside the free territory.

The aggressor is still trying to break through with his infantry onto the free territory, but in vain, since the golden lilies of the 7th Corps present an impenetrable wall and an insoluble enigma for the chetnik warlords. Our fighters have continued to inflict losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, while the positions that they hold remain firm and stable.

Serbs Claim 70 Muslims Dead

LD2510173294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1636 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Kupres, 25 Oct (TANJUG)—Muslim forces today opened sporadic mortar fire on civilian facilities and Serb defense lines in Kupres, Serb military sources reported.

There were no losses among the Serb soldiers but significant material damage was caused to civilian facilities.

Serb military sources in Srbobran today announced that at least 70 Muslim soldiers from units of the 7th Corps of the Muslim army were killed and around 120 wounded in attacks over the past five days around Kupres and Srbobran.

Serb Attacks on Sarajevo, Eastern Fronts Noted

AU2510202394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Today a civilian was wounded in Gorazde close to the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] checkpoint. Throughout the day the aggressor has been firing at this UN protected zone with artillery, while chetnik howitzers have also been firing on the Rogatica and Pale fronts, Fahrudin Becic reports.

As for the Olovo front, the aggressor has been using artillery against our defense lines. The chetniks have been pounding the town of Olovo itself with howitzers. This was reported by the Information Service of the 1st Glorious Olovo Hill Brigade.

The free Zvornik territory has today been exposed to chetnik tank fire. The worst of it was directed at Zaseok and Nezuk, reports the Information Service of the 206th Chivalrous Hill Brigade Zvornik.

On the Sarajevo front, the aggressor has been firing at our defense lines using an antiaircraft machine gun and small arms from (Obaljak) and from the direction of Brezovaca. In the theater of operations of the Visoko brigades, the aggressor has been firing an antiaircraft machine gun at the Visoko-(Guci) road. The defense lines in (Zajezda) and Vratnica have been exposed to small arms fire and grenade attacks, but without any consequences for our fighters. A machine gun has used to fire from Stijena at (Borak Kosa) and our positions in Zege and Hrastik. An antiaircraft gun and a mortar have been firing at the area of Brda and (Borak). This has been reported by the Information Service of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps.

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UNHCR Reports Croatia Blocking Fuel for Serbs

LD2610113594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1046 GMT 26 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 26 (TANJUG)—A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees spokesman Tuesday said Croatia had for more than a month been blocking the passage of fuel for the UNHCR office in Banja Luka.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted the UNHCR spokesman as saying Croatia had been hindering the passage of the UNHCR-intended fuel across Bosnian Serb territory.

The spokesman said that Croatia's blocking the passage of humanitarian transports directly hindered the distribution of relief aid to Bosnian Serb refugees in the Serb towns of Doboj (central Bosnia), Banja Luka (western Bosnia) and Petrovac (northwestern Bosnia).

The UNHCR office in Banja Luka said the last time Croatian border authorities had prevented the shipment of fuel from Zagreb was on Oct. 19.

Envoy Alleges Ties Between Bosnian, Croat Serbs

LD2610084594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 26 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Mario Nobilo, permanent Croatian representative at the United Nations, has informed David Hannay, president of the Security Council, about the fresh escalation of attacks on Zupanja and Rajevo Selo mounted by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units. Yesterday's attack, when almost 20 projectiles were fired, followed similar attacks which began last week, Nobilo stressed. The aggression against the Zupanja area and earlier attacks on the Dubrovnik area clearly show that the Bosnian Serbs' weapons are being used on behalf of the Belgrade proxies in the occupied Croatian areas, about which the Croatian Government has warned on many occasions.

RSK Assembly Dismisses Parliamentary President

LD2510212194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2021 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Knin, 25 Oct (TANJUG)—After a long and at times heated debate the assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] has relieved Branko Vojnica of his duties as president of the Krajina parliament at a session this evening.

The dismissal was proposed by the group of deputies of the Serb Democratic Party of Krajina [SDSK]. Their proposal was supported by the Social Democrats and a group of independent deputies.

The deputies of the Serb Radical Party of Krajina [SRSK], of which Vojnica is a member, voted against the proposal.

Of the 72 deputies who attended the session and took the vote, 39 voted in favor of his dismissal, 21 were against, and 11 abstained.

Drago Kovacevic explained the request on behalf of the SDSK deputies' club. He cited as reasons for Vojnica's dismissal violations of the constitution and the assembly's standing orders and unfounded accusations at the expense of the SDSK and bodies of authority, which, as he said, "has damaged the RSK." [passage omitted]

The dismissal of the former president of the RSK assembly was preceeded by speeches by guests, representatives of the Srpska republic, and party leaders. A letter by RSK President Milan Martic was also read out to the deputies.

In his letter, dramatic in content and tone, Martic warned against "the activity and petty politics conducted by individuals who want to damage the RSK."

The president of the RSK again called for unity and stressed that this is the only path toward achieving national interests. He said that in the name of unity "petty political interests which are sending us into the enemy's hands should be neutralized."

On behalf of the Srpska republic's state and political leaders, Biljana Plavsic addressed the RSK assembly and called for unity at this fateful moment.

The SRSK leader, Rade Leskovac, blamed his coalition partners, the SDSK, for Vojnica's dismissal and said that by doing this they have betrayed the confidence that the people entrusted in them in the elections.

New President Elected

LD2510214294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2058 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Knin, 25 Oct (TANJUG)—The assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina this evening elected Rajko Lezajic (Serb Democratic Party of Krajina) to be new president of the parliament.

Of the 66 deputies attending the session, 50 voted for Lezajic, 13 against, and three abstained.

Lezajic is currently the president of the executive council of the Benkovac municipal assembly. [passage omitted]

Defense Ministry Protests Serbian 'Deception'

LD2510183194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with today's Serb attack on Zupanjska Posavina, we have received a statement from the Defense Ministry, which says: The chetniks today used long-range artillery to hit the Zupanja area—Zupanja's Stitar and Babina Greda. Large-scale material damage has been caused.

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We stress that UN observers from Brcko reported that the artillery barrage was started by the Croatian army, while at the same time observers and the protection forces from Gunja, who had an overview of the whole situation, have refuted these assertions.

It is obvious that this is yet another deception designed to convince the world public that the chetniks respond only after they have been provoked. So we sharply protest and refute any reports about attacks by the Croatian army. We are amazed that UN observers are taken in by false reports provided to them by the Serb aggressor, says the statement signed by Brigadier Ivan Tolj, head of the political administration of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Croatia.

UN Reports Croatia, RSK Honoring Cease-Fire

LD2510182094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1800 GMT 25 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct. 25 (TANJUG)—The United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] said Tuesday that Croatian and Serb Krajina armies were generally observing a ceasefire and troop disengagement agreement.

Speaking at a press conference at UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb, Gen. Pierre Peters said Croatia and Serb Krajina Army representatives had agreed in a meeting with UNPROFOR experts in the Croatian-held town of Novska on Monday that the Croats had violated the ceasefire 11 times and the Krajina Serbs 13 times.

Gen. Peters said this was a very good result for the more than six months since the agreement took effect.

Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina signed a ceasefire and troop disengagement agreement at the Russian embassy in Zagreb on March 29. The agreement took effect in early April.

Gen. Peters said the Croats had restricted the movement of U.N. peacekeepers more than the Serbs did. He said that the atmosphere along the separation lines was worsening and could jeopardize the ceasefire.

He said talks on political and economic issues were needed to progress with the plan for the normalization of Croatia-Krajina relations.

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia unilaterally seceded from the former Yugoslav Federation and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Serb Krajina territory was placed under U.N. protection by an agreement reached in the spring of 1992, but Croatia has since attacked the region four times.

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Gligorov Appeals For Election Participation

AU2510161294 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 24 Oct 94 p 2

[Report by A. Damovska on speech by FYROM President Kiro Gligorov at a rally organized by the Alliance for Macedonia in the Macedonian National Theater in Skopje on 23 October: "Victory of the Struggle for Peace and Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The last to take the floor was the President of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM] Kiro Gligorov who was met with loud ovations. In thanking for the confidence and for the mass participation of the voters, Gligorov said that the people understood the historic responsibility and voted for the future they wanted to have: "I also thank those that did not vote out of various justified reasons, but I firmly believe that they are with us, too. I firmly believed that the people would vote for peace, democracy, for progress and mutual understanding. There is no people that would have done otherwise. The historic memory of this people has simply contributed to its wisdom. The interest of the world in our elections was not by accident. They know that Macedonia and its policy is the key for peace in the Balkans and at large. The first comments from the outside world have clearly demonstrated a great relief after the elections. Nevertheless, the victory has not been won yet. We are facing the election of the top executive body, and we shall know its composition only after the second round, on which the composition of the government will also depend. Only then shall we know if we shall continue on the already started road to European and peaceful Macedonia."

In reviewing international policy, Gligorov said that "there will be a reestablishment of the Balkans, an abolition of all conflicts, blockades, and embargoes, and there will be no more interference in the internal affairs of other countries. All this will open our road to the European Union." "That is why we must have a strong parliament, a strong government, and that is why I appeal to the citizens to fulfill their right to vote in the second round and to vote for maintenance of our independence. I also want to repeat this: I have been and I shall be the president of all the citizens in Macedonia, regardless of their political, religious, or national affiliation. It is my duty to defend their interests. That is why we must create a solemn atmosphere next Sunday [30 October] when each citizen will participate in the elections and thus determine the future of this country," the President of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov said at the end of his speech.

Opposition Announces Demands in Memorandum

AU2510162494 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 25 Oct 94 p 1

[Unattributed report on news conference by the VMRO-DPMNE, the DP, and the MAAK on 24 October; place not given: "Opposition Parties Will Boycott Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Five days before the second round of elections the political situation is still uncertain due to the announcements of the largest opposition parties. Yesterday a common news conference was held by the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the DP [Democratic Party] that was also joined by the MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action] and independent candidate Todor Petrov, when it was categorically decided to boycott the second round of the parliamentary elections.

This decision was preceded by a memorandum that was issued at a protest rally that was held by these two opposition parties in Skopje after the first election round. The memorandum consisted of five formulated requests and it was sent to the chairman of the Assembly of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM]. The memorandum demanded an annulment of the elections, provision of all necessary conditions for fair and legal elections, resignation of the government and a formation of a professional government, resignation of the State Election Commission, and a separation of the presidential from the parliamentary elections. Before the deadline that was scheduled by the two parties, Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov replied that he was rejecting practically all their requests. In his reply Stojan Andov pointed out that he did not intend to undertake any measures that would lead to a conflict between the Assembly and the basic constitutional principles and that the request for the annulment of the elections was in contradiction with the constitutional role of the Assembly.

Two days had to pass after the Assembly chairman's reply and after the expiration of the ultimatum before the leaders of the opposition parties announced that all their candidates that had secured a participation in the second election round (84 of the VMRO-DPMNE, 68 of the DP, four of the MAAK, and independent candidate Todor Petrov) had submitted resignations in case they would be elected to parliament and that they would not give up this decision. At yesterday's news conference the opposition announced that it would organize protest voting at all town squares throughout the country on 30 October, election day, under the slogan "For a Democratic Macedonia."

Yesterday the State Election Commission also organized a news conference in the presence of the majority of its permanent members and some representatives of political parties and independent candidates. Since there was not a necessary quorum an informal meeting was held, where the known official results of the first election round were presented, after which the number of constituencies where elections will be repeated on Sunday was increased from 13 to 17. It was also said that before the second election round the presidents of the voting boards would be further instructed about the course of the voting, as well as about the attitude of the observers and their rights during the elections.

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Opposition Leaders on Need for Election Boycott

AU2510182194 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 25 Oct 94 p 4

[Report by "A.D." and "E.S.": "Boycott in Second Round"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The DP [Democratic Party], the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], and the MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action] will not participate in the second election round. The struggle for a civil society will continue in a peaceful and creative way within the framework of the constitution. On 30 October there will be organized protest voting for new elections under the slogan "For Democratic Macedonia" in all town squares throughout Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM].

This was stated at yesterday's joint news conference of the DP, the VMRO-DPMNE, and the MAAK. This is what the leader of the DP Petar Gosev said at the conference: "We replied to the organized state forgery with requests that we sent to the institutions of the system, although they accused us of implementing noninstitutional forms in presenting these requests. We demanded an urgent session of the State Election Commission, we submitted 116 objections with general and concrete remarks of our candidates to the election commissions, and after they were rejected we sent them to the Supreme Court. The responsible bodies refused them all. As for our struggle, we organized several news conferences for our political communication at which we revealed the state forgery of the first election round in time, we organized a peaceful rally from which we sent a memorandum to Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov. Before the rally we asked for an urgent session of the Macedonian Assembly to discuss the work of the election stations' commissions. What happened? They replied to our legal procedure with political arguments, and they presented legal arguments for our political requests. It is obvious that the law on election lists was suspended, as well as the law on election stations, the lists were not presented in time, the number of the voters has been changing every day, 120 people that are not citizens of our country voted, there was a drastic violation of the law on parliamentary elections, the voting lists were not marked. An outrageous state forgery was done, and it is our duty to oppose to it and to refrain from taking part in such an election farce," Petar Gosev said at the end of his speech.

"To our indications that the greatest forgery in the presidential elections was also done Branko Crvenkovski and Risto Ivanov gave a reply to us, and not the State Election Commission. It is obvious that Gligorov self-proclaimed himself for president with only 48.01 percent of the votes," Ljupco Georgievski, president of the VMRO-DPMNE said. "We shall persist on our first stance—to boycott the elections. From now on we shall have only one objective—as many members of parliament from the Alliance for Macedonia as possible. Let us help them to get 100 members of parliament." Georgievski raised a few opened questions for the head of the mission of the CSCE Norman Anderson. "He tried to persuade us to go to the second election round by conveying the message from the government that all irregularities would be corrected. Even after the expiration of the deadline of eight days for presenting publicly the voting lists not a single such list has been posted anywhere. Mr. Anderson," Georgievski addressed him personally, "it is evident that the Macedonian Government has cheated you again. If they present the lists, they will prove that it was a forgery."

The leader of the MAAK Ante Popovski joined the assessments of the leaders of the two parties and he said that a strategic operation has been done in Macedonia according to which victory should be won at any cost, and that it was a state interference in democracy. According to Popovski "we understood these elections as a process of national maturation, but we came to completely opposite conclusions." "That is why," Popovski said, "to go to the second election round will mean to support and give legitimacy to an antidemocratic orientation."

Independent candidate Todor Petrov, who also attended the news conference, agreed with this decision.

The journalists were told that the cooperation of the parties is only in the aim of casting away the authority. As for a possible election of their candidates, Petar Gosev replied that all the candidates have already submitted their resignations in advance. There are 84 such candidates of the VMRO-DPMNE, 68 of the DP, four of the MAAK, and Todor Pertrov, independent candidate.

Government Session Assesses 1st Election Round

AU2510164294 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 25 Oct 94 p 3

[Unattributed report on Macedonian Government session: "Successful Accomplishment Also of the Second Election Round"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM] held a session yesterday chaired by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski. It reviewed and defined several proposals relating to the economic and political life in the country. Among others, the government also reviewed the information on the preparations for the second round of elections and it concluded that all the necessary activities for a successful accomplishment of the second round had been undertaken.

The government assessed that the technical irregularities in the first round were not many and that they did not influence the citizens that participated, who numbered as much as 77 percent of the registered voters in the first election round.

The government accepted the plan proposed by the coordinating group in which the duties and the activities of each subject responsible for the implementation of the second election round were specified.

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The government concluded that it is necessary to provide for a greater cooperation between the state administration and the citizens so as to secure the right to vote for every citizen of Macedonia.

For that purpose the government emphasized that all the citizens have the possibility to inquire about any unclear questions in the departments of the general administration of the Ministry of Administration in all the communes.

For the purpose of promoting the law and cooperation in the administration the government adopted some proposals on negotiations and interstate agreements between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria for legal assistance in the area of civil and criminal acts, as well as in the area of making mutual court decisions. The government also adopted proposals on equal negotiations and interstate agreements between Macedonia and the Russian Federation, as well as an agreement on extradition, so as to enable sanctions to be undertaken in the country where the criminal has citizenship.

The government also reviewed and adopted the draft decision on the sale of 5,000 tonnes of corn from the reserves at 6 denars per kg. This was stated in the information of the Macedonian Ministry of Information.

State Election Commission Meets Without Quorum

AU2510192494 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 25 Oct 94 p 4

[Report by K. C. and L. K.: "Will Irregularities Be Corrected in Second Election Round?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Election Commission held a joint session yesterday at which the majority of its members were supposed to be present together with representatives of political parties and independent candidates. The agenda covered the situation after the first election round as well as preparations for the second round, scheduled for 30 October. At the meeting, despite the lack of a necessary quorum, an agenda was set and discussions were conducted. There were only 28 members present, but the commission proceeded with its work, because this was the third attempt to arrange the meeting.

Some of the members considered the commission illegal due to the lack of quorum, but some of the permanent staff opposed. For example, Petar Najdanov, its president, said that the fact that some representatives of the candidates have not come could not be considered an obstacle to the commission's work (that was his personal opinion). His deputy Vasil Petkovski agreed, saying that it was not necessary to have a quorum for points that are not to be adopted. In his opinion, if they insisted on a quorum it would be an intentional blockade of the commission. That is why he asked the present members to agree to hold the meeting.

Najdanov presented the known results. Of 1,766 candidates for parliament, from 37 political parties and 284 independent candidates, 389 have remained for the second round, that is 22.04 percent of the total number. In 120 electoral wards, at 2,700 polling stations, 1,058,130 people voted, that is 77.76 percent of the total number of 1,360,729 registered voters, and according to the commission this figure is more than satisfactory. Of these voters, 125,473 did so voted by presenting the necessary documents.

Voting will be repeated at 17 polling stations, which is four times greater than the number presented two days ago. Finally, Najdanov passed on the message of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the CSCE that the observers had concluded that the first election round passed in a peaceful, correct, and democratic atmosphere. Regardless of some irregularities, such as incomplete lists, undelivered invitations, voting in pairs, and so on, the CSCE stance remains unchanged.

The representative of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] did not agree with this assessment. He delivered a few remarks on the electoral procedure and on illegal activities at some polling stations, after which he left the session, citing "lack of a quorum for making decisions."

The others also discussed a number of irregularities on election day, as well as during the "silent period," but they were advised that they should have submitted their remarks in time or informed the police. The second point of the agenda was then discussed, that being the second election round. Among other things, it was stated that the voting boards will have further training on how voting should be implemented without creating chaos, as well as the behavior of observers and their rights during the elections. Due to the very short period of time before the second round, it was decided not to hold another meeting.

Alliance for Macedonia Election Platform

AU2510145094 Skopje MIC in English Sep 94

["Election Platform" of the Alliance for Macedonia—the Social Democratic Alliance, Liberal Party, and Socialist Party; dated "September 1994"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] We, the members and sympathizers of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia, the Liberal Party and the Socialist Party of Macedonia created the Alliance for Macedonia in order to unite the forces of peace, independence, development and democracy in the country.

We enter these elections together, in order to secure:

—an Assembly, to which we will return the dignity of the highest legislative authority;

—a stable government that will continue the economic reforms and will create conditions for the functioning of the state in which-law rules;

—a president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] that is trusted by the citizens and who firmly intercedes for peace,

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independence, interethnic understanding and international affirmation of Macedonia.

What We Inherited and What We Achieved

We secured a democratic ambient for the transition to the multiparty system and market economy.

We inherited an almost dead-end economic situation. We inherited the endangered survival of the country. We inherited an unfavorable international position and an unfavorable surrounding of neighbors.

But, we achieved plenty. We gained our independence in a peaceful and legitimate fashion. We achieved the dream from 1903 and continued the tradition of ASNOM [Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia]. The world recognized this achievement.

We created the Constitution of this country, which was evaluated by Europe as being a modern, citizen's Constitution. With the Constitution we founded the state in which law rules and is a civil society, which remains the foundation of our current democratic reality.

We accepted the responsibility to form a Government, when others weren't neither capable nor had the courage to do this. What did we achieve as parties that were in power:

—We stabilized the economy and initiated the fundamental market reforms,

—We disrupted the policy that treated social problems with demagogy,

—We started to solve the acute economic-social problems with a sane market economy, without any adventures to return back to the planed economy,

—We stabilized the interethnic relations. We did not allow them to be the cause of internal conflict and the changing of the constitutional system of the Republic of Macedonia,

—We solved the issue of the rights of the nationalities on the basis of international standards,

—We conducted a census of the population that finally put an end to the speculations concerning the ethnic structure of Macedonia and the national identity of the Macedonian people,

—We secured the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and became a member of the UN. We established diplomatic relations with the most important countries in the world. We are a member and are cooperating with the world financial institutions,

—We confirmed that the Republic of Macedonia is a factor of peace and stability on the Balkan [as published]. We initiated the process for cooperation and equal relations with all our neighbors,

—The stability and the integrity of the Republic of Macedonia became the interest of the international community. The UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] forces in Macedonia showed the advantages of preventive diplomacy,

—We initiated a dialog with neighboring Greece for solving the problems in our mutual relations, we withstood pressure and embargo, isolation and threats, but we remained consistent: no one can change the name of our country or our people,

—We created the ARM [FYROM Army], which is the guarantee for the security of our borders. We requested admission to the "Partnership for Peace" and later on to NATO,

—We started to achieve our long term aim for Macedonia to became a member in the European integration, moving ahead step by step so that it can be real and achievable.

Because of all of this we achieved the stability of the country and the reputation in the world.

Our contribution to these elections is that we have joined forces in the Alliance for Macedonia.

Let us unite in achieving the following goals:

—To preserve the peace and the stability of the Republic of Macedonia. For us this means the continuation of the policy of equality in the interethnic relations and the strengthening of the state in which law rules. For us this means the continuation of the foreign policy towards European integrations, for the Europization of the Balkan and good-neighbor relations.

—To secure swift economic reforms and the smallest social price for exiting this period transition. We will hasten the process of privatization, especially with the development of the private sector, supported with taxation measures, credits and other measures. We will also encompass with the privatization the sectors of the agriculture, banking and insurance. The fundamental pillars of the economic policy and reforms will be the securing of a new investment cycle and the advancement of the current program of stabilization with measures that will support production and in global the availability of goods. We will secure the enhancement of the taxation system, the restructuring of the public sector, implementing European standards in production and the strengthening of legislation in the field of ecology. Of special interest for us is the development of private farms.

—Social policy and protection will be directed towards securing a decent life for every citizen and the development of a social state. Within that frame we will secure the opening of new jobs and material security for every household.

—The availability of health-care and education will be equal for all and, which is fundamental, that they will not depend on their material situation.

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—To strengthen the parliamentary democracy and the state in which law rules. This means the full development of human rights and freedoms. This means the implementation of international standards in relation to the rights of the nationalities. This also means the respect of the division of the legislative, executive and court authority. This means a state in which law rules and an independent judicial system. This means a democratic general public and full freedom of expression.

—To secure the strengthening of the international position of our country. To start the gradual process of the integration into the European union and in the collective systems of European security. We firmly stand in reference to our concept for equal relations and full cooperation With our neighbors. We will carry the process of Europization to the Balkan. In the United Nations we will stand on the side of the countries that are for peace, on the development of the worlds economy based on the global dependance and for the overcoming of the reasons for current and new crises spots.

The election program of the Alliance for Macedonia unites us in an alliance of the forces that are for peace and healthy reasoning. To preserve the achieved independence and friends throughout the world. To continue the reforms and to stabilize the democracy. With us all of this becomes *certain* (meaning secure). With us to Europe and in Europe *certainly*].

[The following political slogans each appear at the bottom of one page: "Certain until now, certainly from now on!"; "Everyone together, everyone for one!"; "Peace has no price!"; "On a certain road!"]

VMRO-DPMNE Election Platform

AU2510171994 Skopje MIC in English Sep 94

["Election Program" of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity for the 1994 elections; dated "September, 1994"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

We Promised—We Fulfilled

With its advent on the Macedonian political scene (17 June 1990), the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity [VMRO-DPMNE] resurrected the Ilinden ideal of the Macedonian people for national freedom and the creation of an INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN MACEDONIAN STATE.

In a time when in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], the remaining 17 political parties worked to keep Macedonia a part of Yugoslavia, VMRO-DPMNE proclaimed the need for a disintegration of that artificial creation and the formation of an INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN MACEDONIA.

VMRO-DPMNE proposed the DECLARATION FOR FULL SOVEREIGNTY OF MACEDONIA.

VMRO-DPMNE was the first one to ask for international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia.

VMRO-DPMNE first asked for an independent Macedonian foreign policy and diplomacy.

VMRO-DPMNE first asked for Macedonia to be accepted in the United Nations (but not under the name FYROM).

VMRO-DPMNE was the first one to proclaim the Yugoslav National Army an occupational army in our country and asked for its departure from Macedonia.

VMRO-DPMNE first asked for the formation of a Macedonian Army, as the only guarantor of the nonviolability of our borders.

VMRO-DPMNE was the first one to ask that the Yugoslav dinar be thrown out of the financial space of our state, and that a Macedonian currency be introduced.

VMRO-DPMNE was the first one to ask that a Macedonian citizenship and Macedonian passport be established.

VMRO-DPMNE first asked for the formation of a Macedonian Olympic Committee and the creation of Macedonian sports representations.

These are only the main points that VMRO-DPMNE promised its voters four years ago. Those promises are today our Macedonian reality.

Citizens of Macedonia! VMRO-DPMNE presents its ELECTION PROGRAMME—SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND THE MACEDONIAN NATION AS BEARER OF ITS STATEHOOD—FOUNDATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF VMRO-DPMNE For VMRO-DPMNE, the sovereignty and independence of our state is the central and starting basis which has no compromise or alternative, and the basic foundation on which the complete party programme for the elections '94 on an internal and outside political plan, is built.

For VMRO-DPMNE, the independence and sovereignty of the Macedonian state is the highest goal that the Macedonian nation has achieved, thanks to exactly this generation. In view of this, it will be our greatest challenge to create a respected central state on the Balkans out of Macedonia.

Foreign Policy

VMRO-DPMNE knows how and can provide Macedonia its true place on the international political scene, as a worthy subject, respected, foremost by the Balkan states, and then by the European and big world powers. We see the Republic of Macedonia as a member of the United Nations and all the other international associations, under the constitutional name and with its own state symbols.

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VMRO-DPMNE will work for a foreign policy based on modern European foundations and on the basis of a new law for foreign affairs.

VMRO-DPMNE sees Macedonia's strategic position within the framework of the European Union, as well as participation in all regional organizations which have economic prosperity, peace and security of the region as their goals.

VMRO-DPMNE, in the European framework, will work for the creation of alliance-type relations with the great powers which support the independent and sovereign Macedonian state.

The Politics of the Balkans

According to VMRO-DPMNE, the central place in the foreign policy of the Republic of Macedonia should be held by the friendly relationship and close cooperation with the four neighbors: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania. The contacts with these states and the settling of the open problems are a priority for VMRO-DPMNE in the Macedonian foreign policy, on which the stability and economic development of our state will depend. We see the closing of the Republic of Macedonia with our neighbors only on an equal basis and mutual respect.

One of the first activities that the VMRO-DPMNE government will undertake, after winning at the elections, will be the initiation of a conference for Balkan security and cooperation, as the first regional bridge for connection of the Balkan states.

For the Macedonians who Live Outside the Republic of Macedonia

VMRO-DPMNE regards the Macedonians living outside the borders of the Republic of Macedonia as an integral part of the Macedonian nation. They present a double interest for the Macedonia state:

—in the protection of their human and civil rights, and

—as a strong lobby for building friendship between the Republic of Macedonia and the state they live in, regardless of whether they are in some of the neighboring countries or the diaspora.

VMRO-DPMNE feels that the human rights of the Macedonians in the neighboring states must be solved by means of interstate agreements and on the principle of reciprocity.

The Defense of the Republic of Macedonia

For VMRO-DPMNE, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia is the only guarantor of the inviolability of the state borders, a factor for stability in the state and the security of all its citizens.

The Macedonian Army should present a national pride of every Macedonian citizen and factor for deterring every hostile-minded neighbor.

Therefore, VMRO-DPMNE believes that the Macedonian state is obliged to create a modern military-technically equipped army, and at the same time morally and patriotically upraised and disciplined.

VMRO-DPMNE views the development of the military-industrial capacities as a chance of proving the Macedonia scientific and technical capabilities and as a space for new employment and the activation of a line of, at this moment, ruined factories.

VMRO-DPMNE sees the security of our state, strategically, in Macedonia's membership in the "Partnership for peace" project and the NATO pact.

Civil Values

In the spirit of the European democracy, VMRO-DPMNE will stand for a division of the authority into executive, legislative and judicial.

VMRO-DPMNE is firmly oriented for a parliamentary democracy in Macedonia of a Western European, in which all the civil values will be guaranteed:

—freedom of speech and press;

—freedom of congregation;

—freedom of religion;

—guaranteed right of private property;

—guaranteed minority rights;

—independent judicature;

—equality of the sexes;

—inviolability of the home, mail and telephone.

Freedom of Speech and Press

VMRO-DPMNE concludes that even four years after the first multiparty elections, the Republic of Macedonia has still not made even the basic steps towards parliamentary democracy. The fear of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia from the local and state power-heads, to speak openly and to freely express their thoughts, is present everywhere in every-day life.

Guaranteed Minority Rights

VMRO-DPMNE believes that the minorities should perceive the Republic of Macedonia as their own fatherland in which they will have all the rights, and obligations. They should decide for loyalty towards the Macedonian state, to feel as Macedonian patriots and Macedonians, in a civil sense.

On its behalf, the Republic of Macedonia should guarantee the minorities all the basic human rights which are foreseen according to the documents of the United Nations and the other international organizations and acts which regulate this field.

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VMRO-DPMNE, with its policy, will severely oppose the ever more expressed Albanian extremism, whose final aim is to turn the Republic of Macedonia into a federal state of Macedonians and Albanians, with two official languages and a double government, as the first phase towards the creation of a Great Albania.

Equality of the Sexes

Thanks to the current government, the rate of violation of one of the basic civil values—the equality of the sexes, in our state, is undoubtedly one of the highest in all of Europe. The current government, in order to retain its shaky coalition, has been seeing through the fingers of the politics that the party PDP conducts towards the Albanian women, for four years now, whereby the Albanian woman is still treated as a second rate citizens. In these relations, her basic function is to excessively give birth to children, whereby a practice of forcefully interrupting the educational process, getting married under force, and torture of the man over the woman is established, which ranks Macedonia right after Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the violence over the woman is a result of the war.

Economic Policy

VMRO-DPMNE has submitted over 80 legal projects and proposals in the sphere of economic policy in the past mandate period, with which, if they were accepted, not only would they have prevented the negative occurrences in our economy, but the Macedonian economy would have been in a zone of development, the life standard would have been at a much higher level, it would have come to a reduction in the number of social endangered, to a reduction in the number of unemployed and the economic courses towards the neighbors and Europe would have been stimulated.

Economic Consequences

How much our programme orientation and projects which we proposed were justified can be seen by the consequences which are a result of the economic policy led by the current government and the inacceptance of the proposals by VMRO-DPMNE. They are as follows:

—one billion dollar debt to the foreign creditors;

—one billion dollar debt to the holders of foreign currency bank accounts;

—nearly 200,000 unemployed, the highest unemployment percentage in Europe;

—50,000 families on welfare;

—200,000 pensioners who have not received their pension cheques for two months;

—destroyed farmers who work only for their bare existence;

—every year, drop in production from ten to fifteen percent;

—hundreds of firms and factories which only wait for the day of their bankruptcy;

—drop in sales, exports and imports;

—liquidation of over 1,600 middle and large companies;

—grey economy which is two times greater than the legal;

—corruption with every economic transaction;

—lost confidence in the state by its citizens, the foreign states, international institutions, and so forth.

This situation in the Macedonian economy gives us the right to decide on the following programme orientations:

Market Economy

VMRO-DPMNE will create conditions for the development of market economy, that is, capitalism. The challenge for VMRO-DPMNE is how to come to capitalism of a modern European type, in Macedonia, and not to capitalism from the end of the 19th century, with relentless relations and the constant threat of social conflicts which leads us to the current authorities.

When the Communists first came to power 50 years ago, they firstly made nationalization, therefore, democracy with us should start with denationalization.

Determination of the Ownership Structure of the Macedonian Economy

Ownership without an owner is not kept ownership, and therefore, it is constantly a subject of theft.

So far, the state has not protected the public ownership with one legal act and it has particularly damaged it with the inapplicable Law for privatization.

The public ownership should be transformed into other types of ownership foremost private and state ownership.

We will carry out a revision of the privatization of the public capital done so far, and if there are any cases of abuse, we will invalidate them and return the capital to the state.

In order to provide a successful and rightful privatization of the public ownership, VMRO-DPMNE will pass a law for privatization of the public ownership, using, in the process, the western experience and the experience of the states which are in transition. In the process of conducting the privatization, the interest of the Macedonian state must also be upheld.

Our programme is based on the intention to privatize over 50 percent of the companies, mainly small and middle companies, in the next four years.

The companies that are of public interest, that is, of national economic interest, will not be privatized in the first period.

Revitalization of the State-Owned Companies

For a large number of public companies, middle and large, as well as a pan of the bankrupt companies, there are ways of continuing with their work.

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By turning those companies into public, or companies with mixed ownership, they will create conditions for their revitalization, that is, we will equip them for normal work, whereby the employees who were dismissed from work will be returned.

The state-owned companies will work under market conditions, like the western state-owned companies.

Support of the Private Business and Entrepreneurship

IMRO-DPMNU will build an economic system in which the private companies and initiatives will have a developmental perspective, and create a legal basis and institutions in power which will protect and develop that economy.

IMRO-DPMNU will work for private companies with employees, and not like now, for private companies without employees, whereby the tax system will be based on the tax payers financial situation. The tax payers will not pay tax on the income which is necessary for their basic living and social existence.

IMRO-DPMNU will affirm the economic function of the tax system. Everyone who will expand and open up new jobs will be exempt from paying tax for a certain period.

The foreign investments will be tax exempt for a period of at least five years.

The Construction of a New Monetary and Credit System

The existing monetary and credit system and the institutions that it consists of, are an immanent for the state ownership, more precisely for the planed nonmarket economy.

IMRO-DPMNU will construct a monetary system that complies with the market economy, that will secure the stable work and development of the firms and the other subjects.

The Development of a New Taxation System

The existing taxation system is in it's essence fiscal and enforces all forms of nonproduction expenditures. This system is unjust, and has no social or economic components. This system does not care for and does not develop the tax payers so that tomorrow they may pay more taxes, but rather it destroys them.

The government of IMRO-DPMNU will construct a taxation system that is immanent to the market economy. Dominant within it will be the direct taxation.

The new taxation system, besides the fiscal, will force the economic and social function.

IMRO-DPMNU intercedes for the thesis of the European right, which proved to be successful, and that is: "larger taxation—empty budget, smaller taxation full budget" ....

IMRO-DPMNU's intention is to lower taxation, in the first year alone by 20 percent.

Customs Policy

The existing authorities are implementing a Yugoslav customs policy which protects products that are not produced in Macedonia. Today we have an unbalanced customs policy in Macedonia that is not in the interest of the Macedonian economy.

IMRO-DPMNU will construct a new customs system and will implement five new customs tariff, with which it will lead a protective policy only for the products that are of strategic importance for Macedonia and it's economy....

Dispersion of the Economy in Macedonia

IMRO-DPMNU decisively opposes the current concentration of the Macedonian economy in Skopje, which is unfavorable for the other places in Macedonia. That is why we also have a concentration of the superstructure and other institutions of the economic system.

IMRO-DPMNU will carry out a dispersion and a new displacement of the economy, taking into account the equal economic development of every inhabited place in Macedonia....

The Macedonian Village

IMRO-DPMNU will make the Macedonian village a privilege to live in, in compliance with the West-European village. The first towards this will be: Every village with an asphalt road, with electricity and water supply system.

IMRO-DPMNU will lower the difference in the treatment between the city and the village. Every village has to be transformed into an urbanized place, a place that will produce not only food, but where it will also be refined into a final product.

IMRO-DPMNU will initiate the renewing of the abandoned villages, especially in the western part of our country, by giving economic privileges to those that want to return and rebuild their abandoned homes.

The Development of Agriculture

... will develop our agriculture and our village through the following measures:

1. by collecting every drop of water through the construction of dams and other hydromelioration objects and systems,

2. by constructing a detailed irrigation network,

3. by liberating the farmers from taxation on income from agriculture,

4. the buying of the agricultural products according to market prices,

5. the development of an infrastructure for connecting the agricultural lands,

6. by equalizing the agricultural and workers pensions,

7. with compensation of damage caused by elementary disasters,

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8. financing through the budget of specialized institutions for the development and financing of agriculture,

9. with the equalization of the interest rates for credits that will be identical to those that are being implemented in the developed countries,

10. bonuses for:

—bonus for artificial fertilizers,

—bonus for gasoline,

—bonus for seed material.

11. An active role of the Macedonian Government in opening new markets for strategic products in the agriculture which, besides the current, should include the grapes, rise, cotton and poppy plantations.

Development Policy

...Macedonia is the center of the Balkan and therefore it must be the cross- road for the goods, people, ideas and capital....

...Especially important is the transportation infrastructure west-east. It is the century long natural course of transportation of people, goods, ideas and capital. This natural road will connect Macedonia with the west and the near and middle east and is of great, economic and political importance for the independence and sovereignty of Macedonia. The road that will make Macedonia a true center of the Balkans.

Investments will be made for the restructuring of our economy, for dams, for preserving our natural heritages the Ohrid, Prespa and Dojran lakes....

Macedonia—Financial Center of the Balkans

With the VMRO-DPMNE government, Macedonia as the center of the Balkans will represent a space for the huge circulation of goods, services, people, ideas and capital. All of these factors will need financial and other services that Macedonia will have to offer.

VMRO-DPMNE will form special financial and other institutions for carrying out banking, financial and other services that are dictated by the developed businesses. We are of the opinion that this business will fasten the circulation of goods and capital in Macedonia.

Labor

...VMRO-DPMNE is well aware that in a market economy the letting off of workers is an inevitable phenomenon, but VMRO-DPMNE will intercede that the reason for letting off is exclusively due to economic reasons and nothing else.

VMRO-DPMNE will not allow letting off from jobs, without a parallel social program. Without secured funds in a social program, there will be no letting off from jobs....

...In the field of Labor, VMRO-DPMNE will pay special attention to the solution of the problem of the employment of the young.

Special attention will be given to determining the minimal wages that, unlike today, must secure a decent life

Population Policy

For VMRO-DPMNE there can be no social policy without a well-thought-out state population policy.

Therefore VMRO-DPMNE will lead a population policy that will be in the function of the development of Macedonia viewed from the angle of the birth rate, and from the angle of the territorial dispersion of the population.

VMRO-DPMNE's population policy, respecting the fundamental human right for freedom, will be constructed on the basis of the limited space, of the economic and other resources of our country. Macedonia can not survive and develop itself without such a policy. This policy is our obligation, but also the obligation of all the parties and citizens in Macedonia.

The population policy is an especially important issue, because certain minorities, with their high birth rate, would like to disrupt the demographic, economic and political stability of the country.

Parallel to the population policy we will lead a strict emigration policy.

The Young, Their Employment and Their Involvement in the System of the Macedonian State

VMRO-DPMNE will do everything so that the young may love and build their state. VMRO-DPMNE also has a solution for this problem:

—by forming a special ministry for the young and

—by employing the young that are unemployed.

VMRO-DPMNE is a party that is being lead by young people. They are the main pillar of the party in all it's structures from the local committees to the peak of the party. This is our strongest argument that among us the young gained an opportunity that up until today they did not have.

Solution of the Problem of Unemployment

The 200,000 unemployed Macedonians is a number that shows that unemployment is one of the largest problems in the economic processes of our state. Therefore, VMRO-DPMNE's entire economic policy is subordinated by two basic points:

—increasing production and

—drastic drop in unemployment.

Returning of the Plundered Capital

We are witnesses that during the rule of the current authorities, an immense plundering of the state owned capital occurred, which could be called the plunder of the

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century, which has caused a great deal of injustice towards every citizen of Macedonia.

The plundering was carried out in the name of the authorities or from the position of authority. This plundering is legalized, sanctioned by the current law for privatization, and it was paid by the enormous army of unemployed and another army of the employed who were let off from the plundered firms.

The plundering of the state owned capital was carried out:

1. through the privatization of the state owned capital
2. through the nonpayment of taxation and contributions
3. through the bankruptcy of the firms
4. through the liquidation of the firms
5. through the integration of the firms
6. through the gray illegal economy
7. through privileges issued from the organs of the authorities etc.

VMRO-DPMNE will take all measures with which it will carry out a revision of the privatized estate of every firm and citizen and if it is determined that it was acquired via an illegal way, it will be returned to the state.

The Creation of a Customs Union

Macedonia needs a customs union with the countries in the Balkans.

VMRO-DPMNE will intercede for the creation of a customs union with the countries from the Balkan who have an interest in such a union. VMRO-DPMNE promises it's electors that it will make Macedonia the economic center of the Balkan, without which it will not be possible to even imminent even one Balkan economic process.

We have to make a Macedonia an economic power, if we want it to become a politically powerful state.

For VMRO-DPMNE, the independence of Macedonia, means first of all economic strength and a higher standard for the Macedonian.

Participation in the Financing of Educational Projects in the Field of Natural Sciences

Education in the field of natural sciences at all levels, requires specially equipped laboratories, the forming of which requires advanced scientific knowledge. The development of various forms of education in this field will be supported by the Ministry of education and the Ministry of Science.

Financing Publishing Activities

Priority will be given to the publishing of lexicographic literature and dictionaries with scientific terminology. Separate financing will be enabled for the publishing of work in esteemed foreign editions.

The financing of scientific magazines will be supported if they fulfill the strict conditions for quality. The existing magazines, if they do not fulfill the determined norms, will have a one year deadline to change their concepts, so that their financing can be continued....

The Reevaluation of the Status of the Scientific Degrees Acquired on the Basis of Highly Ideologized Work

The Ministry will no longer support researchers that acquired high research and research-leading positions solely due to their ideologic stances, without any substantial scientific contribution. Their positions can normally be re-evaluated during the course of the regular elections and reelections.

Education

VMRO-DPMNE is for education that will be based on scientific basis, liberated of all ideological coloring and to affirm the fundamental values of the Macedonian people, European culture and civilization....

VMRO-DPMNE will respect the autonomy of the Macedonian universities. VMRO-DPMNE will intercede for the opening of private schools and private universities, in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, for the dissolution of the stereotypes and monopolies in the field of education. We will be open for the opening of foreign universities and high schools in Macedonia.

The minorities will be able to develop their education within the frame of the European conventions and in compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia but with their own financing.

Culture and Arts

At a time when Europe is uniting and when the global political and economic integrations are ruling in the world, the national culture of a state becomes even more the fundamental mark according to which states compete and according to which we make a difference between nations and states in the new architecture of the world.

VMRO-DPMNE's government will stimulate the development of the Macedonian culture, the upholding of the traditions, and also the support of the new free creativity and the revealing and the development of the genes of the culture and the spiritual surrounding can be achieved solely through the firm support from the budget of the Republic of Macedonia, which must regulate the those conditions where the market economy can not exist.

VMRO-DPMNE's government will especially support:

—the national movie production,

—the publishing activity for domestic and foreign authors,

—Macedonian classical, folk, pop, and rock music and

—all stage arts.

Culture and sport will carry the Macedonian spirit and will, with which we will represent ourselves before the world.

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Drnovsek Initiates Action on EU Membership

AU2510120994 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime minister's cabinet has reported that Prime Minister Drnovsek has initiated a diplomatic action regarding the continuation of negotiations between Slovenia and Italy and the passing of a mandate to start negotiations on Slovenia's associate membership of the European Union.

In a letter to the EU chairman, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Drnovsek presented the Slovene proposals to overcome a crisis in the relations between Slovenia and Italy and Slovenia and the 12.

Last night, the prime minister reportedly discussed this with European Commission Vice President Leon Brittan and briefed the EU charge d'affaires in Ljubljana with the government views.

Drnovsek will meet with EU ambassadors resident in Ljubljana and U.S. Ambassador Wendt today. The Foreign Ministry representative will present a Slovene draft of a joint statement by both prime ministers in Rome.

Drnovsek To Serve as Acting Foreign Minister

AU2510163894 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Early this afternoon, Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek met with the EU ambassadors accredited to Slovenia. For the time being, no official statement about the content of the talks is available; however, we have learned that Prime Minister Drnovsek, in addition to having a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Slovenia Alan Wendt today, has also written to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and EU Chairman Helmut Kohl.

Prime Minister also notified parliament that the mandate of Foreign Minister Peterle will finally expire on 31 October and that the prime minister himself will carry out the duties of foreign minister until the appointment of a new minister.

It appears the leaders of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] are negotiating over the new minister. According to our sources, Drnovsek here indicated to Peterle that the candidacy of Andrej Umek is unacceptable for him. In the next few days they hope to find another solution—either another SKD nomination or an agreement between the two parties on another candidate.

Peterle Rejects Criticism of Aquileia Accord

AU2510151594 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 24 Oct 94 p 1

[Report by "D.P.": "Peterle: 'I Reject Criticism'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 23 Oct—[Outgoing Foreign Minister] Lojze Peterle assessed reactions to the recent signing of an agreement in Aquileia as follows: "It seems that what has been achieved in Aquileia, which is not little, is turning into a matter of local elections, that is, of Slovene internal affairs. I reject criticism of this declaration. I believe that we made significant progress in Aquileia, that we changed the terminology, brought the matters regarding the past to a reciprocal level, and found a common language that facilitated a breakthrough. This declaration is a sufficient expression of political will to set the train that has been at a standstill into motion in the interests of both countries and of European integration. I see that, in Slovenia, we are still encountering a problem of too many foreign ministers. Some people would like to be bosses regarding this issue, and I believe that this is aggravating the situation and that it is the state that suffers ultimately. I negotiated for eight hours in the company of a very experienced diplomat, Dr. Kosin, who also does not understand the government's reaction and the public debate about the emerged situation, as something could perhaps be accomplished in a diplomatic way, however, not by taking a public stance on the document that was passed. I cannot help but also identify the internal political needs here."

Ministry Confirms Peterle Received Bomb Threat

AU2510172394 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovene Foreign Ministry today confirmed reports that Lojze Peterle [outgoing foreign minister] recently received a threatening letter. In the letter, persons unknown threatened that he would be the next victim of a letter bomb.

The Foreign Ministry gave no details, as it is within the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry and its services to do so.

The Slovene Christian Democrats have condemned the threats to Lojze Peterle from neo-Nazi circles. The party president has become their target because of the resolute and upright defense of the rights of the Slovene community in Austria. The Christian Democrats here thanked everybody for their telegrams of solidarity and good wishes for Peterle to receive Vienna Mayor Helmut Zilk tomorrow.

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Federal

De Lapresle Views UNPROFOR, NATO

BR2510154694 Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Oct 94 p 8

[Report on interview with General Bertrand de Lapresle, commander of UNPROFOR forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by Remy Ourdan in Zagreb; date not given: "'There Is a Cultural Difference Between the United Nations and NATO'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—According to General Bertrand de Lapresle, there are three threats endangering the mission of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. First of all, the Bosnian Serb forces are increasing their pressure on the Muslim enclaves, as well as on the "Blue Helmets." Next, the Bosnian Serb staff is no longer concealing its desire to see UNPROFOR leave the country so that it can be ensured a rapid military victory. The Bosnian Army—composed mainly of Muslims—represents another threat: With every passing day it grows more confident in its abilities to win back ground and, perhaps, to obtain more active support from NATO.

Finally, the final concern of the French officer comes from his NATO "allies," the Americans in particular. Back from New York, where a consultation meeting was held last week—fresh contacts are to be made this week—General de Lapresle was, according to those who met him at the time, "furious" at the refusal of NATO officers to take account of the problems facing UNPROFOR, which is highly exposed to possible reprisals on the ground.

"There is a cultural difference between these two organizations," he acknowledged quite diplomatically in an interview with LE MONDE in Zagreb. "NATO absolutely wants to identify an enemy, demonstrate its military efficiency, and be victorious. UNPROFOR has a peacekeeping mission. I do not have enemies, I have partners! I have no victory to win apart from the victory of the arrival of peace. My soldiers did not come here to wage war," he continued. "I would nevertheless like to pay my respects to them. They admit that the mission can only be continued if the dialogue continues. If the dialogue breaks down, then the UNPROFOR mission will be in danger."

In fact, it is the Blue Helmets themselves who are in danger every time NATO carries out air strikes. When raids were carried out in spring against Serb positions around Gorazde (a Muslim enclave besieged by the Serbs), dozens of Blue Helmets were taken hostage by the Serbs, who also shot down a British NATO plane. After the raid near Sarajevo on 5 August, the Serbs adopted the same attitude, closing off access roads to the Bosnian capital and forcing the United Nations to halt the humanitarian airlift. This was a "forceful" method, whereas the Serb tank destroyed on 5 August by NATO planes was not being used and the Serbs had been warned of the strike 30 minutes previously.

"Send a Signal"

"My objective is not to have one less tank in the Serb Army," General Lapresle said. "When we carry out an air strike, we want to send a signal. It is the demonstration that is important. The Serbs then understand that we are capable of targeting something else besides an unused tank. I am not here to obtain military successes," he concluded.

It is this rhetoric which the UNPROFOR commander used during the meeting in New York, together with a reminder of everyone's responsibilities. "NATO is only providing support to UNPROFOR. We are the decision-makers, we were entrusted with the mission of reestablishing peace in this country. We are the ones who define the parameters of air action." General de Lapresle will soon have the opportunity to raise these issues with French Defense Minister Francois Leotard, who is expected in Sarajevo and Zagreb on 27 and 28 October. Following a meeting in Seville earlier this month, Mr. Leotard had come out in favor of the American proposals advocating an intensification of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs.

"Two-Thousand Hezbollah Fighters"

While the snow began to fall on the mountains of Bosnia Herzegovina and the people are anticipating a severe winter before, they think, a more intensive resumption of the fighting, the humanitarian situation is much different. According to General de Lapresle, "living conditions have improved." "The most significant progress is, of course, to be able to live sheltered from the daily threat of massive shelling." Nevertheless, the five Muslim enclaves—Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa, and Bihac—are terrorized by the idea of a third winter of siege. Some 30 months of war have plunged them into a nightmare that does not seem likely to end. On the other hand, in central Bosnia and the northern part of the country, civilians should not suffer too much from food shortages, unlike previous winters. The humanitarian convoys have been in operation there for more than six months, since the end of the conflict between Muslims and Croats, which are once again officially allies against the Serbs.

"Nobody is interested in unfired shells," the French general complained. "I would like to express my action over these past six months by the number of shells that have not hit these towns. However, we are still concerned about certain negative aspects of the situation," he said. "During this period, the Bosnian Serbs were an obstacle to our freedom of movement, and they continued their policy of ethnic cleansing in the regions of Banja Luka and Bjelinga, to which we do not have access." With regard to the state of the Bosnian Army, a victim of Serb firepower since the beginning of the conflict, the commander of the Blue Helmets worried

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about its progress and resources. "The concern of any military leader is to give his head of government a tool that can be used to carry out actions," he said. "It seems legitimate to me for General Delic (head of staff of the Bosnian Army) to want to obtain arms. On the other hand, I am not prepared to give my blessing to all those in the international community who are willing to supply arms to General Delic." He said he was "very concerned, with regard to that Army, about the development of a force of around 2,000 Hezbollah fighters in the region of Zenica, which represents a threat to the military future of that region."

"If the Muslims have an army that is too strong, that could frighten the Bosnian Croats and weaken the Croat-Muslim federation," went the French officer's analysis. "However, so far, the Bosnian Army is not only lacking heavy weapons; it also has a problem with training officers and tactical training. It is unable to control the combined actions of several units. Nevertheless, I have to admit that a balance of power is a factor contributing to peace," General de Lapresle said. "Just because the means are there does not mean that they have to use them. After all, peace in Bosnia may have to go via the installation of a military balance."

Envoy Sees Accord as 'Key' to Recognition

AU2510160794 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 24 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by R.M.: "Knin Is Key to Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is prepared to hold talks with Croatia on all issues but without any preconditions, which is what the latter has been doing by demanding recognition within its existing borders."

"The FRY takes a different approach, that the conflict in Croatia must be solved between Knin and Zagreb, and the FRY will accept whatever is agreed. Then mutual recognition could follow," Veljko Knezevic, chief of the FRY Bureau in Zagreb, yesterday told the Seal of Time program of Radio Kragujevac.

According to Knezevic, the work of the so-called mini-contact group frequently mentioned in the press—which is supposed to consist of the U.S. and Russian ambassadors, and which is seeking a political solution to the conflict in Croatia—is mysterious, but it is already evident that this group is working hard on the problem.

"I hope that this mini-contact group will be impartial, and that it will not offer take-it-or-leave-it solutions. We expect that this group will come up with a more serious plan than the one for Bosnia," Knezevic said.

There have not been any spectacular results in the process of normalization of relations between Croatia and the FRY since the bureaus were opened in Belgrade and Zagreb. The opening of the FRY bureau in Zagreb helped understanding of the problems and the lives of the Serbs in Croatia, who have been feeling insecure and fearful owing to the arrogance of the authorities, the propaganda against the Serbian community, and the general atmosphere in the republic.

"Unfortunately, we in the bureau cannot help much, since we do not have consular authority. We can give advice, and forward complaints to the Croatian authorities. We have different ways of attracting the attention of the Croatian authorities to the problems of the Serbs," Knezevic said.

Commenting on the rumors about negotiations between Serbia and Croatia in Graz, Knezevic said that he had no information about any indirect or direct negotiations, except what he sees every now and then in the press.

Kontic Announces Policy To Protect Exchange Rate

AU2510213994 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Oct 94

[Report by Dragana Vasiljevic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Vasiljevic] Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic this afternoon addressed the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly on the implementation of economic policy in 1994. The prime minister stressed that he had spoken about this in the Chamber of Republics a month ago, but, considering that some time has passed since then, he said that today's speech would be a summary of the previous speech supplemented with new facts.

Kontic said that the main objectives and tasks of the economic policy were being achieved very successfully. He stressed in particular that the significance of the results achieved is so much greater since they were achieved in the conditions of total isolation for the Yugoslav economy. He reminded those present that hyperinflation had been slashed as far back as January and that, in comparison with previous months, retail prices had fallen continuously until September, when they rose by 0.2 percent. According to estimates, they had risen 1.5 percent in October.

Nevertheless, in the February-October period, Kontic said, the general level of prices has been about 9 percent lower. He also stressed that the normal functions of the new currency had been protected: Its 1:1 parity with the German mark has been maintained. Several attempt to undermine this parity, Kontic said, had been successfully checked.

The federal prime minister then stressed that we must be very sensitive to the latest disturbances and react in time and effectively, primarily with economic measures and by strengthening the control functions of the relevant bodies. Here is what he said about this:

[Begin Kontic recording] In the past week, the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia has responded in the

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field of credit and foreign exchange policy. The primary aim of these measures has been to strengthen the stability of the new dinar's exchange rate. The essence of these measures is as follows:

First, the temporary suspension of all loans from the National Bank of Yugoslavia, except those for liquidity purposes. This can be done only on the basis of definitive sales of foreign currency to the central bank.

Second, the reduction of liquidity in the banking system and the economy.

This will be realized through the issue of compulsory treasury bills to the value of 5 percent of the deposit at the end of the previous month. In addition, all loans falling due will have to be paid in the course of the current week.

Third, the increased intervention by the National Bank of Yugoslavia on the foreign exchange market. The National Bank of Yugoslavia will come to the foreign exchange market with a considerably larger amount of foreign currency than has been the case so far in order to meet the foreign exchange needs for the total legal import of raw materials, production materials, and humanitarian needs.

This will have a dual effect: The first is connected with the reduction of liquidity in the economy; the other is to deal with the unofficial exchange rate.

And fourth, the placing under control of all the credits that are outside the banking system. In this context, the Federal Government has already passed a decree banning loans to commercial banks from budget resources.

The National Bank of Yugoslavia has announced that it will cancel all cooperation with banks that charge above 15 percent a year for loans, including interest. The Federal Government wholeheartedly supports this.

These measures taken in the sphere of monetary policy are already producing certain results. Their consistent implementation could soon facilitate more favorable economic trends. [end recording]

[Vasiljevic] Radoje Kontic stressed that the stability of the domestic currency is of paramount importance for all essential elements of the economic program. The market and the population react to attempts to undermine the dinar exchange rate with particular sensitivity. Therefore, he said, we will defend the dinar and stable exchange rates not only with the monetary measures but also with the entire economic policy.

Kontic said that appropriate measures are also being taken to remove other disturbances in the price and market sectors. He said that all analyses show that a rise in prices, not only in extreme but also in other cases, has no economic or market justification.

[Begin Kontic recording] Withdrawing goods from the market in order to force the price up should be qualified not only as an attempt to undermine the economic program, but also as a criminal offense. In all such cases, we will also react with economic measures, which include intervention with goods from federal and republican commodity reserves.

At the same time, we will create conditions to increase imports of these products. These measures should be followed with a ban on loans, an increase in taxes, and other repressive measures, as, after all, is done in countries with market economies. We must not give in to pressure whose aim is to increase prices for speculative purposes. [end recording]

[Vasiljevic] At the end of his speech, Radoje Kontic stressed that the Federal Government is firmly on course in implementing the stabilization program, and will resolutely and consistently protect it and implement it.

A discussion on the federal prime minister's speech on the implementation of the economic policy for this year has been scheduled for tomorrow's session of the Chamber of Citizens. [passage omitted]

SRS Leader Seselj Stripped of Immunity

LD2510134794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1315 GMT 25 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 25 Oct (TANJUG)—Vojislav Seselj, head of the Radicals' club of deputies and leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], was today stripped of parliamentary immunity by the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Citizens.

The reason for the suspension of immunity were two incidents in the Federal Assembly—both of which were instigated by Seselj. The first occurred on 18 May, when Radical deputies and Assembly security staff were engaged in a brawl.

Because of this, and in order to enable further court proceedings against a group of SRS deputies, parliamentary immunity was also withdrawn from Filip Stojanovic, Milorad Jevric, and Slobodan Petricevic.

The second reason for stripping Seselj of his immunity was an incident between Seselj and Radoman Bozovic, chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, which resulted in the adjournment of the Chamber's session a month ago.

Serbia

'Secret Negotiations' Between Srpska, Croatia

AU2510121994 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 21 Oct 94 p 4

[Report by Djuro Martin: "Secret Division of Territories"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Secret negotiations about the fate of the territories of the republic of Serbian Krajina have really been held! However, they were not held in

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Graz, as some newspapers that carried that sensational piece of news guessed, but in Davor on the Sava River and in Srbac. Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman were not the negotiators. Negotiations about territories were held on two occasions between officers of the Srpska republic [SR] and the Republic of Croatia.

The two states' officials met for the first time at the end of September in Davor on the Sava River, near Nova Gradiska, on Croatian territory. The second meeting took place in Srbac, on Serbian territory, on 14 October.

At the Davor meeting, the Srpska republic was represented by Aleksa Buha, minister of foreign affairs, with aides, and the Croatian delegation was headed by Ivic Pasalic, an important person in Tudjman's establishment. At this first meeting, the two sides talked about swapping territories, moving peoples, opening customs points, trade, distributing Ljubija ore to the Sisak steel works, reopening electricity power lines.... It was then that some undeniably common stands were defined. Thus, as has been learned from reliable sources, Banija, Benkovac, Obrovac, and western Slavonia would belong to Croatia. The question of Knin remains open and the solution to its status was left for later times. As Croatia obviously did not expect such a "calm" consent to swapping Krajina territories, Pasalic promised SR the demanded aid in oil and ammunition. It was agreed that, in the first installment alone, Croatia should deliver 30,000 metric tons of oil to the SR. An agreement was also reached on repairing the bridge near Samac and opening a border crossing near Glamoc.

Shortly after the talks in Davor, Mate Granic, Croatian minister of foreign affairs, secretly appeared in Pale. The aim of his visit was to see how realistic the earlier negotiations were and to examine the options with which Croatia may reckon. This visit, however, has not gone unnoticed in the diplomatic circles in Zagreb.

The second meeting in Srbac was at the highest level and denoted a step forward in the negotiations. The Serbian side was represented by Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, and Aleksa Buha, and the Croatian side was headed by Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic, with his closest associates. Before the official talks, negotiators lunched at the "Ambalazerka" restaurant near Banja Luka, where Radovan Karadzic had his headquarters recently.

Robbing Peter To Pay Paul

As has been learned, the Pale delegation was of the opinion that the SR will have to be a sovereign state and that the agreement with Croatia would define the borders of both the SR and Herceg-Bosna, and would also determine the position of the Muslim state in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concessions, however, would have to be bilateral: Karadzic would not pose questions about the republic of Serbian Krajina nor the question of Serbia's interests, and Croatia would renounce a minor part of its territory. Such a development would suit Karadzic, as it would strengthen his position in the SR. It would help Croatia to definitely solve the question of borders and the West would get rid of the headache caused by the relations between Zagreb and Knin.

According to Karadzic's offer to the Croats, the republic of Serbian Krajina should renounce Lika, Kordun, Banija, and western Slavonia to Croatia. The commune of Knin would either be granted a marked autonomy in Croatia or would belong to the SR. Glina would become a Croatian county. Benkovac, Obrovac, and Drnis would be given back to Croatia. The Cazin Krajina would be added to this, so that Croatia, and above all the Catholic Church, would acquire dominance in central Bosnia. In that case, it would be logical to grant Croatia a corridor through Drvar.

A Way Out Into Europe

Western Slavonia was a special topic at the talks in Srbac. This territory includes a highway, electric power lines, and an oil pipeline. Opening the oil pipeline would have priority at these talks, so that "black gold" could arrive in the Slavonski Brod refinery wherefrom Brod (former Bosanski Brod) in the SR would be supplied. However, it has been learned that on that occasion, the fate of eastern Slavonia, western Srem, and Baranja was not agreed upon.

In return, Croatia offered Karadzic a 35-km section of sea coast south of Dubrovnik and south of Cavtat, as well as a large part of Konavli, to which he agreed. The SR would get the Kupres Height in order to be able to connect the region with Knin.

In order to be able to realize such an agreement, it is necessary for Karadzic to convince the republic of Serbian Krajina to an urgent union with the SR, because without that he lacks the credibility to negotiate on behalf of the republic of Serbian Krajina. This explains why Karadzic feels uniting with the republic of Serbian Krajina is so urgent and why he persistently refuses confederation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After the breakup with Belgrade, being aware that he lost links with the world and that the international scene is closed to him, the Pale leader decided to seek a way out on the other side. An urgent union with the republic of Serbian Krajina would give him a way out into Europe.

Article Views Karadzic's 'Western Variant'

AU2510125694 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Oct 94 p 5

[Report by Djuro Martin: "A Recipe for Division"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The talks about the fate of the territories of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], which the Srpska republic leadership held with the Croatian officials in Davor and Srbac, were only a part of the secret diplomacy that the leaders from Pale have been pursuing for a long time. Dr. Radovan Karadzic does not conceal that he has hold negotiations with the

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Croats and buying oil from the Muslims from Western diplomats. Speaking about the swap of territories, it is interesting that, in the contacts with the Western negotiators, Karadzic offered even more than he had promised to the Croats, emphasizing here that the situation could also be resolved through a war option.

The Western diplomatic circles, as well as their intelligence services, assess that the offers by the Pale leadership for an overall solution of the Yugoslav crisis, which would bring the RSK into question and threaten the interests of Serbia, could result in the unexpected resolution of the relations between the Srpska republic and the RSK and the Srpska republic and Belgrade. However, according to foreign observers, here lies the bone of contention between Pale and Belgrade.

In the secret contacts with the representatives of the Western countries, held on the territory of the Srpska republic or in correspondence with them, Dr. Karadzic persistently advocated a view that the Srpska republic must be an independent state. He is, however, also willing to accept a different division of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina with certain minor corrections. Recently, he has, thus, via his channels, expressed a readiness to accept the 50:50 division, on condition that this is proposed by the Contact Group. In such a case, Karadzic would, as he said, become personally involved in having such a division passed by the Srpska republic assembly. The Western analysts conclude that two goals would be accomplished in this way; Karadzic would retain his position in the Srpska republic and the new Contact Group plan would be adopted.

Three Agreements

According to what Karadzic has proposed, and the West will probably react very swiftly to it, the Srpska republic would be sovereign with its capital in Srpsko Sarajevo. (The present Sarajevo would be divided into two towns and not two parts—the Serbian and the Muslim). In return for the enclaves in eastern Bosnia (Gorazde and Srebrenica), the Serbs would renounce two of their municipalities north of Sarajevo (Vogosca and Ilijas). Karadzic stated the following reasons in favor of such a division: Towns would be able to function normally and the Muslims from eastern Bosnia would be moved to the heart of the Muslim state.

If the agreement on 50:50 division was to be signed, two additional agreements, as Karadzic says, should be signed immediately afterward. First, an agreement on the swapping of territories between the Srpska republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and second, an agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the FRY about Western Slavonija, which, as Karadzic believes, would facilitate the Serbs' return to Croatia.

Western Variant

An international conference should be held three months later, the president of the Srpska republic envisages, which would resolve the conflict between the RSK and the Republic of Croatia. To the West, Karadzic is actually proposing an option like the one offered to the Croats during the negotiations in Srbac. According to him, the RSK should renounce Lika, Kordun, and Banija to the benefit of Croatia. It remains unclear what stance the Republic of Croatia should take toward Eastern Slavonia, Western Srem, and Baranja.

Dr. Karadzic told the West that he had accepted Croatia's proposal, ceding 35 km of the coast south of Dubrovnik, the town of Cavtat, and a part of Konavle, however, it remains questionnable whether these territories would be ceded to the detriment of the RSK. The president of the Srpska republic here emphasized that such a solution would suit the Croats and all in the West who have an interest in keeping the Muslims surrounded and preventing the penetration of Muslim fundamentalism into Europe. The majority of Western countries, Karadzic believes, do not want the creation of a Muslim state in Europe; however, they cannot reach a consensus as to how to resolve this problem. It is believed in the West that Karadzic here neglects an important fact that 38 Islamic countries, which are pressing on the United States to support Alija Izetbegovic, are standing in the way to such plans.

An overall agreement such as the one Karadzic proposes, individual Western diplomats assess, would undoubtedly create a powerful Srpska republic, but would most certainly break up the RSK and threaten Serbia considerably. Again, this does not suit the interests of all Western countries. Individual influential circles in the West even assess that Karadzic would by this practically reintegrate parts of the RSK into Croatia and complete a great task for the West regarding the relations between Knin and Zagreb.

A few months ago, Karadzic admitted to an influential Western diplomat that the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the breakup of the RSK, which would come as a result of his solution, would be painful for Krajina, however, that he must primarily keep the interests of his people in the Srpska republic at heart.

The question, of course, is how realistic and feasible all this is without the consent of all the representatives of the Serbian people. It is also uncertain which direction events will take. Namely, Karadzic's "Western Variant" and seeking support in Croatia could have unforeseeable consequences.

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Authorities Downplay Dysentery 'Epidemic'

AU2510121294 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Oct 94 p 28

[Report by D. Vitomirovic: "Chairman Does Not Want To Raise Dust"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zajecar—If there had not been a meeting at the house of Sreten Trojancevic, chairman of Zajecar County, at which the information about the dysentery epidemic at the Sokobanja spa and the measures taken to control it were discussed, the public would have had no opportunity to learn that, in Sokobanja, a dysentery epidemic has been raging for more than 15 days and that, so far, 104 residents have contracted the disease.

Dr. Vesna Savic, republican health inspector, informed the participants in the meeting that, in 13 cases, shigella bacterium have been isolated, which is a reliable sign of dysentery; that the epidemic is expected to spread in the next month, when new cases will be discovered; that five to six new cases are discovered on a daily basis, whereas jaundice, which always follows dysentery, is expected to appear at the conclusion of the epidemic.

Unpleasant polemics took place between Dr. Savic and Branislav Markovic, chairman of Sokobanja Municipality, who was obviously unhappy that the issue had come to light, because: "There was an epidemic last year, and nobody raised much dust about it," Markovic said. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

School Erects Wall To Separate Minority Pupils

AU2510130694 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 471 in English 24 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dardania primary school in Prishtina, one of the most modern primary schools in the capital of Kosova, is no longer the same. From the outside it looks very normal, but when you step in you notice that the school has been divided in two parts. Over 60 percent of the building is now being used by just over 500 Serb pupils, whereas 40 percent of the building has been left to 2,300 Albanian pupils of this school. To make everything "safe" for the Serb pupils, the installed Serbian management has erected walls within the school in order to separate the premises, thus giving way to intolerance, hatred and xenophobia. Ahmet Pllana, school deputy-principal told BUJKU: "We have made four classrooms out of the school corridors. We can hardly fit more that 10 to 12 desks in them. All labs have been converted into classrooms. We have access to only two bathrooms in the second floor; the ones in the first floor have been closed to the Albanians..." The premises used by the Albanian children are often without electricity and water. The school continues to operate in very difficult conditions and the only help they receive is the help from the parents of the school children, ends the report published in today's Prishtina-based BUJKU newspaper.

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